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ABSTRACT
The thesis is a case study of the delivery of emergency medical
services in the central region of Massachusetts. It examines the organi-
zation of services within that region and the planning and.,policy-making
activities that guide and influence the patterns of organization. The
particular focus of consideration are the spatial and institutional
arrangements associated with emergency outreach of medical care from
hospitals by means of ambulance services. A theme throughout is that im-
proving outreach is only achieved by improving those arrangements of
delivery and, as well, the planning and control (or guidance) processes.
The criteria used to gauge the effectiveness of the guidance and outreach
systems relate to quality of care, geographic accessibility of services,
and economic efficiency.
The study examines the present and proposed state powers for
planning and regulation and concludes that they are limited in scope,
essentially negative in style, and with a weak policy basis. Proposed
alterations have some promise of partially remedying those defects. The
thesis concludes that the actions and decisions of the individual pro-
viders are much more significant in the overall guidance of emergency
services organization and delivery than the state programs.
A detailed examination of the resources and modes of delivery
in Central Massachusetts reveals a fragmented and uncoordinated pattern.
Resources are used inefficiently because the base population is inadequate
to effectively support a system organized on a town-by-town basis. Gaps
in the accessibility and the quality of services are also apparent because
of the lack of regional organization and coordination. The processes that
enhance and ensure the management of medical care by a physician are es-
pecially deficient, since contact between ambulance crews and hospital
emergency facility staffs is unsystematic and often infrequent and since
many of the hospitals in the region offer emergency service without hav-
ing full-t i, hospital physician coverage.
In a.'dition to evaluating the performance of the delivery system
by the use of standards embodied into state laws and regulations, other
means of evaluation associated with the basic criteria mentioned above are
presented, including a methodology for analyzing ambulance utilization
rates.
The thesis proposes, on the basis of the case study, improve-
ments as to the processes of planning and regulation and as to the or-
ganization of the delivery system in the central region. It recommends
the formalization of a regional emergency medical services planning
council and encourages the state to delegate sufficient authority and
responsibility and to provide sufficient support to the regional plan-
ning program to make its efforts meaningful. It is argued that much
more collaboration among providers and users--and planners--of emergency
services is needed. Furthermore, it notes the need for a regulatory
process that takes into account the wide range of capabilities and
characteristics of the various communities and provider organizations
across the state.
Finally, the thesis proposes a model of delivery of emergency
medical outreach services in Central Massachusetts, that is hospital-
centered and organized on an area-wide basis. The thesis concludes by
arguing the necessity of improved information methods, effective means
of public financing, and careful planning of the transition process, if
real improvement in the direction of the model is to occur.
Thesis Supervisor: Robert H. Hollister, Ph.D.
Title: Assistant Professor of Urban Studies
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9Chapter I: Introduction: The Context of the Study
This study is concerned with the effects - intended and
unintended - of planning and decision-making on the organization
and delivery of emergency medical services and ways in which the
system for rendering emergency medical assistance can be improved.
The document reports the findings and recommendations resulting
from a case study of emergency care in the central part of
Massachusetts and of the planning, regulatory, and strategic
decision-making activities which affect the system, taking place
both within Central Massachusetts and at the state level. Of
particular interest is the interplay between the fragmented and
traditionally autonomous decision-making of individual emergency
service provider organizations and institutions and the state's
regulatory efforts. How and where regional planning should fit in
between is an important theme.
This study was catalyzed by a request of the Comprehensive
Health Planning Council of Central Massachusetts (CHPC) - an area-
wide health planning agency authorized under Section 314b of Public
Law 89-749 - which has planning and advisory responsibility over a
1.
wide range of health concerns within its: planning region.
The CHPC had for some time been interested in the subject
of emergency medical services,2 and additional impetus came in the
form of an inquiry from a committee of Worcester hospital adminis-
trators about whether any "official policy" existed or might appro-
priately be formulated to guide ambulance crews in their choice of
hospitals. Beyond that, the Council felt a need to document emergency
care resources available within the region in order to better respond
to requests for advice about the subject which state agencies were
beginning to make and to be in a better position for obtaining emer-
gency medical services-related grants.
The CHPC should not be held responsible for the final study
design, the observations, or the recommendations expressed within.
The staff participated extensively in the assembling of information
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and in the production of the report and provided invaluable support
and criticism along the way, but the study is essentially an independent
evaluation, done as a thesis for the Department of Urban Studies and
Planning, and presented to the agency with the hope that it will prove
useful to them in structuring their policies and programs and in
stimulating dialogue and collaboration among the providers and consumers
of emergency medical services in Central Massachusetts. In addition,
it is hoped that the perspective that this study provides will be
helpful to state officials and planners, particularly in the Department
of Public Health, who are presently elaborating state-wide emergency
care policy and who were also very helpful during the course of this
research.
Conceptual Framework and Definitions
The emergency medical services delivery system is the means
through which a community - whether through public, institutional, or
private entities - provide emergency medical assistance. It consists
of "signaling arrangements (such as emergency phone numbers, special
signal boxes, messengers, etc.); medical care outreach, through trained
personnel, medical equipment and supplies, and communications capabilities.
to medical care centers; transportation, by ambulance, public safety
vehicles, helicopters, or whatever; and hospital emergency care, with
access to the full medical resources of the hospital, especially
competent physicians to manage the care of emergency patients. The
system exists primarily to respond to emergency conditions occurring
unexpectedly outside the realm of influence of medical facilities and
providers.3
An apparent medical emergency may be perceived without resulting
in a demand on the emergency medical services delivery system. If a person
has access to other means of getting immediate and convenient diagnosis,
advice, and/or treatment of a condition which he feels is urgent (as
when he has access to a group practice of private physicians that provide
coverage on a twenty-four hour basis), he may make relatively few
demands on the emergency medical services system. If a person has
access to alternative means of transportation, particularly if he feels
12
inhibited about calling an ambulance ("too expensive," "it will take
too long to get there," "they don't know what they're doing") he may
bypass the outreach and emergency transportation components of the
system.
A medical emergency is defined as follows:
"Condition requires immediate medical attention;
time delay is harmful to the patient; the disorder
is acute and potentially threatening to life or
function." 4
The final determination that an emergency in fact exists can only be
made upon an examination of the patient by a physician. Hence, the
system must involve means of sorting patients (called triage) ac-
cording to the apparent urgency and characteristics of their need,
to ensure that out of the total demand on the system of apparent or
patient-perceived emergencies, the urgent cases are picked up and
given necessary priority.
The emergency medical delivery system has a heavy burden of
responsibility: Unlike some other aspects of medical care, the con-
sumers of emergency care may be completely dependent (either because
of time constraints or physical/emotional limitations imposed by
their conditions) on the operations of the system as to the management
of their care. The delivery must be prepared for a maximum range of
eventualities, since emergencies are only predictable statistically
and require rapid-to-instantaneous response. Moreover, human lives
are at stake.
Hence, there must be means to account for the system's per-
formance to the public - those who use, who mandate, and who pay for
the system, and those who direct and provide the services rendered -
to ensure that the purposes of the emergency medical services delivery
system are met, that the system operates impartially and consistently,
and that mistakes or deficiences are quickly remedied. The means for
doing so may be described as a system of guidance. Through the guidance
system, the processes of goal-and standard-setting (planning and program
development), performance evaluation (regulation), and system improvement
(enforcement and program adjustment) occur.
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The study presented here will describe essential features of both
the emergency medical response system in Central Massachusetts, focusing
particularly on the outreach and transportation aspects, and the means
of guiding it in order to evaluate the net effectiveness of the guidance
processes in ensuring that delivery of services meets public standards
with respect to three criteria:
1. The quality of the response, as to triage and initial
care and as to the speed with which competent physician
supervision of the patient's care is established.
2. Accessibility of services, primarily as to geographic
location and distribution.
3. Efficiency in the use of economic and other resources
committed to the delivery system.
Based on that evaluation, policy recommendations for improving
both the response system and the means of guiding it can be made.
By chapter, then: The conceptual, historical, and methodol6giial
frameworks on which the study is based are set forth in Chapter I.
Chapter II describes the existing programs and responsibilities and the
directions of policy development, primarily in Massachusetts state
government, as elements of the guidance system. That description pro-
vides a backdrop for the presentation of the case study in Chapter III,
where the delivery of emergency medical services in Central Massashusetts
is examined for the patterns of coverage, the interrelationships among
the elements of the provider network, and the policies and procedures
which shape delivery. Chapter IV is an evaluation of the processes of
guidance in accounting for the three criteria established above, and
Chapter V contains the recommendations for improving policy and the
structure of the response system.
Emergency Care in the United States
"Medicine's lifesaving techniques and the system organized
to deliver them are in sharp contrast. Progress in medicine's
lifesaving techniques is dramatic. Today there are cardiac
monitors and pacemakers, exquisite surgical techniques,
drugs of great potency, institutions splendidly equipped and
superbly staffed. These are available for many.
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Emergency medical systems in most cities and nearly
all rural areas, however, do not often enough bring
the patient at the right time to the right place;
nor is there assurance the patient will get the proper
treatment by the proper professional. Progress in
this system is not dramatic." 5
Manegold and Silver, in the above quote, noted a fundamental
problem of emergency care in the United States - the gap between the
state of sophistication achieved in medical science and technology
and that achieved by the systems for extending those resources to
patients in emergency circumstances. The reasons for this disparity
can be seen in a historical context.
The development of medicine as a science and as a profession
and particularly the role of the hospital as the prime locus of medical
care created a need for an emergency medical response system, for, if
lives were to be saved, initial stabilizing care and definitive treat-
ment had to be provided quickly. Also, as medical care became more
dependent on specialized equipment and facilities and personnel, it
became increasingly separated from the average home or workplace.
Hence, the need for a way to quickly bridge distance and connect the
patient by means of transportation and communication with the centers
of care delivery.
Emergency care services were slow in their development, however,
for a number of reasons. Emergency care was less scientifically in-
teresting because individual cases had to be handled as crises, offering
little time for reflection, research, and formulation of method and
because patterns of incidence and causality were less predictable.
In the rather paternalistic mode of early hospital care, oriented heavily
to charity cases, emergency care was particularly neglected. Emergencies
could be viewed as anomalous occurrences, allowing expediencies in
procedures that wouldn't be tolerable in normal situations. And, too,
medical emergencies often never entered the emergency care system
because constraints imposed by communications and transportation tech-
nologies made it often impossible to activate the response system quickly.
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As a result, hospital emergency care was limited to a
neglected and inadequately organized and equipped "accident ward"
until well into the twentieth century.6 In addition, the ambulance
function, which had been operationalized in military settings, was
not given civilian application for a number of years. Initially,
whatever mode of transport happened to be available was used, and
only in the late 1800's did hospitals begin to provide specialized
ambulance service. 7 However, even though hospital-based ambulance
service staffed by interns became a significant mode in some parts
of the country for a time, there was really no commitment by medical
care providers to the ambulance service as a medical or hospital
function. Hence, as demands of economic and staff resources increased,
hospital ambulance service languished because it became a burden for
them to provide. 8
The responsibility for ambulance service is divided even today
amoung private organizations, of which funeral parlors predominate,
who somehow manage to relate it to their other activities or otherwise
make it at least marginally profitable; 9 police or fire organizations,
who provide about 25 percent of the nation's service and who assumed
the burden in many cases only because no one else seemed ready to do
it; and volunteer groups in smaller towns, which make up another quarter
of United States service. Only 2 percent of the service nationwide
is presently provided by hospitals. 10 The trend, incidentally, is away
from private stervices because of rising costs and shrinking profits,
though they are still responsible for forty to fifty percent of the
service provided in the United States.
A major problem with emergency care, then, is that the response
system is fragmented. It is not clearly organized as a system of medical
outreach but represents a patchwork of business, public safety, volunteer,
and medical care interests each providing some component of the total
delivery of emergency medical services and usually as a sideline to
other activities.
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The twentieth century has seen a radical increase in the
demands made on hospital emergency facilities for "non-emergency"
care because of the apparent unavailability of primary care ND's,
greater urbanization, and increasing expectations as to the level
of care and as to the convenience of obtaining it. 11 The pressure
on the emergency care system has also increased because, as other
causes of death are brought under control, the terrible loss from
trauma and heart attacks and other emergency conditions becomes
less tolerable.
After lagging far behind the emergence of the problem
there has been growing attention to the problems of emergency care
delivery in recent years. The mid-1960's saw the publication of
what came to be a landmark report, Accidental Death and Disability:
The Neglected Disease of Modern Society, which has catalyzed much
activity and research, 12 and the enactment of the Highway Safety
Act of 1966 with the subsequent issuance of "Highway Safety Program
Standard Number 11 - Emergency Medical Services," Standard Eleven,
which established, among other things, that each state should have
an "up-to-date, comprehensive plan for emergency medical services"
with the purpose of providing "the coordination, transportation, and
communication necessary to bring the injured and definitive medical
care together in the shortest practicable time.."
Yet, despite such standards and numerous conferences, com-
.missions,and studies on emergency care, 1 4 the impact to date seems
small. Five years after the enunciation of such standards, Massachusetts
has no state plan and the president of the State Medical Society describes
emergency care in the Commonwealth as "lousy."15
The reasons for the lack of apparent improvement are complex.
One explanation may simply be that in an era when many priorities are
being urged upon the public conscience, the response time to an issue
is long, particularly one that does not automatically inspire public
commitment as seems to be true of emergency medical services delivery.1 6
Another reason is that no established tradition exists for the
use of regulatory power to ensure that the health and welfare of the
17
citizenry is not endangered by ineffective organization of the
delivery system. That kind of application has not developed because
the concept of medical care delivery occurring through an area-wide
system or network of many providers and facilities is relatively
recent. Traditionally, the hospital or other medical facility was
viewed as complete in itself, and its relationships were not con-
sidered particularly significant to the quality of care. With this
perspective, regulation could be limited to sanitary conditions and
approved procedures and equipment.
Yet the quality of emergency medical assistance, because of
the importance of geographic acesssibility and speed of response, is
especially dependent on the nature of the relationships among providers
and the means connecting the network together. It has, as a result,
been especially limited by the narrow traditional view.
A third reason, and probably the most important, is that the
challenge of emergency care is different in kind than the challenge
of say, cancer, of from a different area, getting to the moon. The
problems inherent in the delivery of emergency medical services do not
demand technological breakthrough. As Manegold and Silver noted at
the outset of this section, the essential need is to create (or revamp)
an institutional framework which is systematic and efficient in making
emergency care resources available to everyone. Doing so requires some
sacrifice of traditional prerogatives, some disturbing of established
balances of influence, some adjusting of the role definitions of in-
dividuals and organizations, because emergency care delivery stands at
the nexus of a number of well-established institutions. Obviously, such
change does not occur without resistance.
The nations with good emergency medical services have perhaps
been working at it harder and longer than we have, but have also faced
in almost all cases a simpler, substantially less pluralistic political
environment. However, well-organized systems of emergency response are
just as worthy a goal and just as necessary here as elsewhere, even
though progress toward the goal seems slow and our context is pluralistic.
In the United States, we must face the fact that, given the
18
fragmented delivery system and diversified political environment,
change must occur through collaborative planning and participatory
program development as well as governmental regulation - and that
quality emergency care must develop out of effective processes of
community action, as well as broader policy development.
Relatively few studies have dealt specifically with the
effect of guidance processes on the organization of delivery at
local levels. This study is presented to enhance such a perspective
of the problem and to aid specifically in overcoming the obstacles to
creating an effective delivery system in Central Massachusetts.
Methodology
The objective of the study was to come to understand the
nature of a system - the means of guiding the delivery of emergency
services. An.appropriate and effective method of learning about a
system is through a case study, an investigation of an example of
a system that is chosen not because it is necessarily typical of
other instances of the system (since typicality cannot be defined
until the system characteristics are understood) but because it is
interesting and illuminating and conducive to the generation of ad-
ditional knowledge about the system.
Hence, though nothing can be said about whether Central
Massachusetts is or is not typical of other areas as to the guidance
and delivery of emergency medical services, it is useful as a case
because it provides material for the subject at hand in four respects.
The case study occured during a: time of ferment and change in emergency
medical services guidance in Massachusetts and thus can be a means to
begin to evaluate proposed policies and also to provide additional input
into the development of policy. The region, as defined, is a relatively
complete and cohesive area, socio-economically and as to medical care
delivery - and is a single health planning jurisdiction. Third, it
presents the problems involved in organizing the delivery of emergency
care in rural as well as in urban areas and in trying to establish
standards that are reasonable for both. And, finally, it is a useful
case because the planners and providers involved were anxious to help,
which improved the process of knowledge generation.
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To the extent that the characteristics of the emergency medical
response system of Central Massachusetts are a consequence of policies and
programs of higher governmental levels, they are likely to have analogues
in other regions similarly affected. Inverting the statement, to the
extent that similar conditions and characteristics are found in other
regions, the subsequent presentation might provide an initial explanatory
model.
The methodology was intentionally open and, to some extent,
opportunistic. A literature search, using the Index Medicus and similar
guides and following up bibliographic citations, provided an overview
of the issues of emergency care delivery, a sense for the various
methodologies used, and comparisons against which incoming data on the
case could be checked and compared as the research proceeded. The
literature was also important in revealing the themes of recommended
standards and programs and the points of consensus and controversy. 1 7
Interviews with key state and Federal officials, as well as re-
presentatives of charitable and professional associations, with some
interest in or responsibility for emergency medical services programs
were conducted. The interviews were usually quite open and occasionally
informal in order to improve the interview. Individuals with roles
particularly significant to the Central Massachusetts emergency medical
services were interviewed in greater detail to gather information about
the processes of guidance and about existing and proposed legislation
and standards within the state.
Providers of emergency medical services in Region II were also
interviewed - in person and by phone. These interviews tended to be more
structured, particularly those over the telephone, in order to elicit
specific information about pro'rams, operations, and policies but still
retained some flexibility in order to pursue and highlight unique situations
or problems and particular perspectives. In total, five Worcester-area and
three other hospital administrators, representatives of eighteen licensed
ambulance services (three private, one hospital-based, eight volunteer,
and six police or fire services), and twelve police or fire chiefs of
departments providing non-regulated emergency transportation in so-called
"dual purpose vehicles" were interviewed.
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The planning and regulatory activities of State agencies were
another major source of data. The Bureau of Resource Development of
the Department of Public Health had on file the returns of two state-
wide surveys, one of all hospital emergency facilities that was con-
ducted in the Spring of 1971 and the other of seventy-five percent
of the regulated ambulance services, conducted early in 1970. Both
studies proved useful, although the latter suffers from rather poor
design and has never been tabulated. The Division of Medical Care, of
which the aforementioned Bureau is a part, also maintains on file Annual
Statistical Reports submitted by each hospital. From these certain
statistical information could be gathered. Information about the
licensed ambulance services of the region was obtained from the files
kept by the Bureau of Health Facilities on each service. In addition,
statistics on deaths from accidents, heart attacks, and other causes
were provided by the Registry of Motor Vehicles and the Office of Health
Research of the Department of Public Health. Though these data could
only be given brief mention in this report because of the problems in-
volved in interpreting their meaning for emergency services, they were
considered in some detail during the course of the research.
Finally, two survey instruments designed specifically for this
study were utilized: A short, mailed survey of licensed ambulance
services in Region II, conducted in December, 1971 and January, 1972,
which had a fifty-six percent response (25 of 45),18 and a survey of
arrival modes at five high-volume emergency rooms in Worcester and
Fitchburg over a six-day period in early February, 1972. Record was
kept by emergency room staff of means of transportation used by each
patient in getting to the hospital. Also recorded were the general time
of arrival, the patient's age, and whether the patient's condition was
urgent (defined as requiring immediate medical attention).
Unfortunately, getting reliable and comparable information is
an inevitable difficulty given the nature of current emergency medical
services planning in Massachusetts. The information from these sources
did not completely coincide, and the more significant disparities will
be noted during the course of the report. In addition, data on services
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varies, also unavoidably, from town to town. Very little information was
obtained on many of the smallest towns, because the services available
within the town are extremely limited. The only larger populations for
which information is particularly scarce are in Milford, the Ayer-
Shirley-Groton area, and the Monson-Warren-Brimfield area. These def-
iciencies were due in part to the distance of these areas from the
Worcester office of the Comprehensive Health Planning Council (which was
a base of operations for the field work of this study), and in part to
a simple lack of response of providers within the area to requests for
information. To some extent, secondary sources of information, such as
interviews with providers in adjacent communities and with state officials
familiar with circumstances in those areas, helped compensate for the e
deficiencies.
22
NOTES
1Region II, as defined by the Office of Planning and Program
Coordination, Executive Office for Administration and Finance,
Commonwealty of Massachusetts.
2Planning Program in Central Massachusetts, April 21, 1971 (agency
work program).
3When a medical emergency occurs within a hospital, some of the equip-
ment, supplies, and personnel of the emergency facility may be called
upon, but seldom is the emergency victim actually taken to the emergency
facility.
4 Weinerman, E. Richard, et. al. "Determinants of Use of Hospital Emer-
gency Services," American Journal of Public Health, July 1966, p. 1043.
5 Manegold, Richard R. and Silver, Michael H., "The Emergency Medical
Care System," Journal of the American Medical Association, April 24,
1967, p. 124.
6National Academy of Sciences - National Research Council, Accidental
Death and Disability: The Neglected Disease of Modern Society, p. 18.
7Curry, George J., M. D., "Immediate Care and Transport of the Injured,
p. 9.
8 Mitchell, Howard W., M. D., "Ambulances and Emergency Medical Care,"
American Journal of Public Health, November 1965, p. 1719.
9 Even service stations and auto wrecking firms get into the act in
certain localities. See Medical World News, "The Crisis in Medical.
Care," p. 7.
10ibid., pp. 6-7
llShortliffe,Hamilton, and Noroian, "The Emergency Room and the Changing
Pattern of Medical Care," New England Journal of Medicine, Jan. 2. 1958,
p. 24.
12 Gaston, Sawnia R., M. D., "Accidental Death and Disability...: A
Progress Report," Journal of Trauma, March, 1971, pp. 195-206.
1 3U. S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration,
National Highway Safety Bureau, June, 1967.
1 4 Such as the American Medical Association Conference on Emergency Medical
Services, 1967; the Airlie Conference on Emergency Medical Services, 1969;
Emergency Medical Services in the Chicago Area, by the University of
Chicago Center for Hospital Administration, 1971, etc.
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15 Ballantine, Thomas, quoted in the Boston Globe, December 27, 1971.
1 6 The human tendency seems to discount one's personal risk of requiring
emergency medical assistance; also, emergency facilities tend to be
"out of sight, out of mind."
1 7 The literature on emergency medical services delivery tends to break
down into four categories:
1. Descriptions of current problems and recommendations
for standards.
2. Inventories of services and utilization studies
3. Theoretical studies, emphasizing mathematical modeling
and operations research techniques
4. Description of specific technologies, equipment designs,
and techniques for rendering emergency care
The fourth group was the least applicable to this study. No
pieces reviewed of this type were used to any great extent. Examples of
each of the first three that were particularly helpful are listed here.
The reader is referred to the Bibliography for other references.
1. "The Crisis in Emergency Care," special publication of
Medical World News, McGraw-Hill, 1971. Also, Recommended
Standards for Development of Emergency Medical Services Systems,
U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Public Health
SErvice, Health Services and Mental Health Administration, Division
of Emergency Health Services, 1971.
2. Gibson, Geoffrey, Emergency Medical Services in the Chicago
Area, Center for Health Administration Studies, 1971.
3. Stevenson, Keith A., Operational Aspects of Emergency Ambulance
Services, Technical Report No. 61, Operations Research Center,
Mass. Inst. of Tech., 1971.
18A copy of the questionaire is attached in Appendix A.
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Chapter II: The Means of Guidance, Present and Prospective
The guidance system of emergency medical services consists of
three major components. The first is strategic planning, which involves
decision-making relating to the development of policy with long-term or
widely-felt impacts (such as locational decision of a new hospital,
determination of need by the state Public Health council, passage of
legislation increasing training requirements, etc.). This chapter
will deal primarily with the planning carried on at the state level.
However, as this report will show, the state's role in policy development
has been limited. The individual providers have the big impact. An
additional input to this process, particularly in the legislature, is
the effect of interest and "veto" groups in advocating or opposing
changes in policy.
Regulation is a second function and derives out of the state's
police power. The Department of Public Health is the agency with primary
responsibility for emergency medical services but its regulatory
activities at present are quite narrow.
The third component might be called operations control and
involves both logistical as well as medical care quality control. This
is a function of individual providers. Chapter III will essentially be
a description of operations control in Central Massachusetts.
The guidance of emergency medical services delivery in
Massachusetts is primarily an ad hoc, fragmented system. Individual
providers of hospital and ambulance emergency service play the dominant
role and can act relatively autonomously. Traditionally, an individual
or group could decide to offer ambulance service pretty much at their
own discretion and could as well determine the nature and extent of that
service. Recent years have seen the development of some state regulation
of ambulance services in Massachusetts, but, even so, once the reguire-
ments are met, the service is in business, and still there is no master
determination of need or of appropriate service area. As will be
explained shortly, the establishment of emergency hospital service has
been a subject of state regulation for a longer time but the nature of
that service once the basic regulatory criteria are met, has been the
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prerogative of the individual institution to determine. Again, no
overall establishment of objectives for the delivery system has
traditionally occurred.
The matter of guiding the delivery of emergency medical
services in Massachusetts raises a number of issues which become
important themes in this report. A number of these are also generating
political heat at the present time.
If emergency care is in fact rendered through a network of
providers and facilities (whether or not it is recognized or admitted),
and if the outreach and transportation component provided by ambulance
service is as much a part of the delivery system as is hospital care,
then the respective component providers of the delivery system have
to be organized some way. A few would maintain that the "invisible
hand" is sufficient - that the respective providers, pursuing basically
their self-interest will achieve an effective system, adequate for its
mission, while avoiding the stifling effects of control. On the other
hand, an argument is also made for rather extensive centralized control.
Thus, underlying the debate is the basic question of to what extent the
government should be involved and how much regulation should occur.
As mentioned, government use of the police power in relation
to emergency medical care has been limited but is increasing. In
Massachusetts, both recent history and the immediate future promise
substantial change in this direction.
A significant concern that arises especially in relation to
the case examined here is the place of local and/or regional determination.
Assuming providers agree that planning for the delivery of emergency
medical services really must take into account networks and systems
rather then individual providers, how much authority for determination
of objectives and regulation would be left with them? From the state's
perspective on this matter - what represents the state's interest?
Can it simply oversee regional planning and guidance activities to
ensure that they result in the achievement of desired ends or must the
state carry out the great bulk of the guidance function itself?
Furthermore, at what level is achieved the appropriate mix of first-
hand knowledge of how the emergency medical services system functions
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and yet of detachment and impartiality and understanding of the
broad persepctive? That is, can regional planning efforts -
especially those involving the participation of providers - be
sufficiently protected against favoritism, undue influence, and
logrolling? Or, conversely, can state planning efforts be suf-
ficiently informed about how "things really are"?
For Central Massachusetts, there are added concerns that
the state guidance processes, emanating from Boston, seem to be
biased by an urban perspective and make unreasonable demands of
the more rural parts of the state. The worry is that state regulation
is insensitive and causes "the baby to be thrown out with the bath
water" by setting standards which undermine or altogether drive out
the emergency care resources of smaller communities. Emergency
services are by no means the only focus of this concern.
Another thread is apparent in the foregoing: the appropriate
degree of interconnection between elements of guidance. There is
debate about how much information is needed for the regulatory process
and when it becomes an imposition on privacy. There is some tension
between regulatory and planning bodies about whether the latter
should give cues to the former. Also unclear is the appropriate role
for planners and emergency service providers as to participating in
the regulatory function.
Finally, the issue is whether central planning and guidance
can do more than ensure a minimum system. How much can state regulation
do to create excellence? Can state planners stimulate local processes
that would lead toward real improvement? Can collaborative, self-
determining planning efforts of providers and consumers within an area
find the commitment and result in the sacrifices necessary to succeed
in achieving real system effectiveness?
These issues are much too complex, of course, to deal with
fully and explicitly in this report. Nevertheless, they have been
interwoven in the study, as it has developed, and will run through-the
discussion to follow.
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State Guidance
1. The Regulation of Ambulance Services.
The Division of Medical Care of the Department of Public Health
and the Registry of Motor Vehicles are the two bodies which have specific
legal.mandate for the regulation of ambulance services under two statutes,
one dealing with the training of drivers and attendants and the other
giving the Department of Public Health (DPH) the authority to regulate
ambulance services so as to ensure sanitary conditions.
The first is a 1957 Act, apparently rather progressive in its
time, which states:
"No person shall operate any ambulance transporting a sick
or injured person, nor shall the owner or custodian of an
ambulance permit the same to be so operated upon any way
unless the operator of such ambulance or attendant thereon
has been certified as having successfully completed the
Senior Red Cross course of first aid training, or has
received training which is equivalent thereto."2
As far as could be determined, however, the Registry has no
enforcement machinery established to deal with this code; rather it
has been left to the Bureau of Health Facilities of the Deparment of
Public Health to assure compliance with this statute along with their
duties pertaining to the second.
The second statute gives the Department power to regulate
if
Sanitary conditions of ambulances" and to make rules regarding the
"necessary equipment for the care and treatment of sick or injured
persons" and allows the imposition of fines.3 Pursuant to that
authority the Department approved a set of regulations which were to
be administered by the Bureau of Health Facilities. Under these
regulations, a copy of which is attached in Appendix B, the Bureau
assumed responsibility for receiving and reviewing annual "Appli-
cations for Certification" and for inspecting ambulance vehicles
and base stations and other aspects of service-4 This inspection
is carried out by a cadre of nurse-inspectors who visit the various
ambulance services in.the course of their work inspecting other
health facilities.
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The Bureau maintains a file on each service containing the
Applications for Certification, the Reports of Training, mentioned
in the previous chapter, the inspector's reports, and any complaints
or allegations which are received. The files are difficult to use
and consdquently are infrequently consulted for system-wide infonnation.
Because the role of the Bureau of Health Facilities deal with.hospitals,
nursing homes and other similar health facilities in addition to am-
bulance services, and becuase the man-power of the office is so
constrained, there is almost never any contact between the Bureau
and an individual service in between annual inspections and re-
certifications. Midyear contact only occurs if the service itself
were to seek out the Bureau's assistance or, possibly, if someone
brings a complaint against a service (which necessitates knowing
about the Bureau's function). 5 The files indicate that requests of these
types are very infrequent. As a consequence, the Bureau has almost no
notion of the way in which the service actually operates or the level
of quality of the care rendered. It gets no information on operations
of the ambulances services, such as numbers of runs of various types,
numbers of patients served, activity of each of the personnel listed
in the file, types of first aid rendered, and so forth.
As mentioned previously, the legislation and regulations do
not at present cover emergency public safety vehicles used for other
purposes in addition to ambulance work. Illustrative of that escape
hatchis the final paragraph in the above-mentioned regulations:
"These rules and regulations shall not preclude the
reasonable omission of any of the foregoing requirements
when a law enforcement officer or a representative of a
fire department determines an emergency exists."6
2. The Regulation of Hospital Emergency Care.
For two decades, the Commonwealth has had a regulation
relating to hospital emergency rooms as a rather small piece of
the licensure rules for hospitals which the Department of Public
Health administers. The provisions include the requirements that
the emergency room be a distinct facility with a special ambulance
entrance; that it have sufficient space, equipment, personnel, and
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diagnostic and therapeutic facilities available at all times; that
certain equipment and supplies be available (a minimal list); that
a physician be available; and that a record be kept for each patient.7
Obviously, these provisions do not make major demands in terms of policy
explication on the part of the hospital.
3. Planning and Policy Development.
Beyond these regulatory functions, activities relating to
emergency medical service guidance has been very limited at the state
level until quite recently. The Department of Public Health has never
had an office dealing specifically with planning for emergency services,
and so the staff of the Bureau of Resource Development have had to add
the day-to-day shepherding of any emergency medical services projects
to their other duties. With the assistance of a staff person from the
United States Public Health Service who has been on loan to various
state agencies doing work related to emergency medical care, the De-
partment of Public Health has administered two surveys of emergency
care providers in the state mentioned in the previous chapter. However,
the use of the result has been minimal.
Presently, the Department of Public Health is moving in three
major policy directions to expand its planning and guidance function.
They are the creation, within the Department, of an Office of Emergency
Medical Services and a state Advisory Council on Emergency Medical Ser-
vices; the revision of regulations pertaining to hospital emergency ser-
vices; and a legislative effort to increase its statutory basis for the
regulation of ambulance services. Succeeding paragraphs will discuss them
in turn.
The Department of Public Health has also applied for a grant from
the Department of Transportation under its Highway Safety Act, for the
creation-of an Office of Emergency Medical Services. The application has
been approved and the Department received the go-ahead in the Fall of
1971. However, due to a series of complications, the Office has not yet
been established and can therefore only be discussed on the basis of what
the grant application outlines.
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In addition to the three-member office, is a state Emergency
Medical Services Advisory Committee, made up of representatives of
various agencies and associations, the general purposes being to
provide "leadership. in stimulating interested health agencies in
'planning for emergency response programs,' to acting as a "clearing
house of information," to assisting in the "evaluation of the de-
liver-yof emergency medical services," and to stimulate "appropriate
research activities.'.'
The proposed activities of the office would involve preparing
an interim State plan, inventorying existing laws and ordinances re-
gulating emergency medical services, creating an emergency medical
services data collection system, and surveying local delivery systems.
Later phases, to occur in the second and third years, focus
on evaluating and updating the plan and establishing procedures for
periodic program evaluation.
All of this, again, waits and remains untested until positions
can actually be created and filled. The objectives are grand, but the
budget and staff will be small.
Another strategic planning activity of the Department of
Public Health has been to review and propose rather significant
revisions of its regulations for hospital emergency services. The
proposed revision is aimed at encouraging regionalization of policy
and role determination as to emergency care.
The proposal would require all hospitals to identify themselves
as to emergency service in one of three ways; as providing comprehensive
emergency care, routine emergency care, or as having no announced emer-
gency service. A hospital in the third category would at a minimum have
to "accurately inform the community of its potential for providing emer-
gency services" and have explicit policies concerning emergency medical
assistance and referral for the cases of medical emergencies that do
arise. To offer emergency service, a hospital would have to have,
among a detailed list of requirements, in-hospital availability of an
M.D. at all times with a Registered Nurse on duty in the emergency room
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and would have to announce its capabilities and spell out its policies.
More specifically, the capabilities of a hospital offering routine
emergency service would have to include twenty-four hour physician
coverage of the emergency room with the emergency service the
physician's principal assignment, readily available radiological
and anesthesiological personnel, and, "if possible " two-way radio
contact with "ambulances, dispatches, law enforcement personnel and
other hospitals.'
A comprehensive service would include these capabilities:
1. Twenty-four hour hospital coverage by at least senior
residents in general surgery, internal medicine and anes-
thesiology.
2. Twenty-four hour emergency room physician and Registered
Nurse coverage, without concurrent duties elsewhere.
3. Twenty-four hour radiological and anesthesiological
coverage in-house, and
4. Such hospitals "are urged" to have two-way radio
equipment linking to the emergency care outreach components.
The third thrust is to seek expanded legal definition- of
the Departmert's emergency medical services regulatory powers - particu-
larly with respect to ambulance services - an effort which has been
unsuccessfully attempted in the past two legislative sessions. Pre-
sently, however, the state legislature is considering a bill submitted
directly by the Governor which shows greater promise of succeeding.
The bill would substantially increase the Department's role.
"Dual purpose" vehicles (vehicles used by the police and fire departments
for both ambulance work and regular duties) now exempt, would become
subject to regulation. Regulatory authority would cover not only sani-
tary conditions but also subjects "...including but not limited to re-
quirements governing ambulance personnel, safety, sanitation, equipment,
medical supplies, and recorde.- The Department of Public Health would be
allowed "to make such reasonable classifications of ambulances, by type
of vehicle and purpose, and ambulance services, by nature and scope of
service, as it finds necessary or appropriate in the public interest."
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Further, it would have "determination of need" powers as to the
distribution of services and vehicles, and it would have the power
to delegate to subdivisions authority relating to regulations. A
date of January 1, 1974 should be set as a deadline for compliance
with training requirements to be established by the Department. In
addition, the legislation would mandate the creation of an emergency
medical services advisory board similar to that proposed in the grant
application. The enforcement mechanism is also much strengthened.
Other Influences on the Guidance System.
Recently, the Tri-State Regional Medical Program announced
that Federal emergency medical service-related money would be available
for the coming fiscal year and a hurried grant proposal for Massachusetts
was assembled with the Department of Public Health and regional health
planning agencies inputs. If the grant is in fact obtained in roughly
the amounts requested, it will allow the establishment of a state-
wide data system, creation of regional emergency medical services plan-
ning mechanisms where none exist and improvement of communications
systems, training programs, community education activities, and other
programs, as specified by individual regional health planning agencies.
Also exerting subtle influence over emergency medical services
guidance in Massachusetts are voluntary and professional associations,
such as the Massachusetts Heart Association, Massachusetts Medical
Society, Red Cross, Massachusetts Ambulance Association. The impact
of such groups in the guidance process is difficult to assess accurately.
They act as interest groups in the process, pressing for reforms or
actions they feel would be valid and rather successfully vetoing moves
they oppose, yet their advocacy is, in most cases, translated into real
action only in areas very central to their identity. Individuals, however,
from such organizations serve devotedly in a number of guidance capacities
such as advisory committees.
The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals, also has
minimal influence on the policy and practice of hospital emergency
service delivery. It has set out five basic standards of evaluative
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accreditation pertaining to emergency medical services of which the
first is that: "A well-defined plan for emergency dare, based on com-
munity need and on the capability of the hospital, shall exish within
every hospital." In elaborating on the standard, the Joint Commission
elaborates the standard as requiring that even a hospital without an
emergency service per se must have a plan for effectively referring
emergency patients when the need occurs, and also that a "hospital
and its medical staff should promote, and help to develop a community-
based emergency plan, and should show evidence of such participation."8
Although it is unclear how much overall importance these con-
siderations are given in accreditation, indications are that they are
not stringently pursued.
Guidance Within the Region
As noted, the bulk of the guidance of Region II emergency
medical service delivery occurs within the region. No emergency
medical services advisory commiteee or other region-wide planning
body presently exists. Rather, the process is fragmented at the level
of providers. Chapter III will discuss their role in the context of
a description of the delivery system.
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NOTES
iCurry, Op. Cit., p. 14.
2General Laws, Chapter 90, Paragraph 7f, Registry of Motor Vehicles,
Ambulance Drivers, First Aid Training, 1957.
3General Laws, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Chapter III, Paragraph
8B, Department of Public Health, Sanitary Conditions of Ambulances
and Equipment.
4Although the authority was limited to the regulation of sanitary
conditions and equipment, the actual regulations are broader than
that and, therefore, cannot be effectively enforced at the margins.
5 Interestingly, the predominant source of the few complaints that are
on file is other ambulance services, and even this is usually limited
to the private services which compete for business.
6 Department of Public Health, Division of Hospital Facilities, Rules
and Regulations Relative to Ambulances, April 10, 1968, p. 9.
7State Licensure Rules and Regulations for Hospitals and Sanatoria in
Massa'chusetts, 1950, p. 19.
8Accreditation Manual for Hospitals, 1970, p. 71.
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Chapter III: The Case of Emergency Care Delivery in Central
Massachusetts
This Chapter will describe the resources available to provide
emergency medical assistance in Central Massachusetts. The emphasis
will be on the outreach and transportation component of the response
system. Hospital emergency care will be considered to the extent that
it affects outreach. Call-receiving arrangements will get only minimal
attention. The description will be based on the information gathered
within the region by interviews, phone calls, and two surveys, and on
information about regional emergency medical resources available from
the state. Existing Massachusetts laws and requirements will be used as
standards in this chapter. Throughout the description of the resources
themselves and the patterns of resource origin, the role of the decision-
making and operations control activities of the individual providers of
service will be noted.
The Setting
The study area lies roughly between Route 495 and the Quabbin
Reservoir east of Amherst. In that region there are seventy-one towns
and four cities, ranging in population (1970) from New Salem (474 in-
habitants) at the west boundary to Worcester with 176,572.1 Thus, the
region contains 21.4 percent of the 351 towns and cities in the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts, almost a quarter (1,936 square miles) of the land
area, and about one-eighth (713,721) of the state's population.
The distribution of population can be seen on the map in Figure
2. The primary cluster is in the Worcester-Shrewsbury area with a
population of 195,768 and a density of 3,380 per square mile; a secondary
cluster is in Fitchburg-Leominster with a total population of 76,282 and
a density of 1,357 in 1970. These two urban areas together make up thirty-
seven percent of the Region's population. Other smaller aggregates occur
in Gardner, Milford, Franklin, Southbridge, Webster, Clinton, Athol, and
Palmer. Route 9, Route 2, Route 12, and the Blackstone River are the
major population axes.
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Components of the Emergency Medical Services Delivery System
1. Outreach and Transportation.
Outreach and transportation are both carried out by ambulance
services or organizations. The Department of Public Health, as noted,
has regulatory jurisdiction over only a part of the total service pro-
vided. Police and fire wagons and cruisers used for other purposes
besides medical transportation provide a substantial part of -the am-
bulance service in the Commonwealth but are not subject to the Department
of Public Health licensing and inspection. Data concerning these unregu-
lated public safety operations can only be acquired directly from the
towns themselves and even then is sketchy. As will be seen, dual-
purpose vehicles play a significant role in the transportation of
emergency patients, especially in the smaller communities. 2
Forty-six ambulance services in the region are certified by the
Department of Public Health. Sixteen are volunteer rescue squads;
fourteen are fire department services; eight are private, for-profit
services; seven are police department services; and one is hospital-
owned and -operated. These forty-six organizations use fifty-eight
approved vehicles. Four other services operate ambulances which, ap-
parently due to confusion in the certification process, are not on the
books at the Bureau of Health Facilities, even though the operators are
under the impression that they have met the requirements. Five vehicles
are involved. Figure 3 shows the locations of these services. Eighty
percent (571,4000) of the population of the region live in towns served
by certified ambulance services. That number increases to 606,100 or
eighty-five percent when the services are counted whose licensure status
is unclear.
Primary emergency ambulance service to Central Massachusetts
communities is provided in six general ways. The type of coverage relates,
for the most part, to the community's size, as Table 1 reveals. Very
small towns in a few cases apparently rely on neighboring communities for
ambulance coverage. Towns of a somewhat larger size are serviced by
vehicles used in general police or fire work which double as ambulances
(though, as mentioned, they are not subject to state regulation as such).
A third group of cities, comparable in population to those in the previous
group, have certified ambulances operated by volunteer squads or on-call
72*00' 71 00'
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Table 1: Comunity Characteristics by Type of Ambulance Coverage
NO. OF 1 TOTAL
TYPE COMMUNITIES POPULATION
2 SMALLEST MEDIAN
% COMMUNITY COMMUNITY
(1) No organized ambulance
service within the town
(2) Unregulated service
using dual-purpose
vehicles
(2a) (with licensed service
support)
(3) Regulated service-
volunteer or on-call
(3a) (with private service
support)
11
21
(12)
31
( 9)
(4) Regulated service -
full-time 8
(4a) (with private service
support) ( 6)
14,461 2%
120,309 17%
201,966 28%
320,310 45%
(292,068)
474
730
(1,014)
1,681
(1,681)
6,635
872
4,273
1,315
5,729
(6,609)
5,606
(4,281)
18,126
(6,635) (26,068)
6,482
4,292
15,347
(15,347)
17,830
(8,779)
40,039 176,572
(48,678) (176,572)
(5) Regulated service-
private
(6) Regulated service-
hospital-based_
3
1
45,175
11,680
6% 6,095
2% NA
19,352
NA
15,065
NA
1 For a list, see Appendix D
2 Per cent of region's population
W3
MEAN
COMMUNITY LARGEST
19,748
NA1 11 80
40
policemen or firefighters. A fourth set, mostly large communities,
use public ambulances operated under the auspices of a full-time
public safety department. Three communities get primary emergency
coverage from private ambulance services, and one uses a hospital-
based and - operated ambulance. There is some variation within each
group, as no two towns have exactly similar arrangements. The towns
in each type are listed in Appendix D. A description of general
characteristics of each class follows:
Little can be said about towns which apparently have no
ambulance-type vehicles aof their own because little is known. Some
use sedan cruisers to transport patients, calling on an adjacent
ambulance service when a patient needs to be transported in a supine
position. Others rely on adjacent services for regular coverage as
well. A few of the smallest also rely on neighbors for police or
fire support in non-medical situations. Eleven towns, comprising
only two percent of the region's population, are included here. Im-
provement in ambulance coverage in these towns will be hindered by
the small demand generated.
Of the second group relying primarily on "dual purpose"
vehicles operated usually by the police department, the service is
normally provided without charge,3 and is limited in all cases to
the town only, that is, to town residents or to persons injured or
incurring illness while in the town. The vehicles are station wagons.
In the larger communities, they may be used as cruisers, and police
chiefs take pride in the rapid response that is enabled by having them
on the road. In the smaller towns, the force in on-call only and the
vehicle must be activated for both general police duty and for medical
emergencies.4 Generally, first aid equipment is very limited and the
first aid rendered minimal. Even in the larger towns, often only one
policeman is in the vehicle. Twenty-one towns rely heavily on dual-
purpose vehicles. Three others use them occasionally to back up private
or hospital ambulances. Of the twenty-one comprising seventeen percent
of the region's population, twelve are within the active service district
of a certified ambulance, which some use whenever possible for emergency
work. Five towns, all adjacent to Worcester, have a wagon cruising
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twenty-four hours a day; another half dozen have a wagon cruising
part-time. Officially, the vehicles should only be used for medical
transport in "emergency" situations. That requirement is interpreted
loosely, since alternative coverage may be minimal. Also police and
fire departments are -reluctant to question a claimed emergency unless
the misuse is blatant.
Twenty-eight percent of Central Massachusetts residents live
in the thirty-one towns of the third category. These towns are
served by the Department of Public Health-regulated ambulance services
using volunteer or on-call personnel.5 The vehicles are Cadillic-
type ambulances, for the most part. The services use municipal or
public safety dispatch systems. In twenty-nine, the regular service
districts include the town only. Of the other two, one serves five
towns. The idealism tends to be high and the first aid competent.
Often there is no charge for the call. The maior difficulty with
this service is the unavailability of personnel during the working
hours, but these are small services with low utilization rates.
Nine of the services are part of private ambulance company districts.
Full-time police or fire departments handle the ambulance
function in eight communities. The exact format varies. In some
cases, a number of the personnel may be part-time only. In the largest
cities, t ie ambulance personnel. are assigned spedifically to this
function, in some cases as their first assignment with the force. In
other communities, the first available men act as the ambulance crew
when a call arrives. The service areas are limited in all but one
case to the community itself, except in mutual aid situations. The
equipment for rendering first aid is much greater than- in towns using
cruiser-wagons, but the training of the men may not be greater. These
are the busiest services in the region and the men are frequently
exposed - for better or worse - to emergency situations. Two cases
included here, Winchendon and Shrrewsbury, are not presently certified.
The Department of Public Health files show the Winchendon service as
having been terminated and have no information or record of Shrewsbury,
although it has operated two ambulances for some time. Six of these
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are part of active service districts of private ambulance companies
as well. The eight constitute forty-five percent of the region's
population.
The communities which depend on private, for-profit
companies for their ambulance coverage include only a sixteenth
of the residents of Central Massachusetts. They are Gardner,
Milford, and Lancaster. Gardner pays a monthly fee to Wood's
Ambulance Service to provide service on a twenty-four hour basis,
and Milford has two services which share the business and to which
the police department alternately refers its calls. All get some
back-up, but only Lancaster has a station wagon available as back-up
in each community, the chief of the department with back-up respon-
sibility felt satisfied with the arrangement. In all three cases,
the company provides ambulance service beyond the town itself.
The only other major type, found in just one town, is that
of a hospital-owned and-operated service, using a certified vehicle.
This is in Palmer, affiliated with the Wing Memorial Hospital. The
critically important difference between this coverage and that of
the private services described below is that a much higher level of
medical care can be provided at the scene and underway. In addition,
the medical supervision is much more effective since it uses registered
nurses from the emergency room and has radio contact with the emergency
room. The police can provide transportation back-up with a station
wagon but have very little first aid capability. The Wing Hospital
ambulance serves six towns on a regular basis.
Three private ambulance services, based in Worcester and Holden,
also provide some emergency service, but do not have primary responsibility
for emergency outreach in any community. Their major function is trans-
porting elderly and convalescent patients on a scheduled call basis.
This service is, in two of the cases, provided to a large number of
towns in the Worcester and Holden emergency medical services system.
The third company serves Worcester primarily. One firm actually operates
under two names, one for Worcester and one for the Holden-West Boylston
area.
A good deal of medical transportation is provided in police
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cruiser sedans, besides that in dual purpose wagons. The Worcester
Police Department has the responsibility, for example, to provide
transportation to welfare and old age assistance cases, which runs
into "hundreds of calls each month." 6 The concern here, however,
is that the cruisers are used in medical emergencies. The occasions
of such use arise when other vehicles are unavailable, when ambulances
take too long, and when the patient's condition warrants quick medical
attention but still allows the patient to sit up. The use of cruiser
sedans is clouded because no separate record is kept, but should probably
be reduced because the vehicle is not equipped or designed to handle
many medical needs. The survey of arrival modes at the five largest
hospitals indicated that fifty-eight percent of the cases arriving by
cruiser or cruiser-wagon are urgent, amounting to more than ten cases
per day at the five hospitals. A review of daily accident reports in
the Worcester Telegram over a three-month period turned up a number
of cases where cruiser transportation of emergency patients had ap-
parently occurred after serious accidents in the Central Massachusetts
area. One such case, probably justified, is reported in a newspaper
article repraduced in Appendix F.
The State Police also respond in certain emergency medical
situations. Other than on the Turnpike, their involvement is generally
limited to mutual aid in traffic accidents on state highways. State
Police no longer have ambulances or station wagons equipped with first
aid gear, except on the Turnpike and in isolated other areas. Nor do
the men automatically go through the first aid course formerly required.
A phone conversation with the state office supported the inference that
they would prefer to reduce their responsibility for emergency medical
outreach.
2. Hospital Emergency Care.
Twenty hospitals are located within the study area, not including
the U.S. Army Hospital at Fort Devens (which, though it does provide
service to the civilian community in critical situations, will not be
considered a part of the delivery system for the purposes of this study. 7
Of the twenty, one hospital - Doctorsit of Worcester - has no emergency
service and will not be considered in detail.
Table 2: Summary of Hospital Emergency Facility Statistics *
HOSPITAL
Athol Memorial
Nashoba Community
Clinton
Burbank
Henry Heywood Memorial
Holden District
Leominster
Milford
Whitinsville
Wing Memorial
Harrington Memorial
Mary Lane
Hubbard Regional
Winchendon
Doctors
Fairlawn
LOCATION
Athol
Ayer
Clinton
Fitchburg
Gardner
Holden
Leominster
Milford
Northbridge
Palmer
Southbridge
Ware
Webster
Winchendon
Worcester
"
BEDS
103
84
82
247
152
85
126
126
30
80
102
79
55
46
120
103
EMERGENCY1
TOTAL FACILITY
ADMISSIONS CATEGORY
3,118 Provisional
2,892 Basic 2
2,625 Basic 2
7,999 Basic
5,363 Basic
3,203 Basic 2
5,170 Provisional
4,933 Basic 2
549 Provisional
1,941 Basic
4,470 Basic 2
2,989 Provisional
2,483 Basic
1,570 Provisional
4,123 Referral
3,977 Basic 2
TOTAL
ER
VISITS
2,279
3,968
6,068
14,015
8,809
7,858
15,231
6,505
1,895
10,449
12,259
2,774
7,390
NA
2,023
ER VISITS:
TOTAL
ADMISSIONS
0.7 : 1
1.4 : 1
2.3 : 1
1.8 : 1
1.6 : 1
2.4 : 1
2.9 : 1
1.3 : 1
3.5 : 1
5.4 : 1
2.8 : 1
0.9 : 1
3.0 : 1
NA
0.5 : 1
Table 2 continued
EMERGENCY 1 TOTAL ER VISITS:
TOTAL FACILITY ER TOTAL
HOSPITAL LOCATION BEDS ADMISSIONS CATEGORY VISITS ADMISSIONS
Hahnemann Worcester 215 8,963 Basic 24,000 ? 2.73: 1
Memorial 379 14,238 Major 28,004 2.0 : 1
St. Vincent 600 16,509 Major 23,927 1.5 : 1
Worcester City 448 11,866 Major 53,305 4.5 : 1
U.S. Army Hospital Fort Devens 320 4,382 Basic ? ?
1 Classification of American Hospital Association
2 This emergency room, though listed as basic, has limited MD coverage and is in that way similar
to a provisional unit
* Source: GUIDE ISSUE, Hospitals, JAHA, August 1971; Annual Statistical Reports,
Department of Public Health, 1971
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These hospitals are the principal end points of emergency
medical services delivery within Central Massachusetts. Other
hospitals which have some significance for emergency care in the
region are the Woonsocket, (Rhode Island) Hospitals to the south;
the Framingham Union, Marlborough, and occasionalfy Emerson (Concord)
Hospital. to the east of the region; and the Greenfield and Springfield
hospitals to the west.
As Figure 4 indicates, the hospitals are distributed throughout
the region with the largest gap being in the rural area around the
Brookfields and Barre. The distances between hospitals in Region
II are relatively large for Massachusetts but not as great as in
the western part of the State.8 Eighty percent of the population
of the region lives with five miles of an emergency facility.
Hospitals vary in their policies and capacities pertaining
to emergency service. They differ as to their staffing patterns and
the depth of experience and expertise of.the personnel, scope of their
direct and support services, and the size and comprehensiveness of
their facilities. In its most recent annual GUIDE ISSUE of.its
journal, 9 the American Hospital Association introduced a self-
classification system to allow hospitals to identify the kind of
emergency service they offer. Four classes were listed:
MAJOR EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT: "Organized facilities
and services capable of rendering advanced surgical
and medical procedures, staffed twenty-four hours a
day by medical and support personnel, with diagnostic
facilities, blood bank, and special purpose operating
rooms continuously available."
BASIC EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT: "Organized facilities
and services capable of rendering care for most
life-threatening emergencies but without highly
specialized resuscitative and surgical capabilities,
staffed twenty-four hours a day by medical and
nursing personnel, diagnostic services and blood
bank continuously available."
PROVISIONAL EMERGENCY UNIT: "Limited to minor conditions
and emergency resuscitation with professional nursing
personnel available twenty-four hours a day, and part-
time or on-call physician service. Diagnostic and
supporting equipment are continuously available."
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EMERGENCY REFERRAL SERVICE: "A unit which provides
first aid and referral services only."
Of the twenty hospitals in Central Massachusetts, the GUIDE ISSUE
listed one in the referral category (Doctors' Hospital, already men-
tioned), five as providing provisional emergency services, eleven
as basic, and three as having major emergency departments. These are
listed in Table 2 and located on the map in Figure 4. An adjustment
to the above categories has been made based on a survey by the
Department of Public Health and the field work done for this study.
Of the eleven which are listed as offering basic emergency services,
only five actually have twenty-four.hour medical staffing required
for that category. The other six are essentially provisional units
as to night and weekend emergency care. This six are circled in Figure
4.
During the daytime hours, two-thirds (68%) of the region's
population lives within five straight-line miles of at least a basic
emergency facility. However, when the classifications are adjusted
to reflect the lack of night and weekend physician coverage at the
emergency rooms in Holden, Clinton, Milton, Southbridge, and Ayer,
now only half of the residents of the region live less than five
miles from an emergency department will full-time M.D. staffing.
Another third live less than ten miles away, but sixteen percent are
located at a distance greater than ten straight-line miles. Further-
more, the major emergency departments in three Worcester hospitals are
more than ten miles from almost three-fifths of the population.
Mapping Emergency Medical Services System Areas
The ambulance and hospital emergency care resources available
in Central Massachusetts are linked, though not officially or explicitly,
in a network as components of a system. An emergency medical services
system can be defined as the network of all communications systems,
ambulance and public safety organizations, physicians, and thospital
emergency rooms that regularly interrelate or depend on each other in
some way in medical emergencies, and the people and geographic territory
they serve.
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Though all emergency medical services in the region can be
considered as part of a single delivery system, there are benefits
to be gained from breaking the whole down into a set of smaller
scale systems to allow comparisons as to geographic and other variables
as data is presented. In addition, smaller system areas will turn out
to correspond more closely to the pattern of day-to-day operations
and interactions of provider entities. The-succeeding paragraphs
describe the method used to derive eleven catchment areas, each
served by relatively complete and independent emergency medical
services networks. The number has no meaning, in itself. It is
simply the result of the process of attempting to get a manageable
number and to eliminate dependent networks.
The analysis will be taken through two stages at this point.
First, the emergency catchment areas of individual hospitals will be
defined, based primarily on the identification by ambulance services
of the hospital to which they transport most frequently in emergency
situations. 1 0  Some of the networks so defined turn out to be in-
complete and dependent on other networks or inconsistent with other
information, such as the service districts of ambulance organizations,
the patterns of referral and M.D. staff assignments, and general
community orientation. These inputs will result in some redefinition
of system areas and a reduction to a more manageable number.
Seventeen hospitals, including two not in the study area,
were initially identified as primary destinations of ambulance services,
Four Region II hospitals other than Doctors' Hospital were not named
by an ambulance service as a primary hospital: Whitinsville, Winchendon,
and Fairlawn and Hahnmann in Worcester. The last one, Hahnmann, which
has a high-volume emergency department, may be in this group because
no response to this question was available from Boylston, the town
closest to the hospital. The two hospitals outside the region boundaries
which are primary nodes for ambulance services in the region are the
Marlborough Hospital - for the towns of Northboro, Berlin, and Bolton -
and the Woonsocket Hospital - for Millville, Blackstone, and much of
Bellingham. The towns with the most unclear linkages are Boylston,
Douglas, Hardwick. North Brookfield, and New Braintree. The seventeen
areas are shown in dotted lines in Figure 5.
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The results of this initial description were unsatisfactory
for Worcester. A division into three emergency medical systems is an
artificial state which does not take into account a number of features of
emergency medical services delivery which cannot be so divided. First,
the residents of the city do not divide in their choice of hospital
emergency facilities on clear geographic lines. Second, the ambulance
services in the city serve all of the hospitals on occasion, even though
the prime emergency ambulance provider, the Worcester Police Department,
transports as a general policy to the Worcester City Hospital. 1 1 In
addition, the hospitals share an area-wide disaster plan and overlapping
physician pools, Hence, the Worcester case was redefined a single system
area, incorporating the emergency catchment areas of the Memorial,
St. Vincent, and Worcester City Hospitals. One system makes more sense
in terms of the unifying forces mentioned and allows the inclusion of
Fairlawn and Hahnmann Hospitals and the town of Boylston.
Th~1 emergency service areas of Mary Lane Hospital in Ware and
of Wing Hospital (Palmer) were considered as a single catchment area
as were those of the Leominster and Burbank (Fitchburg) Hospitals for
reasons of interdependence similar to those cited in the Worcester case.
The towns in the partial systems area of non-Region II hospitals
were circumsctibed into service areas of the Region II hospitals with
which they have an affiliation: Northboro into the Worcester :.ystem;
Berlin and Bolton into the Clinton area; and Bellingham, Blackstone,
and Millville with the Milford emergency medical servicesarea.
Finally, the four other towns without clear assignment were in-
cluded in the hospital emergency service area to which they seem to have
the most ready geographic access.
The eleven system areas are shown in heavy lines in Figure 5. Their
member towns are listed in Appendix C along with basic population data.
As can be observed, the areas are by no means uniform as to size -
either i- terms of population or geography. The following pages will
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reveal that they are also unequal as to emergency care resources.
This will ultimately lead to a proposal for organizing the delivery
of care in the final chapter.
The Use of Emergency Medical Services.
Two sources produced information describing the way emergency
medical services are used within the region: The 1971 emergency
facility survey of the Department of Public Health and the survey of
arrival modes at emergency rooms in Region II done specifically for
this study.1 2
Table 3 reports the results of the latter for each hospital
surveyed. Some caveats should be noted: The survey was brief and the
sample was limited. The recording procedures at the five hospitals
were not consistent as to definition of urgency, the proportion of
reported urgent cases varying from 10.5 percent at Hahnmann to 86.0
percent at Memorial, with Worcester City's 55.0 percent being the
median value. No doubt some variation in actual case load exists,
but when Memorial Hospital indicated that 86 percent of its patients
were urgent but 87.5 percent came by car, one is led to assume that
the criteria at the hospitals were quite different. Some of this is
unavoidable, and, in fact, one purpose of the survey was to reveal the
range of perceptions. The fact that no consensus exists illustrates
a basic problem in evaluating the need for emergency services.
Worcester City Hospital also apparently failed to keep track
carefully of night visits during at least part of the period, which
distorts its time-of-day breakdown and overall conclusions about night
visits. Fortunately, the other survey, done by the Department of
Public Health, also provides information about visits by time of day.
Table 4 presents data on Worcester area hospitals, including Holden
District Hospital, from the survey which counted the number of patients
arriving at each hospital during one week in the spring of 1971,
broken down by time-of-day, day-of-week, and by type of disposition.
Together, these two sources indicate that night visits (from
11 p.m. to 7 a.m.) make up less than 10 percent of the total daily
Table 3: Utilization Data for Large Emergency Facilities, by Hospital *
ITEM WORCESTER CITY MEMORIAL ST. VINCENT HAHNEMANN BURBANK TOTAL
"TOTAL VISITS" 729 100.0 375 100.0 343 100.0 387 100.0 266 100.0 2100 100.0
day (7 a.m.-3 p.m.) 443 60.5 155 41.5 152 44.0 221 57.0 133 50.0 1104 52.5
evening (3 p.m.-11 p.m.) 239 33.0 185 49.0 145 42.0 145 37.5 108 40.5 822 39.2
night (11 p.m.-7 a.m.) 472 6.5 35 9.5 46 14.0 21 5.5 25 9.5 174 8.3
age: 0-11 165 22.5 99 26.5 79 23.0 90 23.0 39 14.5 472 22.5
12-64 500 68.5 249 66.5 231 67.0 270 70.0 202 76.0 1452 69.1
65 + 64 9.0 27 7.0 33 10.0 27 7.0 25 9.5 176 8.4
Mode of Arrival:
private car 547 75.0 328 87.5 258 75.0 328 85.0 203 76.5 1664 79.2
police cruiser 33 4.5 12 3.0 39 11.5 17 4.5 4 1.5 105 5.0
municipal ambulance 44 6.0 8 2.0 12 3.5 10 2.5 28 10.5 102 4.9
private ambulance 6 1.0 4 1.0 3 1.0 2 0.5 8 3.0 23 1.1
taxi 36 5.0 3 1.0 4 1.0 14 3.5 11 4.0 68 3.2
other 63 8.5 20 5.5 27 8.0 16 4.0 12 4.5 138 6.6
U'
Table 3 continued
ITEM WORCESTER CITY MEMORIAL ST. VINCENT HAHNEMANN BURBANK TOTAL
U V% % % % % %Urgent Visits 3399 55.0 323 86.0 68 20.0 41 10.5 153 57.5 984 46.8
1 Visits during six days beginning Feb. 8 through Feb. 14, 1972.
2 This number represents an incomplete count.
3 "Urgent" was defined simply as needing "immediate Medical attention".
* Source: Survey of Arrival Modes, February 1972. 100 per cent sample for six days,
including a weekend. Entries made by ER personnel.
U'
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Table 4: Emergency Room Visits by Time of Arrival, Disposition, and
Relationship to Physician Coverage - Worcester Area
Hospitals.1
2
NUMBER OF VISITS % OF TOTAL
Total Visits 2854 100.0%
Time of Day
-day (7 a.m. - 3 p.m.) 1465 51.0%
-evening (3 p.m. - 11 p.m.) 1106 38.2%
-night (11 p.m. - 7 a.m.) 283 9.8%
Weekend Visits 693 24.3%
Visits during Low Coverage Period3 1731 60.7%
Treated and Discharged 2284 80.0%
Admitted to Hospital 293 10.3%
1 Fairlawn, Hahnemann, Memorial, St. Vincent, Worcester City, and
Holden District Hospitals.
2 Totals for one week.
3 Weekday evenings and nights plus all day Saturday and Sunday
* Source: Hospital Emergency Facility Survey, Bureau of
Resource Development, Department of Public Health.
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volume of the emergency rooms, yet the evening shift (from 3 p.m. to
11 p.m.) sees almost two-fifths of the total daily volume. Both
shifts are times of low M.D. coverage in the region as a whole.
From the arrival modes study, 58 percent of the visits during these
hours are classed as urgent. When weekend visits are added to week-
days, evening, and night visits, the total equals 61 percent of all
visits - thus, three-fifths of the visits come when physician coverage
is weakest.
Eighty percent of all visits during the period were taken care
of in the emergency room and discharged. Only one-tenth were admitted
(the proportion at Holden was one-sixth) and of the remaining 10 percent,
two-thirds were referred to the out-patient clinic or another facility.
As to the means of transportation used, emergency vehicles
accounted for 11 percent of the arrivals (see Fig. 6) but 17 percent
of urgent arrivals. If the Memorial Hospital figures are excluded,
the latter proportion is 22 percent. Interestingly, the variable with
the strongest association with the use of emergency vehicles is age:
38 percent of the patients sixty-five or older came by police cruisers
or public or private ambulance. Night visits are also more likely to
arrive by emergency transportation (more than one-fourth of those visits,
as opposed to the expected 11 percent).
Analyzing the types of emergency transportation separately -
public ambulances are used predomifiantly (85 percent) for urgent cases
and their use is skewed toward transporting elderly patients (30 percent
of their business.) They are used at night three times as often as
would be expected (24 trips instead of the expected 8.4), based on their
overall share. Patients arriving by private ambulance have urgent
conditions 70 percent of the time, are elderly in three-fourths of
the cases, and mostly come during the day shift (17 of 23 cases). 1 3
Patients arriving by police cruisers or cruiser wagons are less dis-
tinctive than those coming by ambulance but still tend to be elderly,
to be in urgent need of care, and to arrive at night.
Nevertheless, three-fourths of emergency room patients, including
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urgent ones, are said to come by car. 1 4 As pointed out previously,
these patients seldom give advance notice of their arrival, which
means that emergency rooms must be ready for whatever shows up. The
statistic may also indicate a lack of faith in or knowledge of how
to use the ambulance services in the area. The major ambulance
organizations serving these hospitals are full-time, and the mar-
ginal cost of additional demand for their service would presumably
be minimal, based on the number of ambulance vehicles, for serving
these hospitals. Each public ambulance presently brings only about
one urgent patient per day and each private ambulance, about one
every two days.
Capabilities of the System
1. Communications and Dispatching.
Almost every town has a municipal communications and dis-
patching system, which handles calls for ambulance service, where
it is town-provided, as well as the general public safety functions
and others. The larger communities have serarate police and fire
systems, and calls for ambulances use one or the other, depending
upon which runs the service. A few small communities, including
those which "borrow" ambulance coverage, use another town's dispatch
system. In one instance, Bolton and Berlin' are experimenting with
a shared system. Through these systems, the dispatching station can
communicate with all vehicles using the system, which allows ambulances
and police cruisers to have mutual access to each other in the towns
where ambulances are municipally dispatched. This enables a patrolman
in a cruiser to call for ambulance assistance directly.
The private services and the hospital-based service also have
radio-dispatched vehicles in every case, though one service reported
that at times it has had to share its frequency with an automobile
towing and repair firm's dispatching operation. In these instances
regular phone lines must suffice as the link between public safety
and ambulance dispatching.
All licensed services are nominally listed on the Department
of Public Health records as having twenty-four hour dispatching.
However, in many smaller communities and in the case of some of the
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private services, at least at night and on weekends,calls are taken at
someone's home. If the personnel are on an on-call status, the dis-
patcher must then make phone calls to a list of people until a crew
responds. Some of the private services, without primary emergency
responsibilities, actually close down in the evening, for all intents
and purposes, and a caller would have a difficult time contacting the
service if he tried at night.
The study did not attempt to ascertain in great detail the
policies which guide the actions of operators handling incoming calls.
The nature of their training for the assignment, the decision criteria
they use in determining how to advise callers or whom to contact, the
cases in which they refer or transfer calls - these aspects, along
with data concerning volume and frequency of service, would be important
topics as a follow-up to this report. Ambulance services do have
standard practices of screening and verifying calls, which amount to
implicit policies of sorts. Two services specifically reported that
they do not send an ambulance to a call until they get physician or
police cruiser confirmation. A number of others attempt to screen
out non-emergency requests. for service using implicit criteria. On
the other hand, some are quite willing to provide service whenever
requested. Volunteer groups who operate at very low volumes-and a
few public safety services do so because they see it as their duty to
"give the public what they pay for." Services which depend on the
revenue produced by a large volume of service (especially true of
profit-making private companies) are naturally anxious to provide
as much service as they can.
The communications and dispatch systems are the means by
which a kind of logistical control can be exerted: that is, control
over the deployment of resources in the individual case so that the
victim of a medical emergency is provided with what he needs where
he needs it, without delays, confusion, or mobilization of unneeded
equipment or personnel. Present systems in Central Massachusetts use
a technology that in many cases is too expensive for the scale at
which it is applied. Because of the constrained budgets and the
town-by-town pattern of systems, many communities depend on rather
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makeshift ways of using the hardware that would be subjected to severe
strain in a serious situation.
2. Training and Experience.
This section will present statistics on the training and ex-
perience of ambulance personnel in Region II. A 1957 statute requires
that every ambulance attendant must be "certified as having successfully
completed the senior Red Cross course of first aid training, or has
received training....equivalent thereto."15 However, the methods of
gathering information about and enforcing conformance to this requirement
are weak. The primary source for the data that will be presented on
the training aspect are the Reports of Training and Experience of
Attendants, which regulated services are to file with the Department
of Public Health for each individual attendant. Because these reports
do not always come in, are not kept current, and are not validated
as to the claims made, the following statistics are presented not as
a clear reflection of reality but as the only picture we have.
Eight percent of the recorded ambulance personnel of regulated
services have had only a standard first aid course. 1 6 The bulk of
the ambulance attendants and drivers in the region have an advanced
first aid certificate - 81 percent - which is to be expected since
this is the implicit requirement. The remainder, about 11 percent,
have additional training beyond advanced first aid such as cardio-
pulmonary resuscitation, the training course of the American Academy
of Orthopedic Surgeons, or military medical corpsman training. (See
Table 5)
Illustrative of the deficiencies which exist in the present
reporting and validating mechanism are the responses to a question
on the December, 1971 survey pertaining to training beyond the advanced
first aid course. The services were asked to give the percentage of
their personnel with training beyond the advanced first aid course.
Eleven of the twenty-five responses differed substantially. 1 7  from
what is recorded in the Departuent of Public Health records. It is
unclear which statistics are more reliable. As a consequence, trying
to assess skill levels is difficult. An explanation may be that, the
services which give themselves a higher percentage in answering the
survey counted related "short courses," as part of the extra training.
aTable 5: Training of Ambulance Personnel, by System Area
STANDARD FIRST AID
OR LESS
SYSTEM AREA #
ADVANCED
FIRST AID
TRAINING BEYOND
ADVANCED FIRST AID
# %
TOTAL PERSONNEL
# % 3
I Worcester
II Holden
III Clinton
11
1
7
IV Milford 18
0
11
V Webster
VI Southbridge
VII Palmer
VIII Athol
IX Gardner
2
4
0
X Fitchburg 12
7% 126 77%
2%
6%
15%
0
14%
5%
10%
0
13%
58 95%
75 66%
99 80%
52 100%
63 82%
36 92%
34 90%
19 100%
65 69%
26
2
32
7
0
3
16%
3%
28%
5%
0
4%
163 20%
61 7%
114 14%
124 15%
52 6%
77 9%
39 4
0
0
17
0
0
18%
5%
38 5%
19 2%
94 11%
XI Ayer 5 10% 42 86% 2 4% 49 6%
Total Region 71 8% 669 81% 90 11% 830 4 100%
1 Number of ambulance crew members listed as having standard first aid training or less.
2 Per cent of total personnel in system area.
3 Personnel in system area as a percentage of the regional total.
4 Does not include the RN's who serve on the Wing Hospital ambulance.
* Source: Bureau of Health Facilities files, Department of Public Health.
a'
*
SYSTEM AREA
# 1
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Those courses are not entered normally on Department of Public Health
records. The police and fire services, except in one case, were in
line with Department of Public Health records, and these organizations
do less with ambulance-related training outside the requirements because
of their other missions.
3. Equipment.
The aspects that seem important to present in this section
are the kinds of equipment available in non-regulated dual-purpose
vehicles, the degree to which regulated services conform to Department
of Public Health requirements, and the kind of vehicles used for
emergency transportation in Central Massachusetts.
Substantial disparity exists between the regulated and unregulated
ambulance services in terms of equipment available. Dual-purpose vehicles
are almost always station wagons, not designed to store medical supplies
and equipment along with other equipment necessary for police or fire
work. In nine towns interviewed, all had stretchers in their vehicles,
seven had oxygen available, six had basic first aid kits, two had
splints, and none had long spine boards. These are, for the most part,
larger communities near Worcester with full-time forces. Smaller towns
might have even less.
On the other hand, interviews revealed that many of the more
detailed items of equipment and supplies maintained by regulated
services are on hand simply to meet Department of Public Health
requirements and pass annual inspections, and are not considered
helpful. In the words of one volunteer ambulance committee chairman,
"Some of the things they make us keep are useless. Even the nurse-
inspectors don't know what we would do with them."
All of the regulated services are shown on Department of
Public Health records as generally meeting equipment requirements.
Some might view this statistic skeptically given the reporting process
and the anecdotes about switching equipment and supplies from one
vehicle to another.1 8 Four small services are recorded as missing at
least one item of medical equipment required, but this is a much better
average than was the case a couple of years ago.
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The other important aspect to mention here is the nature of
the vehicles used. The station wagons used for dual purposes have
only a cost advantage. In addition to their other limitations al-
ready mentions, they are too confined inside to allow first aid
treatment to be rendered underway. Most licensed services use
traditional-style Cadillacs or similar makes. In too many cases,
however, these are well past their prime: One town, for example,
must depend on a fifteen-year-old vehicle. Seven of tl-e sixty-three
ambulances licensed within the region are Carryall or Econoline
vehicles. These have the advantage of allowing much more room to
work inside, but the disadvantage of providing a less smooth ride.
No service in the region has a vehicle comparable to the Schwab
ambulance model, (which Boston's Department of Health and Hospitals
is purchasing) which is generally considered the best ambulance
type available and is not as expensive as a new Cadillac.
4. First Aid Practices and the Choice of Hospitals.
Ambulance services within the region-- especially "dual-
purpose" services - tend to emphasize getting the patient to a
hospital as fast as possible, with a minimum of first aid rendered
at the scene and underway, hoping that there "somebody who knows
what they're doing" can take care of the victim. An alternative policy
would emphasize the need for stabilizing the patient's condition
before transporting him and ensuring that his immediate situation and
acute medical needs are accurately assessed and taken care of. The
policy is justified by ambulance operators on the basis of the limited
training of personnel and the proximity to hospitals.
All regulated ambulance services responding to the December,
1971 survey answered that they "routinely give emergency first aid care,
when it is warranted, before and during transport," but the interpretation
of that statement may vary. Based on interviews, it seems that there
are some differences as to care given. Volunteer rescue squads, on
the whole, tend to render more first aid, and police services which have
no specifically assigned ambulance squad tend to do less - compared to
some average for all services in the region. The Wing Hospital ambulance
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service is in a class by itself because registered nurses act as the
ambulance attendants. Its level of initial care is much higher than
any other service.
The nonregulated services rely almost completely, in all but
two of the cases were information is specific, on getting to the
hospital quickly. Even the two exceptions give little first aid.
They will give oxygen but seldom do they splint or even apply dressings
to wounds.1 9
Because of these reasons, almost all ambulances have a simple
decision as to the choice of hospital emergency rooms: They go to
the closest one, if the distances between the hospitals are significant
(as they are in all areas but Worcester and perhaps Fitchburg-Leominster).
In Worcester, they go to the hospital with which they have developed a
relationship, where they know what to expect, even though they may, in
a given case, actually be nearer to another hospital. However, the
'nearest hospital" effect is still often apparent in the initial
decisions which led to the relationship; The communities adjoining
Worcester divide up on a distinct geographic basis in-their primary
hospital linkage. In ten cases within the region, the location of
the town or the distribution of the population within the town was
such that either of two primary hospitals might be chosen, depending
on the location of the emergency.
If the difference in the quality of the available emergency
facilities is marked, the more comprehensive one may be chosen even
if somewhat more distant. This, however, only seems to hold as far
as primary linkages where the distances to each are either very small
or quite great (e.g., Worcester, North Brookfield).
Two conditions may alter the ambulance crew's decision: The
severity of the patient's condition and the patient's expressed
preference for a certain hospital. Of thirty secondary affiliations
listed - that is, hospitals to which the ambulance service transports
second most frequently - twelve relate to a greater capacity on the
p art of the second hospital to handle severe cases. A number of
services in the Holden and Clinton systems will bypass those hospitals
and go on into Worcester if the need seems sufficiently great. The
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other eighteen linkages, however, were apparently not related to the
quality of the other hospital but rather were the result of patient
requests. For the services doing a good deal of routine transport,
patient requests may dominate the pattern of hospital linkages.
5. Ambulance-Hospital Relations.
The nature of the relationship between an ambulance service and
a hospital is more subtle than can be fully ascertained or explained in
this sort of study, when nineteen hospitals and three times that many
ambulance services are involved. Nevertheless, certain descriptors are
available which help define the objective relationship, and they will
be discussed in the following paragraphs. Data will be presented
concerning ambulance-hospital communications capabilities, advance
notification of the emergency room by the ambulance service, equipment
and supplies exchange agreements, evaluation and in-service training
of ambulance personnel personnel by emergency room staff, and information
exchange. The quality of the emergency care delivered is dependent on
the quality of these and the more subtle aspects of the relationship.
The Wing Hospital ambulance is the only emergency vehicle in
the region that can make direct radio contact wit, the hospital emer-
gency room from the scene or underway. Such communication capability
has the marked advantage of allowing medical professionals to give
instructions as to the care the victim should receive and to get first-
hand information about the patient's condition so that the appropriate
staff and facilities can be ready when the ambulance arrives. The
others must rely on regular phone connections.
In the 1970 Department of Public Health ambulance survey,
71 percent (twenty-five) of the thirty-five responding answered that
they "almost always" notify the emergency room in advance of arrival;
however, the Worcester Police Department, the service with the greatest
volume, was one of those which did not so answer. Telephone notification
from the ambulance dispatcher leaves much to be desired. Some emergency
room personnel expressed dissatisfaction because the dispatcher has
little information about the patient or the circumstances. As a result,
they say the calls are useless in helping hospital personnel prepare.
Ambulance personnel arrive, expecting everyone to be on the scene and
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ready to go, and dismayed when such is not the case. The result is cynicism
about the hospital emergency service. A common complaint was expressed this
way by one ambulance service: "We don't get cooperation in emergency
hospital rooms. Doctors are not there and ready when the ambulance arrives,
even though a call has been made ahead when the patient is in serious
condition."
Equipment exchange is perhaps a mundane feature of the interface be-
tween ambulances and hospitals but is an indicator of the cooperation that
exists. The term refers to arrangements whereby the hospitals loan or re-
place any ambulance equipment and supplies which ought best stay with the
patient until his condition is brought under control. It also relates to
agreements in which the hospital provides the ambulance service with clean
linens. Half (eighteen) of the certified ambulance services responding to
the 1970 Department of Public Health survey have such agreements with the
hospitals they regularly use. Two-thirds (thirteen)of the hospitals in the
region respond similarly. The systems that lack such arrangements are
Fitchburg and Ayer in the northeast and Webster and Southbridge in the south.
It is possible that, in a few cases, services using dual purpose vehicles
have such agreements. However, none have been discovered, so none are
indicated.
In response to questions regarding review and on-the-job training of
ambulance personnel, only five hospitals in the region claimed to "make any
evaluation of the treatment given by ambulance personnel prior to admission."
These were Holden District, Hubbard Regional, Leominster, Milford, and Wing
Memorial Hospitals. One ambulance service has prepared a letter to be sent
to the hospitals it uses, proposing a specific means of feedback and evalu-
ation of the treatment the ambulance crews render.
Depending on the ambulance and the hospital and individual people
involved, an ambulance attendant may or may not become familiar with the
work of the hospital emergency room. Factors which affect his involvement
with the emergency room are the volume of "business" handled by the emergency
room and the frequency with which he answers a call for emergency medical
assistance. Again with the exception of the Palmer system, no regular pro-
gram of in-hospital training or work exists, and what exposure ambulance
personnel do have is from just "sticking around and helping out" after the
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patient has been delivered.
As to the exchange of information about the patient, other
than the Wing Memorial Hospital and ambulance service, no case of
actual records transfer from ambulance to hospital exists in Region
II, but the ambulance organizations interviewed say that they usually
convey verbally some information about the circumstances at the scene
and the treatment they rendered. Unfortunately, the information-
exchange process is rendered less effective by the mutual lack of
understanding of each other's perspective. Hospital personnel complain
that ambulance personnel can't answer their questions, while ambulance
services respond that they do the best they can be expected to do,
given the low status accorded their work and the lack of interaction
with physicians.
"The ambulance service of today has a multitude of problems
that relate to the quality of patient care. I would say one
of our larger problems is recognition by the community,
hospitals, etc., as to our part in the emergency medical
field. With the increasing demands for better health care,
we find that we are no longer just ambulance drivers and
attendants, but a vital link in the proper care of the
sick and injured.'' 2 0
From the above and from interviews with hospital administrators
and ambulance service managers, it seems clear that the interface
between the ambulance and the hospital should be the focus of some
attention by both parties and by emergency medical systems planners.
The ambulance must become not only in theory but in reality, and
extension of the emergency room. Even if cooperation between the
emergency room staff and ambulance personnel is good - which it no
doubt is in many cases - the ambulance attendant is without the support
at the front line: He cannot communicate with the emergency room staff,
he does not have access to their experience, and he may not be certain
that they will be ready when he arrives.
6. Hospital Emergency Care.
In the final analysis, the most important element in the
emergency medical servicas delivery process is the ability of the
emergency facility to give the appropriate and necessary. If defi-
ciencies exist here, even an excellent ambulance service cannot fully
compensate.
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Region II has a relatively large number of hospital emergency
rooms but these tend to offer a limited range of services. Again
using the American Hospital Association classification, Table 6 shows
the region's actual and expected shares of the state's emergency rooms
of each class. The region has four-thirds the expected number of
emergency facilities, based on its population, and over twice the
expected number of provisional emergency units.
Of special interest is the proportion of emergency facilities
with extensive capabilities. Defining the expected proportion of such
units in a region as equivalent to the proportion for Massachusetts as
a whole, Table 7 gives the ratios of the actual number of major emer-
gency rooms to the expected number for the four regions of the state
outside of Greater Boston. A Region II hospital is the least likely
to be a major facility.
The Department of Public Health surveyed all hospitals in the
state a year ago to ascertain their capabilities and characteristics
as to emergency care. The results for Region II are summarized in
Table 8 along with percentages for the entire state. The percentages
refer to the proportion of hospitals responding affirmatively to a
given question. It is apparent that the region has a lower proportion
of hospitals with almost every capability than does Massachusetts as
a whole. Only in the percentages of hospitals with twenty-four hour
R.N. coverage and with a training program for attending staff does the
region's percentage slightly exceed the state's. The largest differences
are in terms of hospitals with the capabilities to handle head and chest
injuries, those with twenty-four hour in-hospital M.D. coverage, and
with full-time availability of radiologists and anesthetists. Region II,
in fact, has the lowest proportion of hospitals with around-the-clock
physician coverage of all eight regions.
One cannot necessarily conclude that the total supply of these
capabilities in the region is inadequate, just that what is available is
centralized in fewer hospitals. It is vital that the public and, especially
ambulance personnel understand the limited range of emergency services at
many Central Massachusetts hospitals.
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Table 6; Region II's Share of Emergency Facilities by Category *
REGION II's
MASSACHUSETTS ACTUAL SHARE
REGION II's 4 ACTUAL AS A %
EXPECTED SHARE OF EXPECTED
Population 713,700 (12.6%) 100%
Major units 32 3 4.0 75%
Basic units 59 11 7.4 149%
Provisional units 18 5 2.3 220%
All emergency rooms 2 109 19 13.7 138%
1 The expected share is the number in relation to the state total that
is proportionate to the region's share of the state's population (12.6%).
Thus, 12.6% (or 4) of the major emergency rooms in the state would be
expected in Region II.
2 Emergency rooms of non-military, short-term general hospitals.
*Source: GUIDE ISSUE, Hospitals, JAHA, August 1971.
Table 7; Comparative Numbers of Major Emergency
Region for Outlying Regions
Departments by
MASS. REGION I REGION II REGION VII REGION VIII
Total emergency 2
units 109 14 19 16 9
Major units 32 3 3 3 3
Expected # of
major units (29.4%) 4.1 5.6 4.7 2.6
Actual as a % of
expected 100% 73% 54% 64% 115%
1 Region I-Western Massachusetts, Region VII-Southeastern Massachusetts,
Region VIII-Northeastern (Merrimack Valley).
2 Emergency rooms of non-military, short-term general hospitals.
3 The expected number of major units is that number which, in proportion
to total emergency rooms, equals the state relatioship.
(29.4% of all emergency rooms are major units).
* Source: GUIDE ISSUE, Hospitals, JAHA, August 1971.
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*Table 8: Hospital Emergency Facility Capabilities
Number of Hospitals
Capabilities
Prepared to give extensive
treatment for:
contagious diseases
pychiatric disorders
crushed bones
severe burns
severe head injuries
1
(1)( ( 3) (4) (5) (6)L(7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
6 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 12
xx3
x
x
x
x
x x
x
x
x
x x x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
CENTRAL MASS.
19 100%
8
5
.11
9
6
42
26
58
47
32
severe chest injuries x x x x x 9 41 70
Emergency admission bypass
procedures x x x xx x x x 17 90 97
All ER patients seen by MD x x x x x x x x 16 84 87
MD's on duty in ER required
to be in hospital x x x x x 9 47 77
ER staffed 7 days/24 hrs. by
ND/trainee x x x x x 8 42 69
H
MAS S.
100%
56
28
78
65
60
Table 8: continued
1 CENTRAL MASS. MASS.
(1)(2)(3)(4) (5) (6)(7)(8) (9) (10) (1) %
Radiologist on duty more than
8 hrs/day x x 5 26 53
Anesthetist on duty more than
8 hrs/day x x x x x x x x 12 63 90
RN on duty in ER 7 days/24-hrs. x x x x x x x x x x 18 95 93
An EMS training program for
attending staff
took place lastyear 100110102 0 6 32 30
The Hospital has an Intensive
Care Unit (ICU) x x x x x x x x x
1 1) Worcester System, 2) Holden, 3) Clinton, 4) Milford, 5) Webster, 6) Southbridge, 7) Palmer
8) Athol, 9) Gardner, 10) Fitchburg and 11) Ayer.
2 The Fort Devens Army Hospital is also located in this EMS system and it responded affirmativel
to the items dotted and can support the civilian system in an emergency. However, it is not
counted in regional totals.
3 A check indicates that at least one hospital in the system has this capability, no that every
hospital does.
* Source: Survey of Emergency Facilities, Massachusetts Department of Public Health, Division of
Medical Care 1971.
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Table 8 also breaks the capablilities down by emergency medical
system area. The Worcester area is adequately covered on all points.
The Fitchburg system lacks only night time radiologist coverage, and
the Gardner area lacks that and, in addition, must look to Fitchburg
in emergency cases involving contagious diseases or psychiatric dis-
orders. The Palmer emergency medical system is next in line, having
to look to the Springfield area hospitals for help in aspects where
the Wing and Mary Lane Hsopitals are deficient.
In the other seven systems, hospital emergency care capabilities
are sharply limited. Thirty-six percent of the people of Central
Massachusetts live in these areas and would normally be taken to one
of these hospitals if they were to call an ambulance service for
emergency assistance.
One of the things that makes the subject of emergency care
difficult to deal with is that the human consequences of the processes
of service delivery are great, and no provider is especially anxious
to admit to shortcomings. In Central Massachusetts, negligence on
the part of providers is clearly not a problem. Almost all seem earnest
in their desire to carry out their role with regard to emergency care
responsibility.
Yet sincerity is not enough. The case presentation preceding
has revealed the weakness of the system as it stands - not because
ambulance services and hospitals and police forces are not trying -
but because each has too limited a role, defined so by the cumulative
effect of public apathy, town parsimony, the low priority of emergency
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care on the overall agenda of many providers, and the absence of co-
operative planning. The result is fragmentation and lack of account-
ability. Both the response and guidance systems as they stand within
the Region are more primitive and more unreliable than they ought to be.
The following chapters will first pursue in depth the character
of the deficiencies and then develop a direction of change, as well as
the means to and effects of that change.
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NOTES
1For a list see Appendix C.
2 The major resistance to the Governor's Ambulance Bill will be from
the Selectman's and Police and Fire Chiefs Associations who fear
the added costs forthcoming if these vehicles are brought under
Department of Public Health jurisdiction.
30ne town interviewed did have a $12. fee for this service.
4 It is possible that a few of the towns counted in the first group
(as having no in-town ambulance) in fact provide service on this
basis.
5West Boylston is included here because it uses a special ambulance
vehicle which it says meets all state requirements, evene.though the
Department of Public Health has no record of its existence.
6 Deputy Egan, interview.
7 Data on the 20 is presented in Table 2.
8Compared to many states the linear distances are small. However,
the slower speeds possible on New England roads make for heavy
friction with distance. Travel times will not be given explicit
consideration in this study because the only means discovered for
estimating travel times on the rural roads in Central Massachusetts
would have been to drive them - a process too laborious to be done
for this study. Such information is important for regional planning
and ought to be available.
9Hospitals, Journal of the American Hospital Association, August, 1971.
1 0The regulated ambulance services were asked to rank the hospitals they
serve as a part of both the 1970 survey of ambulance services admin-
7istered by the Department of Public Health and the December, 1971
survey done for this study. The same question was asked of non-
regulated police and fire services interviewed.
llIn an interview, Deputy Chief Daniel F. Egan explained that this
policy is based on the fact that, by experience, they know that
City emergency ward staff and facilities are always ready to handle
whatever they might bring in.
1 2No sampling of hospital emergency room records was done - which would
have produced additional data-relating to patient origins and to types
of conditions - because such a sample had already been taken and coded
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as part of an ambulatory care study in which the Comphrehensive Health
Council was involved. Though it was expected that data processing
would be completed in time for Inclusion of the results in this report,
it was not. Only preliminary variable frequency counts are available,
and these are of minimal use here because they include data from out-
patient clinics as well as emergency rooms.
1 3Most of the work of these private services involves scheduled "routing"
transfer of patients. If they are coming to a hospital, they are
usually already under physician care and are admitted directly. Con-
sequently they do not show up in the figures presented here.
14A survey done by the Athol Hospital during January had basically
similar results: 82.5 percent came in their own or a relative's car,
11 percent were brought by the police or fire, and 9.5 percent came
some other way.
1 5Chapter 90, Section 7F, General Laws, Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
1 6Almost all police and firemen in the nonregulated services would seem
to fit into this category, based on interviews.
17A difference of more than 20 percent was counted.
1 8In an interview, one person said that he knew of cases where an
organization with two vehicles would empty the one of equipment
on the day of inspection and hide it, then claiming it had sud-
denly been called on a run to Boston. The inspector would have
to return to inspect the second vehicle, this time with the first
gone.
19Interviews with the department chiefs.
2 0 Santor, Stanley F., Jr., President, Scott-McAvoy Ambulance Service,
January 3, 1972.
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Chapter IV: An Evaluation: The Effects of Policy on the Delivery System
Gauges to measure and evaluate the output of the emergency medical
services delivery system are, as with almost all social services, hard to
come by. We cannot determine with confidence, for example, a causal
relationship between mortality figures from emergency conditions and char-
acteristics of the delivery system; there are simply too many uncontrollable
variables. As a consequence, the delivery of services must be accounted
for on the basis of input indicators.
The previous two chapters have provided a description of the
services and the means for guiding their delivery. This chapter will
attempt to evaluate the success of the guidance process and the resulting
effectiveness of the delivery system on the basis of the input criteria
which were set out at the beginning of the study: quality of the response,
geographic accessibility of services, and economic efficiency.
The Tradeoffs
These basic criteria are difficult to harmonize fully. In part
they conflict or cannot be measured in terms relevant to one another.
Thus, the policy-making process has to be one of assigning priorities
among the three. As shall be made evident, imposing higher standards as
to quality (e.g. twenty-four hour physician-covered emergency rooms, full-
time emergency medical technicians as ambulance attendants, etc.) and main-
taining criteria of economic efficiency entails sacrificing some accessi-
bility and vice-versa. Because the relative merits of the aspects involved
in the trade-offs cannot be fully assessed, the choice and priority-
assigning process is dependent to some extent on value judgments and is
strongly affected by external considerations.
It would seem that the towns in central Massachusetts have
implicitly favored geographic accessibility over economic efficiency and
quality of care, as a result of the long-standing tradition of town
autonomy. They have opted for town-based ambulance districts in the great
majority of cases. Within that framework, they have opted for low cost
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ways of providing service such as dual-purpose or used vehicles and on-
call personnel, ahead of considerations of the quality of care. This is
not to say that issues of quality have been left out entirely; rather,
the other concerns have simply seemed more important. One gets the
impression that local decision makers feel that quality of medical care
is not particularly affected by town determinations about ambulance
service, viewing quality of care as "the doctors' problem" and as affected
by hospital practices, rather thlan by ambulance work, which they feel is
after all only transportation.
Hospitals seem also to place a higher priority on accessibility
because some operate emergency services for which there is no apparent
need. Hospitals would clearly rather offer some emergency service even
though guarantees as to the quality of service may be weak. They are
willing to provide service at a loss (thus, inefficient in one sense),
but may not be willing to make the outlay necessary to meet the desired
state standard of twenty-four hour M.D. coverage.
The state, in turn, seems to place greater weight on either
quality standards, such as its ambulance requirements, or efficiency
criteria, which predominate in "determination of need" evaluations, even
if the net effect is to make services less accessible by some degree.
There is no ill intent--it is simply a perception of priorities.
For the most part, the decisions which, in their cumulative effect,
shape these policies are made independently by the parties involved. The
consequences are unnecessary confusion, lack of cooperation, and distrust
in the delivery and guidance of emergency medical services. No forum
exists in the region or elsewhere where ambulance providers and hospital
administrators and physicians, etc. meet to develop policy for emergency
care, except on an occasional adversary basis, as in legislative hearings.
The Department of Public Health is not required to involve individual
providers in emergency services guidance activities. The proposed emer-
gency medical services Advisory Board would formalize a means of represen-
2
tation but only taps statewide interest groups.
It is understandable, however, that at the state level partici-
pation in policy-making is necessarily diluted. The problem is that
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what representation at the state level does exist seems to favor the
Greater Boston providers who are immediately accessible and may be the
more visible members of associations and interest groups. As a result,
there is no assurance that the characteristics and capacities of other
areas are fully accounted for. Also, the absence of regional planning
and policy-making machinery in Central Massachusetts makes it difficult
to achieve the kind of dialogue necessary to resolve the various
perspectives.
The rest of the chapter will attempt to apply the three criteria
separately to highlight the delivery system and the effects of policy
from all three perspectives and to demonstrate the interplay between the
criteria. The final section will examine the processes of feedback by
which accountability is achieved.
The Quality of Cake
As was discussed in the first chapter, aspects of the quality of
care that are important are the triage or sorting procedures to quickly
recognize those with emergent needs, the initial care rendered to stab-
ilize the patient's condition as much as possible until definitive
treatment is possible, and the speed with which physician management of
care is established. These relate to the training of personnel (and the
equipment they have access to), to the arrangements between ambulances
and hospitals, and to the policies of each.
1. State Standards.
The present statutory basis for standards pertaining to quality
and the means of accounting for compliance with them is limited. Distilling
existing standards and regulations, the state has four major standards:
1. Ambulance crew should have "senior first aid".
2. Emergency Rooms and ambulance services should provide twenty-
four hour service.
3. A physician should be "available at all times for service in
the emergency room.
. 4. Ambulance should be designed and equipped and used only for
that purpose.
Chapter III described the delivery system on the basis of those requirements.
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The policy development efforts now being pursued would, if
successful, expand the requirements substantially (though possibly also
differentiating the requirements into categories according to the
capacities and service of the provider): The services using "dual
purpose" vehicles would be brought under the regulatory provisions. The
training requirements for emergency ambulance attendants would eventually
go well beyond present first aid requirements. Emergency rooms would
have to have twenty-four hour in-house physician coverage; and area-wide
planning and state determination of need would become more important.
The existing delivery system does not fare well against these
criteria, even though they are still insufficient in some ways, especially
relating to the means of establishing physician management of care.
Presently, few ambulance attendants have training beyond first aid; only
eleven of nineteen hospitals now meet the requirement of physician coverage;
and little area-wide planning or determination of service characteristics
occurs that is based on regional needs.
2. Improving Physician Management of Care nelivered-
Beyond what proposed standards will specifically require, other
aspects pertaining to the effectiveness of physician supervision can be
evaluated.
No case was discovered of an ambulance service with a physician
advisor. The advantages of an ambulance service having regular access to
a doctor are clear. Not only can he help them determine appropriate
training programs, but he can also help them choose and learn how to use
supplies and equipment, evaluate their individual capabilities and their
handling of specific situations and act as a liaison to hospitals. The
lack of such regular interaction is a loss both to the ambulance organi-
zations and to a medical staff who would likely benefit from a better
perspective on the skills and attitudes of the outreach personnel.
The lack of in-hospital work experience for almost all ambulance
personnel not only has implications for training, which were mentioned
earlier; it is an additional instance of non-interaction between the
outreach personnel and the medical profession, further extenuating the
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effective management of care. The lack of regular evaluation of care
also mentioned in relation to training, is still another demonstration
of deficient quality control processes as expressed in physician super-
vision of care.
One of the most crucial defects in present arrangements is that
the medical staff of an emergency room have no direct involvement with
the patient's condition until he arrives at the emergency room (with the
exception of Wing Hospital). If adequately notified, they may prepare
but at best that is of rather limited utility. Present communications
technology would allow very easily and inexpensively the establishment of
two-way radio links between ambulances and hospitals which would allow
the exchange of information and instructions as emergency outreach systems
in various parts of the country have proven. Some have even demonstrated
rather successfully, in high volume settings, the benefits of ambulance-
to-hospital telemetric monitoring of vital signs.
No doubt one reason for the lack of such radio communications
links is that ambulances use more than one hospital, partially as a result
of patient requests. Yet technically it is not a major problem to establish
channels for key hospitals. The relationships among an ambulance service,
the hospital(s) it uses, and the catchment areas of each could well be
more systematic and efficient, and such would tend toward improvement of
a number of the features mentioned in the last few pages. However,
tightening these relationships would necessarily involve not only estab-
lishing ambulance-hospital radio contact and improving policy as to the
choice of hospital emergency rooms but also would necessitate creating
emergency staff privileges for physicians at hospitals other than those
they regularly use. If such a policy of granting emergency privileges
were standard, not all hospitals (in Worcester, for example) would have
to maintain full-scale emergency services. Furthermore, patient requests
as to hospital would diminish if patients knew their physician could treat
them at the emergency room to which they were taken. This would tend to
enhance the quality of hospital-ambulance cooperation as regular relation-
ships would be established. The objective of continuity in care delivery
would also be better met.
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Not discussed in the preceeding is the competence of a physician.
It is not the place of this study to suggest which physicians or specialties
meet that criterion. However, it can be said that a physician only rarely
exposed to conditions associated with medical emergencies will be less
prepared to deal with them. Some cogent arguments are made by proponents
of small group-practice coverage of a hospital's emergency service as to
the benefits of having experts in the care of trauma handling the emer-
gency case load, and Burbank Hospital plans to adopt this type of system
shortly. However, opponents make a case for other disadvantages of that
kind of coverage, especially its failure with respect to the continuity
of care objective. The matter will be left to professionals to consider.
3. Effects of Utilization.
Not expressed as a standard but nonetheless significant for
emergency care is the high ratio of provider personnel to requests for
service in Region II. Because of this ratio there is a danger of loss of
skills or inexperience with certain kinds of situations. The number of
people involved is large because of the common use of part-time and vol-
unteer staffing of ambulances and of rotation as the method of hospital
emergency room staffing. The demand for emergency medical services is
diffused and relatively low per providing unit because of the low popu-
lation density over most of the region. The analysis of utilization of
human skills and capital resources will be considered in greater detail
in the later section on economic efficiency.
The predominant use of private cars to get to the emergency room
also has implications for quality of care in that it means that triage and
stabilization do not occur until the patient arrives at the hospital. By
not taking advantage of medical outreach and transportation, people deprive
themselves of initial care and assistance. On the other hand, if emergency
resources are over-used, they are less available to those who might need
them more urgently. However, over-use ought probably not to be a serious
concern in Central Massachusetts. Perhaps if an improved ambulance
service existed in which people had more confidence, the utilization of
ambulances would be higher.
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Geographic Access
From this point on, the evaluation of delivery has no "official"
standards to rely on. Certainly, the policy of all emergency medical
services providers and planners is that services be as accessible as
possible to everyone, but no attempt is made to define a minimum desirable
level of geographic proximity to services. The same holds true of the
economic efficiency criteria. Judgments about what constitute acceptable
or desirable levels are hard to come by and without consensus. Hence,
evaluation of present delivery patterns must be based on comparisons with
other areas or with possible alternative modes of delivery.
Measuring the accessibility of services to a population must take
into account a number of variables, including population densities, char-
acteristics of the road network, weather, traffic, habits as to travel
and effects of stress factors associated with distance on the patient's
condition.
Because of the complexity of these variables, accessibility can
only be described in simple and somewhat arbitrary terms. Since, however,
the purpose will primarily be to show the effects of policy and to allow
intraregion adjustments in the distribution of services, these terms are
adequate.
A three-way geographic breakdown (within five miles, five-ten
miles, more than ten miles) will be used to represent three levels of
accessibility to hospital emergency service. These distances are obviously
arbitrary but do relate satisfactorily to the scale of the region and to
present characteristics of distribution. Almost all are within ten miles
of a hospital with an emergency service.
The categorization of emergency rooms used by the American Hospital
Association is a surrogate for the classification system proposed in the
4
revisions of state emergency facility regulations. If the hospital
facilities are grouped according to those categories, adjusted for the
physician coverage as in Chapter III, then these can be related to the
three-way proximity breakdown above. The result is ten zones of access-
ibility which are, for simplicity's sake, presented in three classes:
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population within five miles of emergency service (as defined in proposed
regulations), population five to ten miles of emergency service, and
population without a hospital emergency service within ten miles. The
areas within each are mapped in Figure 7. Tabel 9 lists the ten zones and
the population within each.
The important categories to note are No. 4, No. 5, and No. 8 --
those people presently within five miles of an emergency room without
twenty-four hour in-house M.D. coverage. Presently 4/5 are within five
miles of an emergency room of some sort (No. 1-5, No. 8). Only one per
cent of the population is beyond ten miles from an emergency department.
If the state's proposed policy of requiring emergency services to have
twenty-four hour in-house medical coverage were to go into effect abruptly
with no change in hospital staffing patterns, the percentage of the popu-
lation within five miles of an emergency service (No. 1 - No. 3) would
then drop to fifty per cent and the proportion farther than ten miles from
a recognized facility would increase to seventeen per cent.
If outlying areas such as Palmer and Webster were unable to meet
the requirements for "routine" emergency service, (if, for example, the
retiring doctors could not be replaced) the population within five miles
of an emergency facility might be as low as forty per cent (No. 1 and the
part of No. 3 served by Burbank Hospital) of the region's total and the
percentage more than ten miles away might be as high as forty per cent.
Table 10 shows the situation in each emergency medical system
area given the three alternative circumstances. Table 11 analyzes this
pattern of accessibility for five of the eleven systems which are focused
on emergency facilities with twenty-four hour M.D. coverage and for the
six which do not have such service available. Only six per cent of the
population in the other six system areas is within five miles of a basic
or major facility. In fact, a total of 95,000 people (forty-four per cent)
in these six areas lived more than ten miles from an emergency room with
twenty-tour hour M.D. coverage, and eleven per cent have no access to even
a provisional emergency room within five miles.
Five western towns in the Worcester and Holden systems (the
Brookfields, Barre and Oakham) are out of range of any emergency room,
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*Table 9: Zones of Accessibility to Hospital Services
ZONE POPULATION %
Emergency Facility within Five Miles 366,300 51.3
1. Major unit with 5 221,200 31.0
2. Basic unit within 5--5-10 from major 19,200 2.7
3. Basic unit within 5 125,900 17.6
Emergency Facility within Ten Miles 226,900 31.7
24. 5-10 from major--provisional within 5 25,500 3.6
5. 5-10 from basic--provisional within 5 102,900 14.4
6. 5-10 from major 49,000 6.8
7. 5-10 from basic 49,500 6.9
No Emergency Facility within Ten Miles 120,600 17.0
8. provisional unit within 5 82,400 11.6
9. 5-10 from provisional 31,200 4.4
10. No unit of any kind within 10 miles 7,000 1.0
TOTAL 713,700 100.0
1 An "emergency facility" is one meeting the proposed state requirement
of having twenty-four hour physician coverage in the emergency room.
2 A "provisional unit" is one either so classified in the AHA GUIDEBOOK
or a facility listed as basic which does not have around-the-clock
physician staffing.
* Source: Data on 1970 Population distribution, Department of
Affairs, Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
Community
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Table 10: The Effect on Accessibility of Alternative Policies-*
Regarding Hospital Emergency Service, by System Area
SYSTEM AREA
I Worcester
II Holden
III Clinton
IV Milford
V Webster
VI Southbridge
VII Palmer
VIII Athol
IX Gardner
X Fitchburg
XI Ayer
Total Region
PRESENT POLICY
Within 54 Beyond 10
240,000 3,000
19,100 4,000
25,000 0
58,300 0
27,900 0
21,800 0
29,600 0
17,400 0
31,000 0
85,200 0
17,000 0
572,300 7,000
80% 1%
PROPOSED POLICY 
2
Within 5 Beyond 10
223,500 20,600
800 8,500
900 5,100
10,800 38,200
27,900 0
0 5,500
16,400 5,000
0 19,900
24,200 0
61,800 0
0 17,800
366,300 120,600
51% 17%
1Catchment populations of all hospitals presently offering emergency service
2Catchment populations of all hospitals with twenty-four hour MD staffing
of ER
3Catchment populations of the Worcester, Fitchburg, Springfield, and
Framingham ER's.
4Within five air miles of an emergency facility
*Source: 1970 Population distribution data from the Department of
Community Affairs, Commonwealth of Massachusetts
POLICY3
FAVORING URBAN ER's
Within 5 Beyond 10
220,500 23,400
800 8,500
0 24,800
0 85,000
0 31,200
0 25,700
0 21,600
0 21,000
0 29,700
61,800 0
0 17,800
283,100 288,700
40% 40%
Table 11: Disparity of Access to Hospital Emergency Services *
TOTAL
UDTIOT A TnT
POPULATION BEYOND 5 MI.
RDOM EMERENCYr FACITY T
POPULATION BEYOND 10 MI.
FPOM EMERGENCY FACLITTY
POPULATION BEYOND
5~ FRO(M PROVISIONAL2
Six system areas
served by ER's
with limited MD
coverage 217,300 204,800 94% 95,000 44% 23,900 11%
Five system areas
with ER's
covered around
the clock by MD's 496,400 142,700 29% 25,600 5% 14,300 3%
Region Total 713,700 347,500 49% 120,600 17% 38,200 5%
lAn emergency room offering twenty-four MD coverage in-house.
2An emergency room not offering night and weekend MD coverage in-house.
*Source: Data on 1970 population distribution, Department of Community Affairs.
00
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relative to other areas in the region at least, and most of the western
part of the study area is more than ten miles to an emergency room if in-
house M.D. staffing is required. In that case, much of the Ayer, Clinton,
and Milford system areas are also more than ten miles away. It is also
apparent that the distances to the major emergency services in Worcester
are substantial from the corners of the region.
The preceding analysis confirms the need to examine what the access
benefits would be if emergency services that are presently provisional (or
basic without M.D.'s in-house at night) could be upgraded. Table 12
presents the populations added to the upper two classes of accessibility,
if the hospital were able to organize so as to maintain an emergency
physician in-house twenty-four hours a day. The numbers cannot be totaled
since Ayer,.Clinton, and Holden overlap in the areas they serve.
In terms of total population benefitted, the order of priority
for hospital service upgrading would be: Milford, Clinton, Leominster,
Holden, Harrington, Ayer, Northbridge, Athol and Ware.
Because most ambulance service is limited to a single community,
access to ambulance service will, for the present, be defined on that basis:
Ambulances outside the boundaries of the community under examination are
considered inaccessible to that community for emergency service.
The preceding chapter pointed out that at most two per cent of the
region's population lived in towns without at least a dual-purpose station
wagon in the town. We have already seen, however, that if the requirement
is that regular transporting of patients must be done in fully equipped
vehicles designed and used solely for ambulance work, then almost one-
fifth of the population is without effective access to ambulance service.
If on-call personnel were disallowed, almost half of the residents of
Central Massachusetts would be considered without access to ambulance
service, according to the above criterion of accessibility. The next
section will re-examine this issue.
Access to emergency ambulance service, by system area, is indicated
in Table 13. Three areas have 100 per cent coverage. Seven of the eleven
areas have licensed service in at least half of the towns. The towns
surrounding Worcester constitute the largest population aggregate without
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Table 12: The Effects on Accessibility of Upgrading Hospital
Emergency Services *
HOSPITAL 1
Fairlawn
Holden District
Clinton
Milford
Harrington Memorial
Nashoba Community
Leominster,
Athol
Mary Lane
Northbridge
Winchendon
POPULATION.
ADDED WITHIN 5
0
16,000
26,600
38,900
22,400
17,000 3
26,800
17,400
13,000
23,700
6.600
2 POPULATION
ADDED WITHIN 5-10
0
9,100
2,600 3
6,000
1,800
6,000
0
2,200 3
8,900
0
0
TOTAL
POPULATION
AFFECTED
0
25,100
29,200 3
44,900 3
24,200
23,000 3
26,800
19,600 3
21,900
23,700
6.600
1Hospital emergency facility with limited physician coverage. Assumed
in each case is that the emergency service is upgraded to meet the
proposed state requirement of continuous MD staffing.
2The population living within five miles of the named emergency facility
without similar access to any higher order emergency facility.
3Additional population would be served in communities outside the region.
*Source: Hospital Emergency Facilities Survey of the Department of
Public Health; data from Department of Community Affairs.
RANK
11
4
2
1
5
6
3
8
9
7
10
Table 13: Access to Ambulance Service, by System Area
SYSTEM AREA
TOTAL NUMBER
OF LOCALITIES
LOCALITIES WITH .1
AMBULANCE SERVICE
PER CENT OF TOTAL
POPULATION SERVED
I Worcester
II Holden
III Clinton
IV Milford
V Webster
VI Southbridge
VII Palmer
VIII Athol
IX Gardner
X Fitchburg
16
6
5
10
4
3
9
7
4
6
6
3
5
6
4
3
4
2
1
4
72%
64%
100%
86%
100%
100%
57%
82%
59%
92%
XI Ayer 5 3 61%
Region Total 75 41 80%
IAmbulance service licensed by the Department of Public Health.
*Source: Ambulance statistics of the Bureau of Health Facilities,
Department of Public Health.
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regulated service: 78,400 people relying on dual-purpose vehicles (or, in
the case of Shrewsbury, uncertified ambulances).
Since, however, certain areas have real difficulties as far as
proximity to hospital emergency services, present forms of ambulance
service cannot be considered as adequately meeting the needs of those
areas for access to services. Communities located in the middle and
western parts of the region that have no emergency room nearby or have
one with serious inadequacies need ready access to a more sophisticated
level of outreach to them to compensate for inaccessible hospital emergency
care.
Economic Efficiency
Medical care is delivered in a framework of limited resources.
If the system of delivery uses the available resources inefficiently,
then it is able to do less overall than it optimally might. A concern
of the citizenry and public and institutional officials faced with con-
strained budgets is to "hold the line" on costs. If emergency medical
services delivery is to improve, policies must be developed which insure
that the organization of the response system is effective in this regard.
I. Measuring Utilization.
The primary issue is that of utilization--the demand per unit of
supply. Initially here, demand will be measured simply by the frequency
of requests for service.5 As pointed out previously, there are no clear
standards here as to what ought to be; hence, we will move in the dis-
cussion toward testing out maximum levels of utilization by hypothesizing
alternative modes of delivery.
Data necessary for a thorough evaluation on the basis of efficiency
are not available to this study. What is presented deals primarily with
ambulance services and is intended to outline the methods. It ought to
be sufficienthowever, to reveal policy effects.
A rule of thumb commonly used with respect to ambulance work is
that a population of one thousand generates about thirty-five emergency
6
calls per year. This figure does not include non-emergency requests,
such as for routine transfer work. The figure was checked against
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available data on ambulance runs in given service areas and it holds up
surprisingly well--certainly well enough to use here, since comparable
data from all areas of the region on numbers of runs are not available.
This figure can be used to compute demand for service within areas of
the region, and the demand can then be related to the numbers of vehicles
and personnel.
Using that rule of thumb, Region II generates 25,000 calls per
year or about sixty-nine per day. With sixty-three ambulances (not
counting dual-purpose vehicles), the average use is 1.1 calls per day.
In Worcester, where two Worcester Police ambulances responded to 5,134
7
calls in 1971, each ambulance made about seven trips per day. The
total does include some no-service calls and some calls which might not
have been emergencies but that hardly mitigates the difference between
the Worcester rate and the region rate. For contrast, adjacent Leicester,
using two cruiser wagons, answered 425 calls for medical transportation--
about 0.6 calls per day per ambulance.
Table 14 gives the breakdown by system area, ranging from the
Clinton area, where the average number of trips per ambulance per day
is 0.4, to the Worcester system where the daily average is almost five
times that. Most cluster around one trip per day.
A similar analysis is possible for crew members of ambulance
services, which has implications both for the criterion of economic
efficiency and that of quality; 830 people are members of licensed
ambulance organizations within the region. If they respond to calls two
at a time, they each participate on the average, in sixty calls per year
or about one every six days. In Worcester, with thirty people manning
the city ambulances, each participated in 340 calls in a year or nearly
one every day. The statistics for each system area are shown in Table 15.
Again, the Worcester and Clinton systems are the extremes.
Using this kind of analysis with regard to hospital emergency
facilities is hampered by the lack of definition for a provider unit other
than the emergency room itself and the lack of uniformity as to capacity
among emergency rooms.
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Table 14: The Utilization of Ambulances, by System Area
NUMBER POPULATION TRIPS
of 1 PER PER 2
SYSTEM AREA POPULATION AMBULANCES AMBULANCE DAY
I Worcester 293,200 15 19,550 1.9
II Holden 28,400 4 7,100 0.7
III Clinton 27,700 6 4,600 0.4
IV Milford 86,000 8 10,750 1.0
V Webster 36,300 6 6,050 0.6
VI Southbridge 26,600 4 6,650 0.6
VII Palmer 39,600 4 9,900 1.0
VIII Athol 21,000 2 10,500 1.0
IX Gardner 33,700 3 11,250 1.1
X Fitchburg 93,700 8 11,700 1.1
XI Ayer 27,600 3 9,200 0.9'
Total Region 713,700 63 11,300 1.1
1Ambulances licensed by the Department of Public Health of similarly
designed and equipped.
2Assuming 35 trips per year per 1000 population or almost 0.1 trip
per day.
*Source: census data, Bureau of Health Facilities ambulance records.
Table 15: The Utilization of Ambulance Personnel, by System Area
SYSTEM AREA
I Worcester
II Holden
III Clinton
IV Milford
V Webster
VI Southbridge
VII Palmer
VIII Athol
IX Gardner
X Fitchburg
XI Ayer
Total Region
CALLS
PER
YEAR
10,200
990
970
3,010
1,270
930
1,380
740
1,180
3,280
970
25,000
NUMBER
of 2
PERSONNEL
163
61
114
124
52
77
39 3
38
19
94
49
830
CALLS PER YEAR DAYS BETWEEN
PER CALLS PER
CREW MEMBER CREW MEMBER
125 3 days
32 11
16 23
49 7 "
49 7 "
24 15
?3 ?3
39 9 "
124 3
70 5 "
40 9
60 6 days
1Assumes 35 emergency calls per year per 1000 population.
2 As derived from the Files kept by the Bureau of Health Facilities on
ambulance personnel of regulated services.
3The number of personnel listed for the Palmer area does not include
the RN's at Wing Memorial. Hence, the utilization indicators would
be confusing.
Source: The Census and Files from the Bureau of Health Facilities.
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If standards of desired utilization had been established, the
regional average utilization of vehicles and personnel could be evaluated
on t ,e basis of desired rates (which might be the state averages or some
proportion thereof, or the present regional averages might be set as
minimum standards for the communities of the region). No such standards
exist, but indications are that utilization is unnecessarily low, except
in Worcester. If so, the possibility of increasing rates should be
pursued in order to achieve a better system. But increasing utilization
by decreasing the number of provider units or by expanding the service
area must be examined for its impact on quality of care and accessibility.
2. Comparison With An Alternative Pattern of Delivery,
One way to test out the effects of increasing utilization is to
hypothesize an alternative pattern of delivery. For example, the delivery
system in Region II presently relies heavily on the resources of community
hospitals with ambulance personnel performing, for the most part, only a
minimal medical care function. An alternative state would place much
greater emphasis on sophistication in the outreach and transportation
components, so as to lessen the burden especially on small emergency
rooms in outlying areas where physician resources are thin. This would
involve changing from a town-based system of ambulance services using on-
call personnel to area-wide services with full-time on-duty emergency
medical technicians.
Such a change would have many impacts in the form of costs and
benefits over the present ones. In a number of cases, these would be
difficult to evaluate. However, the effects on economic efficiency can
be seen quite readily and can be set in the context of effects on quality
and accessibility.
This section will rely on a set of concepts and a methodology
explained in a technical appendix (Appendix E). The reader is referred
there for the specific meaning of demand intensity, utilization, probability
of dispatch delay, and expected dispatch delay. The technical appendix
also sets out the assumptions on which the succeeding analysis is based.
These are important to examine.
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For purposes of illustrating this methodology, a case area will
be used containing ten towns along the southern edge of the Region.8 The
area has a population of 87,600 and contains 277 square miles for an
average density of 320 per square mile. Other characteristics are noted
in Table 16.
The density, at coarse grain, is assumed to be uniform across
the case area. That is, each ambulance service area, however defined,
9has approximately the same population per square mile. Travel times
would be 2.2 minutes per mile.
The minimum number of ambulances staffed by on-duty crews which
could serve this area, given a maximum radius of 5.5 miles per service
area and a maximum service area of 95 square miles, would be three.
Thus, three ambulances, distributed effectively, could dover the entire
area without .exceeding present response times. See Figure 8. This will
represent the lower extreme--no improvement on response time but a
reduction of nine vehicles over the twelve ambulances presently used
within the region.
At present within the area, these ambulances are available for
service outside the town in which they are located only on a mutual aid
basis. If we assume that mutual aid agreements are easy to activate and
that all twelve vehicles are essentially part of one system, the proba-
bility of dispatch delay is almost zero. However, if they are viewed as
nine distinct town systems, the probability of delay and the expected
elay are higher. For example, in Northbridge, with 11,800 people and
one ambulance, t;he expected delay is sixty-three minutes and a dispatch
delay will occur, on the average, 4.6 per cent of the time.
With three vehicles staffed full-time and available to each other
as part of a centrally dispatched system, the probability of dispatch
delay is less than two per cent and the expected delay is twenty-three
minutes. This small probability of delay could be essentially eliminated
by backup vehicles at the station to be manned, when needed,-this would
occur only infrequently by volunteers or public safety officers.
Thus, three primary and two to three backup vehicles at three
well located sites could provide service of the same effectiveness
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Table 16: Ambulance Utilization Statistics for Ten-Town Case Area
STATISTIC
Total Population
Total Area (square miles)
Average Density (persons per sq. mile)
Total Emergency Calls per Year 2
Demand Intensity 3
Total Ambulances
Total Primary Ambulances
Utilization per Primary Ambulance
Probability of Dispatch Delay
Expected Dispatch Delay (minutes) 4
Number of Ambulance Stations
Average Service Area (square miles)
Average Maximum Radius (miles)
Average Maximum Travel Time 5
Average Maximum Response Time
Number of Dispatching Centers
1Ratio of Alternative Model's Statistic to Present System's.
2Assuming 35 calls per year per 1000 population.
3Assuming 60 minutes service time per call on the average.
4 For primary vehicles only. With secondary vehicles added, the
probability of delay is essentially zero in both the present and
alternative arrangements and the expected delay is reduced to 5
minutes under present arrangements and to 11 minutes in the al-
ternative model.
5 At 2.2 minutes per mile.
6 Assuming 8 minutes mobilization time for on-call services and 3
minutes for on-duty services.
PRESENT
87,600
277.0
320
3,060
.35
12
9
.04
7 min.
9
30.8
3.13
6.9 min.
14.9 min.
9
ALTERNATIVE
same
same
.same
same
same
5
3
.12
0.5%
23 min.
3
92.3
5.4
11.9 min.
14.9 min.
1
.1
RATIO
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
.42:1
.33:1
3:1
3.3:1
.33:1
3:1
1.7:1
1.7:1
1:1
11:1
100
(measured by response times and probability of dispatch delAy) as twelve
vehicles at nine stations presently provide. The number of dispatching
points would also be reduced. Table 16 gives the full comparison.
Clearly, the level of efficiency would be much higher.
The difference is that crews would have to be full-time. The
added costs of on-duty personnel would not be small but could be defrayed
by added revenues from charges and third-party payments and by spreading
the cost of the personnel between ambulance work and either hospital,
10
routine transfer, or public safety work.
Increased utilization would also enhance quality by the use of
well prepared personnel with frequent emergency experience11 and by making
the investment in better equipment more feasible. A central dispatching
system would allow more competent disptaching personnel and a more
effective control over the deployment of resources.
This kind oof analysis could be carried out for the entire region
with similar .results. Reducing substantially the number of ambulances
in the region would have little negative effect on dispatch delay and
would not hurt travel time if personnel could be utilized that were
immediately available around the clock. Aggregating demand in this way
would help spread the greater expenditures necessary for the salaries
that full-time employees require. However, areas with average densities
of less than 285 would either have to pay a higher amount per citizen or
be content with the slightly greater maximum response times necessary to
enclose an area of sufficient population, if they were to have full-time
on-duty service. A compromise which would help such communities would
be to staff ambulances with on-duty personnel only during the day, using
on-call personnel at night.
The Effectiveness of Feedback in the System of Guidance
Two aspects are important here: The information processes and
the effectiveness of regulation in achieving desired ends.
The difficulty of learning about the functioning of the emergency
medical services delivery system in Central Massachusetts and about the
overall system of guidance because of the inadequacy of existing information
processes has been pointed out.
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Requirements as to the nature and format of records are limited
and affect only certain segments of the emergency care delivery system.
Public safety organizations, entities providing communications services,
and physicians providing non-hospital based emergency medical care feed
little planning information into the system on a regular basis. As noted,
however, even regulated ambulance services, are not required to submit
data on operations (such as number of runs, response times, first aid
rendered, times of calls, etc.) other than to their town officials and
individual services vary considerably, as a result, in their ability
and willingness to produce such information when requested. With forty-
six regulated services in the region alone, it becomes an arduous task to
poll each without regular reporting mechanisms, especially because the
quality and meaning of the responses vary.
Hospitals have, of course, much more elaborate information
gathering systems but still do surprisingly little planning analysis of
their emergency services. Again, the definitions and the data-recording
processes differ sufficiently to impair the quality of the analysis of
data collected from them (as was evident in the arrival modes study
reported in the previous chapter).
The state regulatory systems problems relating to information
collection have been described. Some simple improvements in the forms
and the procedures of collection and in the policies for the use of data
would be beneficial.
The two major defects in the regulatory process are the difficul-
ties inherent in relying on a single set of standards for all emergency
services providers of one type within the state and the ineffectiveness
of the enforcement process. The first, in part, impairs the second. The
second tends to mitigate somewhat the first, and both together, when
coupled with the lack of information capabilities, tend to make the
regulatory process an uninspired effort.
Neither in the case of transportation nor in the case of hospital
care services does the Department of Public Health make a distinction
for different types within the class, even though some ambulances are
used almost entirely for medical taxi service and some emergency rooms
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are simply unscheduled primary care facilities. Other ambulance services
and emergency rooms get many of the worst emergencies that occur in an
area. In this respect, the proposed revision of the hospital emergency
service regulations is a step forward because it will allow differentiation
of regulation by grade of service offered. The Governor's bill to improve
the regulation of ambulance services leaves open the option of also
setting up classes of ambulance service.
Still the basic requirements of the proposed ,,gulations (twenty-
four hour M.D. coverage, substantially expanded training requirements for
ambulance attendants) would represent a major hardship on many existing
providers within the state and probably will be resisted, unless means
are developed to take the variety of needs into account in the development
of regulations. Otherwise, three effects are possible: the smaller pro-
viders would be edged out, leaving more rural areas without service; the
proposed rules would be weakened or rejected, despite their positive
features; or the regulations established would not be enforced effectively.
The dilemma of managing the delivery of any social service is how
to effectively establish and monitor the progress towards the achievement
of system objectives. Emergency medical services delivery is simply one
more example. The emphasis on twenty-four hour coverage by a physician,
on bringing all purveyors of emergency medical transportation services
under the jurisdiction of Department of Public Health ambulance regulation,
and the methods used here to attempt an evaluation of equity of spatial
distribution and efficiency of the overall allocation of resources--these
are all attempts to measure the system's effectiveness. The study has
also discussed the problems of evaluating the more subtle and less
quantifiable aspects of the guidance system, particularly as to the
effectiveness with which participation and accountability are ensured.
None of these measures, however, can fully succeed in determining
how well the system operates, nor does expressing them in terms of
regulations or planning powers (e.g. determination of need) necessarily
guarantee an effective delivery of service, for these measures cannot
take into account extenuating or mitigating circumstances in the indi-
vidual case. For example: a hospital in a relatively small community
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may not have a doctor on the premises at all times but may have M.D.'s
living within minutes, and in contrast, a large hospital with a high-
volume emergency service may have a very poor system of physician man-
agement of care despite having an M.D. in the emergency room.
Such circumstances can be perceived fully only at rather close
range, yet decision-making at that level suffers from the lack of
perspective of the whole and from potential loss of objectivity. Hence,
a composite of both perspectives is needed.
The findings of this report argue that the Department of Public
Health emergency medical services planning must place a heavy emphasis on
involving local providers, consumers and area-wide emergency medical
services planners, and must act to decentralize some of its decision-
making power to area-wide emergency medical services planning bodies,
retaining primarily only review responsibility. It should, for example,
establish a sliding scale rather than a fixed standard, with the exact
requirement to be determined by the regional planning body. Thus,
regional input would be felt in the regulatory process to the extent of
participating in the establishment of criteria and standards.
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NOTES
This conclusion was reached after having spent a good deal of
time trying to ferret out those relationships for Central Massachusetts
from data on accidental and emergency deaths and injuries.
2
Massachusetts Medical Society, Massachusetts Hospital Association,
Massachusetts Ambulance Association, Massachusetts Heart Association,
American Red Cross, Massachusetts League of Cities and Towns, Massachusetts
Chiefs of Police Association, Massachusetts Fire Chiefs Association, etc.
3 See section on economic efficiency.
4Major = comprehensive, basic = routine, and provisional plus
referral = no emergency-referral only.
5At a later point, the concept will be expanded to "demand inten-
sity" which additionally takes into account the time required to provide
service.
6Keith A. Stevenson, o. cit., p. 14
7Data provided by the planning section of the Worcester Police
Department.
8Charlton, Douglas, Dudley, Northbridge, Oxford, Southbridge,
Sturbridge, Sutton, Uxbridge, and Webster.
9 This is not true, of course, but is sufficiently accurate for
the purposes at hand.
1 0The last, as noted before, is the way it is presently done in
the majority of towns with full-time ambulance service, but has the
disadvantage that ambulance work generally gets less attention that the
other activities in which police and fire departments engag'e.
1 See Appendix F.
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Chapter V: Conclusions and Recommendations: Towards an Improved
Delivery System
No one, when it comes right down to it, argues that emergency
care delivery in the United States is adequate as it presently stands.
The fact is that it is woefully inadequate. The toll in human suffering,
productive capacities, and lives is far greater than necessary. The
Central Massachusetts situation is no exception. The shortcomings, how-
ever, are not due primarily to conscious malfeasance on the part of pro-
viders or of central misuse of power. To a large extent, the failings
have arisen out of the lack of attention we have given to emergency
medical services as a public priority. As an almost inevitable conse-
quence, fragmented patterns of decision-making and service provision
have developed as hospitals, public safety departments, interest groups;
and governmental agencies have had to fill the vacuum with a hodgepodge
set of "make-do" arrangements.
Not all aspects of health care would benefit by "rationalization",
for the freedom to choose among providers of care is vital and should be
enhanced. However, an emergency medical response system is, by definition,
a means to assist individuals when they are unable to manage their own
care. For this reason and because the response system has to be prepared
for so many eventualities, the requirement for system efficiency and
rationality is high.
Consequently, improving the delivery system in Central Massachusetts
must involve an effort to increase the "system" characteristics of delivery
itself, such as the interrelatedness of the various components, and the
consistency of their processes of communication and action. As we have
seen, the nature of the guidance mechanisms of planning, decision-making,
and control have a very important impact on the degree to which EMS
delivery is "Systematic".
Improving guidance processes is, as a result, a necessary first
step to improving the delivery system and ought to be the initial con-
sequence of this study. Recommendations with respect to the guidance
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system will be presented in the first section of this chapter. The
second major section will present recommendations for improving the
organization of the Region II delivery system. The report will conclude
with a final assessment of the prospects for improvement and the nature
of the constraining conditions.
Though a certain consensus as to the nature of the problems is
wide-spread, solving them is not simply a matter of passing legislation
or even appropriating funds. Achieving better means of delivering
emergency medical services depends on the concern of both providers and
consumers, on the leadership of local and state political leaders and
the commitment of the citizenry. Those communities now held up as
models of desirable emergency medical service programs have in every
case achieved this through a community-wide willingness to work together
creatively. These recommendations are presented with the hope that
interest and commitment both in Central Massachusetts and in the state
as a whole is nearing the "critical mass" necessary for such collaboration
to occur. The study is offered as input to that process.
Improving the Guidance Processes
Necessary elements of the guidance system are a participatory
effort by providers, users, and planners of emergency services aimed at
learning about t e system and evaluating the effects of change and an
effective means for making decisions and setting objectives and monitoring
the success of steps taken to achieve those objectives. Recommendations
as to improving planning, then, relate to three needs: (1) the need for
creating a regional emergency medical services planning process, (2) the
need for improved policy development and implementation at the state
level, and (3) the need for improving data-gathering and update methods.
1. Creating a Regional Planning Process.
The material presented in preceding chapters illuminates the
problems that arise when decision-making is almost completely disaggregated.
Yet, centralized planning and regulation also has problems in the form of
unintentional consequences that result from a lack of understanding of
the less tangible aspects of EMS delivery, less amenable to measurement
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by standards. Massachusetts suffers from both to some extent (though the
problem of overly fragmented decision making is perhaps more pronounced),
because regional emergency medical services planning has lagged.
There is a great need for an effective planning and guidance
effort relating to emergency care in Central Massachusetts that derives
from the participation and collective determination of policies and
objectives by both providers and interested citizens. Establishing such
interaction will, in itself, catalyze further improvement.
Opening up channels of communication through area committees or
task forces should be an immediate step. Initially, the membership and
definition should be very open in order to allow all interested and
affected parties to participate. At the same time, the entire effort
needs direction and legitimacy and staff assistance. The Comprehensive
Health Planning Council seems the obvious sponsor organization because of
its legal mandate and because of the commitment it has already made by
supporting the study reported in these pages.
Ambulance and hospital people across the region need to talk with
themselves and with each other, to explore the different perceptions of
emergency care delivery, to establish some consensus about the nature of
the problems and the resources available, and to engender a region-wide
commitment. Out of the dialogue should come a kind of "inside information"
that this document cannot hope to provide.
The discussion, stimulated by the Health Planning Council, ought
to be promoted both in a central council (bringing region-wide participants
together) and at a local level between those who are part of the same
delivery system and depend on each other.
An initial task is to establish a framework of common definitions,
terms, and standards. Additionally, the methods and findings of this
report should be evaluated, with particular attention to viewing the
region as a set of area-wide delivery systems and to the importance of
integrating the compontents of those systems to ensure effective management
of the medical care rendered. The other important task of the early stage
involves structuring the regional planning system by agreeing on appropriate
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composition and functions and powers of a regional emergency medical
services committee and by creating community emergency medical services
councils. More specific tasks will be presented in the section on
organizing the delivery system.
2. Improving State Policy-Making and Regulation.
Efforts at the regional level to achieve consensus and cooperation
are critical if the state emergency medical services planning program is
to be effective. The legislators, Department of Public Health planners
and other policy makers depend on inputs from those closer to the scene,
and particularly so now, when policy formulation will occur rapidly.
The thrusts being taken by the state are basically good but have
been and will continue to be influenced (unavoidably) by the character-
istics and problems of a high-density urban setting and by the natural
and unconscious tendency of state planners to favor centralization of
planning and regulatory powers. Both providers and consumers of emergency
medical services in Region II need to respond to present and propose
standards and programs at the state level, if for no other reason than
that they can bring a- different perspective to bear than is apparent
from an office in downtown Boston.
2.1. The Need for Differentiated Standards
An important outcome of state-regional cooperative planning in
terms of state regulatory activity, ought to be the development of
differentiated standards, geared to regional and subregional capabilities
and needs. Relying solely on making exceptions for "hardship" cases, as
is now done (although not, perhaps, in such explicit terms), is not
sufficient, for it weakens the entire standard enforcement process. For
example, a decision about whether an emergency facility provides an
appropriate type and quality of service needs to take into account the
size of the physician pool, the population of the catchment area, the
distance to other emergency rooms, and so forth.
Most of this need would be met by a good classification system of
emergency rooms and ambulance services. To be effective, the system
must be initially descriptive, rather than prescriptive; require that the
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individual provider take into account regional planning considerations in
choosing a level of service; and be informative to the public. The last
requirement means that the classes must be reasonable and few in number.
In order to not be discriminatory, however, these few classes might have
to be regulated according to a sliding scale that would consider variables
such as those mentioned above in relation to emergency rooms or such as
demand intensity, travel times, and so forth, in relation to ambulance
services.
2.2. Hospital Emergency Facility Classification
If one were to fault the categorization method of the proposed
emergency facility regulations, it would be that the requirements for a
minimum emergency service are set too high to be completely realistic.
Perhaps the intent is to allow some room to negotiate during the approval
process, but it would seem much better to adjust the regulations to apply
more clearly to the-many hospitals who do not have in-house coverage of
the emergency room by a physician on a twenty-four hour day basis but
which nevertheless perform an important function in their community.
Three alternatives seem possible: First, an additional category,
corresponding to the American Hospital Association provisional category,
could be added, with a statement of limitations as to the service such
facilities could provide. Second, the regulations could contain a pro-
vision to the effect that a hospital more than a certain number of miles
from another emergency facility might offer routine emergency service,
even if it could not meet the requirement for physician coverage, if it
had an effective alternative means of ensuring physician management of
care and had established relationships with another hospital in the
region for consultation and transfer in serious cases. The regional
comprehensive health planning agency, with the approval of the state
health department would have to determine that these arrangements were
adequate. Or, third, the regulations might simply state that such hospitals
would be encouraged to offer unscheduled outpatient care, subject to the
regulations covering outpatient services, and would be available, in extra-
ordinary situations, to provide emergency medical services according to
a plan.
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Clearly, each of the alternatives would have different effects.
The choice between them will require careful evaluation of potential
impacts and should be made in consultation with the comprehensive health
planning agencies. For Region II, the second alternative including a
criterion of distance from other hospitals into the consideration appears
the best, though actually, encouraging unscheduled outpatient care is not
thereby excluded: A few hospitals in the region might be given routine
emergency service status, because of their distance from other hospitals,
while others would continue to provide unscheduled outpatient services
but would no longer announce themselves as a regular emergency room.
The purpose of the comprehensive category in the proposed
regulations is unclear. If it is to indicate major "trauma units", then
more state involvement in the designation of such units is needed, since
presumably they would be few in number; hence, the designation ought not
to be left simply to the inclination of the individual hospital.
The routine-comprehensive distinction as proposed seems unlikely
to be particularly helpful to consumers of emergency services. A purpose
of the emergency medical services delivery system is to get emergency
victims under physician supervision as soon as possible so that they can
be sorted according to their need. A citizen, should not have to choose
between emergency rooms. He should be able to go to the nearest announced
emergency facility (well-marked by signs, etc.) and have the patient's
condition quickly ascertained and his care managed. On the other hand,
state inspectors, health planners, ambulance and public safety and
emergency room personnel, and physicians all need to have more detailed
decision criteria, and the "comprehensive" category is a step in that
direction. For regulation, it is perhaps sufficient, but for planning
and actual delivery of care, more information about hospital capabilities
is needed.
A final point on the proposed regulations: They are too weak in
their emphasis on communications and other linkages with ambulance services.
Rather than simply being "urged" to set up communications capabilities,
these should be required.
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2.3. Classification of Ambulance Services.
A categorization system for ambulance services is also needed.
One class should be "routine transfer only," which would cover a number
of private services. Vehicles used for such service could be of the
Cadillac type, would have to be clean and carry certain minimal supplies.
Identifying them as "ambulances" should be discouraged as they would not
be set up to provide first aid underway. Their purpose would be to
provide transportation to bedridden patients to and from medical facil-
ities and rest homes, etc., most likely on a scheduled basis. Twenty-
four hour service and immediately ready vehicles and personnel would
not be required. Still, there might be advantages to having them dis-
patched through-the same system used for emergency ambulances.
A second category should cover fire and police services using
"dual-purpose" vehicles. Personnel should be required to have certain
training in first aid. Vehicles should be equipped with basic life-
maintaining equipment and supplies such as airways, sterile compresses,
resuscitation units, blankets, and forced entry equipment. The regulations
should tend, over the long run, to discourage these organizations from
transporting patients, as more appropriate means become available, and
should rather emphasize their role in providing on-the-scene stabilizing
care and assisting ambulance personnel. Those towns now relying on dual-
purpose vehicles should be given a period of time to connect with regional
emergency medical services planning and work out an arrangement providing
a higher level of outreach to the town.
Broad requirements, including those in the previous paragraph,
should be made of all organizations providing outreach and assistance in
medical emergencies on a regular basis - a third category. They would
be minimum training specifically oriented to ambulance work (at a level
beyond advanced first aid) and annual testing of those skills; vehicular
design that allows safety and interior working room; equipment for rendering
care, extricating and transporting victims, and for communtcating both
with the base station and with hospitals.
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A top category, arising from the previous one, would have more
stringent requirements than the previous one as to training, full-time
availability of service instantaneously, and vehicle design and
communications capabilities. This category would be encouraged in
planning efforts and given special recognition and priority,2 in hopes
of ultimately replacing services of lower orders.
2.4. The Need for Supportive and Facilitating Programs.
Presently, the primary role of the state is in informing minimum
standards and applying negative sanctions. The critical need for the
future is for the state to adopt positive policy stances that encourage
and facilitate cooperation and improvement. The watchdog role does have
to be strengthened to some extent, in the ways outlined in the preceding
paragraphs, but should receive overall, less emphasis than the programs
that would assist regional planning and improve delivery, such as
technical assistance as to planning methods, equipment purchase, training
programs, and encouragement of demonstration projects showing the feas-
ibility of area-wide ambulance systems and ambulance-hospital collaborations.
3. Tmproved Tnformation Method.
This is a fertile area about which much could be said and proposed that
goes beyond the scope of this report. Present methods of collecting,
storing, and using data about emergency care are inadequate in a number
of ways for effective planning and guidance processes, as is no doubt
obvious from the earlier chapters. Principle needs for the immediate
future which will be discussed here are standardization of descriptive
terminology and means of recording data, increasing the compatibility of
record-keeping systems as to forms design and coding, increased requirements
for reporting operations data to regional planning committees, and an
economic analysis of the costs of providing service and the sources of
revenue.
3.1. Standardization of Terminology - Description.
Perhaps the most fruitful pursuit initially would be to establish.
a more clear scale of urgency by which to record the patient's condition.
The classification ought to be descriptive of not only the perception of
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of the provider but also of the patient's perception of his situation
(because immediate medical attention may be just as necessary in a
certain case to allay patient fears as to treat bodily injury in
another). Both ambulance and hospital records should contain such a
notation assessing urgency. After examination, the physician should
make a summarizing assessment that would include an evaluation of the
appropriateness of the services provided. 3
Other items which should be recorded uniformly are, for ambu-
lances, the nature and the circumstances of the situation, including
causes (if discernible); the location of the victim; the mobilization,
travel, and total service times; the distances from base to the scene
and from the scene to the hospital; and the first aid rendered. For
hospitals, such items are arrival modes; patient origins; and methods
of reporting diagnoses and disposition. In neither case would these
pose significant additional burdens in terms of time or effort.
3.2. Compatible Record-Keeping Systems.
These efforts should be coupled with an attempt which should
be made to achieve greater compatibility of record-keeping systems.
Model ambulance forms should be designed and forms technologies should
be encouraged that allow passing a copy of ambulance forms along to the
emergency room. Special emphasis should be place on uniform coding and
other data-recording devices that are readily compatible with computer
systems (such as optical scanning). Periodic update is much easier if
data, definitions, and forms are uniform and readily accessible.
3.3. Improved Data Reporting Policies.
Particularly in the early period, there is a need to develop a
base of information at regional and state planning levels. Ambulance
services and hospitals should be required to provide quarterly and annual
reports emphasizing utilization and operations data, not so much-to serve
the "watchdog" function as to allow system "learning" to take place. The
regional emergency medical services committee should get regular reports
from the providers about patient origins, runs per man, active personnel
rosters, cross-tabulations of urgency with arrival modes, with time of
visits, with disease category codes, etc. As patterns become evident,
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the frequency and number of items reported could decrease.
3.4. The Need for an Analysis of Costs.
A thorough input-output analysis of costs and revenues in the
delivery of emergency medical services is needed in-Central Massachusetts
and for the state as a whole. Each provider and each planning body
should report total and per service unit costs along with a breakdown of
how the costs are generated. Also, the sources and amounts of revenue
covering those costs should be noted. This information is essential if
effective resource allocation is to occur and if public support of
emergency medical services is to improve. For neither of these will
happen without some reliable expressions of cost-effectiveness.
Structuring the Delivery System
This section will present recommendations in terms of basic
themes, relating them to the fundamental criteria of quality of care,
geographic accessibility and economic efficiency. After discussing the
implications of these themes for the delivery of emergency medical
services in Central Massachusetts, we will propose a model of how the
regional delivery system. could be organized. The section concludes with
recommendations for the process of transition and setting priorities for
the staging of change.
1. jegjonlizaij9on,; Organizing Service at a Larger Scale than the Towns.
We have spoken of the need for larger-scale planning for emergency
medical services, but Chapters III and IV also pointed out the benefits
from the standpoints of efficiency and quality of larger-scale delivery
of services.
1.1. Hospital Emergency Care.
Hospitals are less influenced in their delivery of care by town
boundaries than ambulance services presently are, but they obviously are
influenced by institutional boundaries. In conjunction with the estab-
lishment of a categorization of services, hospitals will need to improve
the networks of emergency facilities, both the geographic networks for
cooperating in disasters, etc. and the hierarchical networks for referral
and transfer of patients and for consultation. A purpose of categorization
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is to improve triage. For that purpose to be fulfilled, hospitals of
lower orders will need good working relationships with higher order
hospitals, including arrangements for transfer of records, for exchange
of supplies, and for regularly granting emergency staff privileges to
physicians of patients being transferred so.that continuity of care is
not impaired. Thus, the delivery of hospital care could be viewed as
occurring in a nested set of emergency facilities.
The other aspect to regionalization is that not every hospital
need provide emergency service. A good Emergency Department is costly
to maintain and, as utilization data for this region and others have
shown, often ends up providing care to patients who are only emergencies
in the sense that they need to see a physician soon but cannot find access
to one. In areas where two or more hospitals are located in close
proximity, some emergency rooms could be converted into unscheduled out-
patient departments with evening and weekend service, and "real" emer-
gencies would then be diverted from those facilities to designated
emergency rooms at other hospitals. At the same time some other hospitals
must be upgraded in terms of their emergency services. Of course, for
this to succeed, the hospitals will have to collaborate and share staff
and financial resources to some extent. In addition, those hospitals
relieved of formal emergency responsibility must be ready to maintain
the episodic care need of the population.
No final recommendation of the fate of each of the present
emergency facilities will be attempted here. That must be a task of the
regional emergency medical services council(s).5 However, some suggestions
will be made, based on the findings of this study. They will be discussed
in the presentation of the model of delivery.
1.2. Ambulance Services.
Organization of ambulance services primarily on a town scale is
not adequate because of economic inefficiency, the wide variation in the
quality of service, and the potential for delay and error in the processes
of receiving calls and dispatching. The population of most communities
in Central Massachusetts is too small to support an effective full-time
ambulance service. The choice has been to rely on the public safety
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forces to carry out the ambulance function as a sideline (using, in many
cases, the same vehicles as are used for regular work) or to use volunteer
squads with the consequent possibility of long time delays assembling a
crew and often with used vehicles.6 It is recommended that communities
work together to support area-wide ambulance services using full-time
personnel. In many parts of the region, the population density is
sufficient to allow the support of a service which could be effectively
utilized and still be able to respond to calls as quickly as town volunteer
services now do. Where possible, the personnel should be ready on a full-
time basis around the clock, but some areas will have to rely on day-time
on-duty and night-time on-call arrangements. A few sparsely settled areas
will still need to depend on volunteer services.
1.3. Dispatch and Communications.
Dispatching sliould also be on an area-wide basis and, ideally,
should encompass all ambulances, no matter how organized. The cost of
communications "hardware" and personnel time is reduced thereby, and the
efficiency with- which vehicles can be utilized is enhanced. As the
example in Chatper IV demonstrated, a central dispatching system would
allow three vehicles manned by on-duty crews to serve a part of Central
Massachusetts at roughly the same level of service (defined as the proba-
bility of delay due to all vehicles being in use) as is presently provided
by nine separate services. Area-wide systems would simplify procedures
of handling major emergencies of "disasters," as present mutual aid
agreements would then be, for the most part, rendered unnecessary by the
shared dispatch and communication facilities. The other advantage is
that with fewer dispatching points, the dispatchers could be more expert
in their function, which is a critical factor in insuring the quality of
the response.
2. Identifying Ambulance Personnel as Emergency Medical Technicians.
The title, Emergency Medical Technician (EMT), is in itself simply
a gimmick. The need is real, however, to create an identity for the people
who provide emergency medical outreach services. It is not sufficient
that it simply be their first assignment as a rookie firefighter or whatever.
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The job deserves a much higher status and priority than it is often
accorded. In cases where policement and firemen operate the ambulance,
they ought to do so because they enjoy the work. They should belong to
a special squad or patrol and have emergency care as their principle
function on a long-term basis. It should be similar with other providers.
Part of the way to achieve this is by better training and better
methods of recognition. Many have pointed out that the Red Cross first
aid courses were never intended for ambulance personnel. Hence, creating
more relevant and specific training programs and providing the means,
such as scholarship funds, to facilitate personnel getting this training
would add to the esprit d'corps. The state is pressing for a legislative
mandate to increase training requirements. Whether or not that effort
succeeds, providers within the region should make a commitment to improving
training programs, particularly as to in-hospital experiences. Under
the auspices of a regional emergency medical services council, a program
should be carried out to test the present capabilities of all persons on
ambulance rosters in the region, not with punative intent, but rather in
an effort to determine training needs. The possibility of using the test
developed for the Emergency Medical Technician Registry program should
be explored, for those who pass then have the added status of being a
"registered" emergency medical technician.
The ideal would be to give prospective emergency medical technicians
training similar to the military medical corpsmen, as a junior or community
college program. Certainly, an expanded identity for emergency medical
technician's could be used as a magnet to draw in veterans with corpsman
experience.
A remaining hurdle to be overcome in this regard would be that
of the legal constraints on the care that ambulance personnel can render.
In a few states, California being one, laws have been passed specifically
giving emergency medical technician's the authority to render care beyond
first aid under physician supervision (for which radio contact counts).
However, William Curran, Professor of Legal Medicine at Harvard Medical
School has opined that existing legislation in Massachusetts is sufficient.7
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The other side of the same coin is whether a more extensive role would
open the Pandora's box of malpractice suits. The Massachusetts
Ambulance Association, comprised of private companies, apparently fears
this:
"If (malpractice) is a problem for doctors today, what will
it be when ambulance paramedical personnel start administering
to the patient--even if it is under the supervision of a doctor
in the emergency room?" 8
Curran seems to feel that, again, existing legislation is adequate to
deal with the malpractice problem, but the case is by no means clear.
Creating a special identity for the ambulance attendant, even
if not so glamorous as television might suggest9 would have another
benefit of releasing police forces in many communities from the burden
of having to take full responsibility for emergency medical outreach.
Police officers will, of necessity, always have some involvement in
many medical emergencies and ought to be trained to deliver initial first
aid, but their role is best at the scene of the accident or injury, their
advantage is that of rapid response. For them to have to leave the
community to take an emergency case to a hospital, as often occurs, is
to leave the community short-handed. It is recommended that where
special ambulance service exists or can be developed, regular patrol-
men be used to provide initial care and ascertain the circumstances
surrounding an emergency and then defer to the ambulance personnel when
they arrive.
3. The Hospital Emergency Facility as the Nerve Center.
Improvement in the delivery of emergency medical assistance will
occur to the extent that the system is built on outreach from centers of
medical care. Only thereby can management of the delivery of care by
competent medical professionals be ensured, for, in the present system
of health care delivery, physician resources are necessarily hospital-
based.
3.1. Comminications.
It is quite clear that the future will see an expanding role for
communications technology in the work of hospitals as medical care know-
how centralizes and population disperses and as the time and effort and
cost of overcoming distance by transportation become greater than the
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costs of bridging distance by communications media. Such changes are
particularly apparent in emergency care.
There are three levels to the communications role of emergency
rooms. The first objective should be to establish radio voice contact
with ambulances in the region. Although the technical requirements of
such a system were not reviewed to any great extent for this study,
there are numerous examples of systems operating in other parts of the
country which could be used as models. Not all hospitals would have
to be in the regular emergency network. Presumably, if some had given
up their emergency service, they might not normally communicate with
ambulance services.
The second aspect of communications is telemetry--electronic
monitoring of the vital signs of a patient in the ambulance, received
and interpreted in the emergency room. Telemetry involves a more complex
technology, is much more expensive, and is only practical in.settings
where the demand intensity is high. At the moment, this does not seem
feasible within the Region.
Having central dispatching done from a hospital base, receiving
all medical emergency calls there, is a more practical and very bene-
ficial aspect. Like poison and crisis centers (which could be related
to this in some way), a hospital-based dispatching system would more
easily allow telephone counseling and instruction as well as simply
taking the call and sending an ambulance. If the citizenry could be
assured that, when an emergency arose, they could call the medical emergen-
cy number day or nig.t and get advice as to what to do, how to best use
the emergency services system, where to go, etc., this would be a sub-
stantial improvement in service. Having the dispatching there would
also simplify ambulance communications systems. Obviously not every
hospital would have this. In fact, perhaps, only a third of the hospitals
in the region would be so designated.
3.2. Hospital-Based Ambulance Personnel.
The advantages to having -ambulance personnel located at hospitals
are great in terms of quality of care and efficiency in-the use of re-
sources. If he performed in a paramedical or assisting role at a
120
hospital, the ambulance attendant could be using his time and training
effectively between calls. He would be sharpening his skills, as training
would continue almost automatically, with ongoing feedback from more
experienced medical people. He would have a much better sense for the
role of ambulance work in the total scheme of care delivered. Physicians
could better assess his understanding and capabilities which would enhance
the effectiveness of radio supervision. This innovation would mesh well
with hospital-based dispatc~hing and would also shorten total service time
in the cases where the patient was taken to the hospital at which the
crew and vehicle were based. Finally, being at a hospital would make it
easier for RN's and even physicains to go with the ambulance in major
emergencies.
The issue of accessibility cannot be ignored, however. The
ambulances could only be based at hospitals where negative effects on
response time were limited. Because of Central Massachusetts' rather
effective distribution of hospitals, a delivery system could be created
that would rely to a large extent on hospital-based vehicles, as will
be illustrated in the following pages. Even if some of these hospitals
were to cease offering emergency service, emergency medical technicians
could presumabley have assignments in other departments. In these cases
the ambulance would transport to a different hospital with an emergency
room (mitigating somewhat a few of the comments made above, but by no
means voiding the point of the argument).
3.3. Centralizing the Storage of Information.
By linking ambulances to hospitals and by assuming a more central
communications role, the flows of information about the patient and his
care would be improved. Fewer cases of duplicated and mismatched
treatment by ambulance and hospital personnel would occur. The emergency
room staff could act more quicly, if they could confidently use the
preliminary information and history taken by the ambulance crew. Logis-
tical control would be related to the control of quality of care which
would likely have positive benefits for feedback and further improving
the system.
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To sum the themes then: Each of the three criteria dealt with
in Chapter IV are important to an effective delivery system: services
must be of a high and consistent quality, they must be provided
efficiently so that economic resources are most effectively used, and
they must be distributed across the entire geography as equally as
possible and must be accessible to those who may require them. The
cumulative effect of decisions and policies of providers has been to
orient the delivery system toward the third--emphasizing accessibility
and proximity- -somewhat at the expense of the other two. The conclusion
of this study is that, though certain improvements to the pattern of
geographic distribution are needed, especially to offset the lack of
nearby hospital emergency facilities in some areas, the greater emphasis
should be directed to the system as to the other two criteria.
Quality of care criteria are most easily met when the care
delivery is managed by a physician from the earliest possible stage by
extending the emergency physician's influence from his location in the
hospital through his involvement in the training of outreach personnel
and his immediate ability to communicate with them by radio. Further,
basing tAe ambulance personnel at hospitals and giving them a medical-
related role between calls improves their effectiveness at outreach and
the communication between emergency physician and ambulance attendant.
Thus, having a doctor in the hospital at all times with an emergency room
assignment is important for the effectiveness of the emergency room.
Criteria of efficiency would suggest that ambulance services be
dispatched from a few, central points, that ambulance service areas be
as large as possible to achieve a high demand intensity, that emergency
services be consolidated in a few hospitals in a given vicinity and that
the others provide simply outpatient services.
4. A Model of a Regional Delivery System.
On the basis of the foregoing, then, it is recommended that the
region be organized into area-wide subsystems around key hospital
emergency facilities, moving from the present implicit systems as
described in Chapter III to formally organized systems with central
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dispatch, area-wide ambulance services, and where possible, full-time
medically-oriented personnel based at hospitals. 1 0
4.1. Identifying Key Hospital Emergency Facilities.
On the basis of the information available to this study, seven
hospitals should be designated as the "nerve centers" of emergency care
subsystems. There are a major Worcester emergency department (either
Worcester City, St. Vincent, or Memorial Hospital), the Milford Hospital,
the Harrington Memorial Hospital in Southbridge (or, possibly, the
Hubbard Regional Hospital in Webster), the Wing Memorial Hospital (Palmer),
the Henry Heywood in Gardner, and Burbank (Fitchburg). The Clinton
Hospital would be the seventh as a node of a dependent subsystem. (See
Figure 2.)
As stated earlier, the evaluation of hospital capabilities is a
responsibility of the regional emergency medical services planning effort.
These were chosen because they represent the best service available
within their respective sections of the region. However, they are not
equal in their capacities. The Milford, Harrington Memorial and Clinton
Hospitals lack night and weekend physician coverage in-house and have
limited capacities in other ways. These hospitals would have to be
strengthened.
These hospitals would become, with the possible exception of
Clinton (which might be covered by Worcester or perhaps Fitchburg), the
central dispatching points and the major centers of medical supervision
of ambulance work by radio. Presumably, the Worcester hospital would
be the central communications point for the entire region.
The emergency services of other hospitals would also be affected:
Hospitals in Athol, Holden, Ayer, and Ware serve areas not easily
accessible to the primary emergency facilities mentioned above and,
therefore, their night and weekend physician coverage also needs improvement.
Their emergency service should not, for the near future at least, be ter-
minated by state regulation. Three hospitals (Fairlawn and Hahnemann in
Worcester and Leominster) are in close proximity to higher order hospitals
and need not offer an emergency service, though at least Worcester Hahnemann
and Leominster should continue their operations as unscheduled outpatient
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services. At least two others--Winchendon and Whitinsville (Northbridge)--
cannot effectively provide an emergency service and should withdraw from
doing so.
4.2. Mapping the System Areas.
This is essentially a repeat of the process carried out in
Chapter III and preserves, wherever possible, the relationships that were
revealed there. Additional inputs are the pattern of telephone directory
service areas, accessibility factors which could be derived by inspection
of population clustering and road connections, and the additional in-
formation that has been presented about emergency care resources in the
various areas. The pattern has not altered substantially, except for
combining certain systems, as can be observed in Figure 10.
All ambulances within these areas would be linked to a single
dispatching point and would regularly use the hospitals within the
system. Especially in the areas served by the more limited emergency
facilities, however, the need would occasionally arise to go to a
higher order hospital, say in Worcester. Through radio consultation
with a physician at the subsystem emergency center, that decision could
be made and the ambulance could then activate communications with the
higher order emergency room as it proceeded in that direction.
4.3. Allocating Ambulances.
We have argued the benefits of having ambulance personnel on-
duty around the clock and have pointed out that a certain level of demand
and a certain base population are necessary to be able to support such
a service. Because the minimum values of these factors are not known
00'
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exactly, the assumptions in Appendix E are again made so that all alloca-
tive process can be demonstrated. (An initial assumption that these others
presuppose is that ambulances and ambulance services are more easily al-
tered as to location, quantity, and operations than are hospitals, and
allocating them across the region is a way to compensate for deficiencies
in hospital coverage).
Using the assumptions of Appendix E, ambulances were assigned to
hospitals and calculations of densities, total populations, and estimated
travel times of the surrounding areas were made to derive service areas.
In some areas more than one ambulance was assigned. Two systems (Gardner-
Athol and Palmer-Ware) have average densities which fall below the mini-
mum 285 persons per square mile required for efficient full-time ambulance
service areas, but parts of other sub-systems also fall short of that
figure. These areas would have slightly greater per resident cost (or the
personnel will have to be used especially effectively in hospitals, etc.,
between trips) and increased maximum travel times.
Gaps in geographic coverage which remained were then filled. In
two cases, it was felt that the ambulances would be staffed by on-call
personnel, so these were given small service areas. Four others, which
might fall into the on-call category, were also assigned smaller areas.
At each step in this process the effect on the probability of
dispatch delay and the expected delay were examined, assuming that all
ambulance within a subsystem area would be available to assist in any
part of the area, if necessary (as one would expect with central dis-
patching). In a number of cases, the number of active ambulances
necessary in a subsystem to have optimal levels of probability of delay
Table 17: Allocation of Ambulances in Proposed Model
ACTIVE BACK-UP
SUBSYSTEM LOCATION AMBULANCE VEHICLES AREA SERVED
A. Worcester Worcester City or So. Worcester, Leicester, Auburn,
St. Vincent's Hospital 2 1 Millbury, Grafton
Memorial Hospital 1 0 No. Worcester, Shrewsbury
Holden District Hospital 1 1 Holden, Rutland, Paxton, West
Boylston
1-290 1 1 Shrewsbury, Boylston, Northboro
East Brookfield 1 1 Brookfields, Spencer
Barre 1 1 Barre, Oakham, New Braintree
Whitinsville Hospital 1 1 Northbridge, Sutton, Uxbridge,
Douglas
B. Milford Milford Hospital 2 1 Milford, Upton, Hopedale, Mendon,
Medway
Franklin 1 0 Franklin, Medway, No. Bellingham
Blackstone 1 0 Blackstone, Millville, So. Bellingham
C. Southbridge/
Webster Hubbard Regional Hospital 2 0 Webster, Dudley, Oxford
Harrington Hospital 1 1 Southbridge, Sturbridge, Charlton
D. Palmer/Ware Wing Hospital 1 1 Palmer, Monson, Brimfield, etc.
Mary Lane Hospital 1 0 Ware, Warren, W. Brookfield, Hardwick
E. Gardner/Athol Athol Hospital 1 1 Athol, Orange & surrounding towns.
Henry Heywood Hospital 1 1 Gardner, Templeton, Westminster, etc.
Winchendon Hospital 1 0 Winchendon, Ashburnham
F. Fitchburg/Ayer Burbank Hospital 2 1 Fitchburg, Ashby, Townsend
Leominster Hospital 1 0 Leominster, Lunenburg
Nashoba Community Hospital 1 1 Ayer, Groton, Shirley
Pepperell 1 0 Pepperell
G. Clinton Clinton Hospital 2 1 Clinton & surrounding towns
Statistical Profile of Proposed Delivery Model, by Area-Wide Subsystem
SUBSYSTEM POPULATION
A. Worcester 332,800 585.2 570 Worcester Hosp. 4 8 8 5 7 1,460 41,600 1% 9 min. 11.6 min.
B. Milford 77,700 131.8 590 Milford Hosp. 14 1 4 1 3 680 13,400 1% 16 " 7.8 "
C. Southbridge/
Webster 60,000 161.0 373 Harrington 2 2 3 1 2 700 20,000 1% 22 " 9.2 "
D. Palmer/Ware 39,600 261.6 152 Wing 2 2 2 1 2 700 19,800 1-2% 33 " 13.7
E. Gardner/Athol 62.500 480.6 130 Henry Heywood 2 3 3 2 3 730 20,800 1% 22 " 15 "
F. Fitchburg/Ayer 113,500 219.2 520 Burbank 2 3 5 2 4 800 22,700 1% 13 " 8.7 "
G. Clinton 27,700 96.5 288 Clinton 10 14 2 1 1 480 13,800 1% 32 " 8.6 "
Region Total 713,700 1936 369 7 14 20 27 13 22 930 26,400 -- -- 10.7 min.
lProbability of Dispatcher Delay, considering only the active ambulances.
2Expected Dispatch Delay, considering only the active ambulances.
3Assumes the total subsystem area is divided equally among the active ambulances.
4Hospitals outside the region are also accessible.
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exceeded the constraint set above of 25,000 population minimum per
vehicle. Presumably, these additional vehicles would be staffed only
on an on-call basis. In the Worcester area, the number of vehicles was
able to be reduced, because the concentration of population and vehicles
allows effective cross-coverage.
The result is twenty-seven primary vehicles, allocated as shown
in Table 17. Up to thirteen back-up vehicles would also be assigned
to locales where a breakdown of the primary ambulance would leave the
area stranded. Even with that number, the total number would be far
below the number now in use (63 ambulances plus perhaps 30 cruiser-
wagons) without impairing service (as defined by response time, pro-
bability of delay). And, hopefully, the quality of care would be sub-
stantially increased because of better trained personnel and improved
equipment.
The service areas proposed (shown in Figure 10 in dotted lines)
would, as mentioned, have very permeable boundaries. Upon receiving
a call for emergency medical assistance, the central dispatcher in a
subsystem would alert the ambulance crew located in the area where the
emergency was located unless they were out on a call. In that case he
would call the next closest available crew, but would rarely have to call
outside the subsystem area. Table 18 summarizes the characteristics of
the entire model by subsystem area.
5. Financing the System
It is the conclusion of this study that much higher levels of
expertise can be made available to almost all of the population without
major increase in cost, if services are organized in a way similar to
that described in the previous section. Even assuming some increase in
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cost to achieve the full level of sophistication proposed, the signifi-
cance of the services to the health and welfare of the population
would offset the added expenditure. In 1970, 398 people in Central
Massachusetts died from accidents and injuries; 2,777 died from heart
attacks. Those 3,175 constituted 44 percent of all deaths in the
region.11 If an improved delivery system reduced the number of deaths
by 10 percent, saving 318 lives, most of whom would have man produc-
tive years ahead of them, the benefits to society just in terms of
salvaged wage-producing capacities would easily offset any increase in
the annual cost of the delivery system. Most sources suggest that
10 percent savings in lives is a conservative figure. 1 2
The key, however, to the funding problem is achieving inter-
community and interinstitutional funding arrangements. Little has
been said up to now about the problems involved. The proposed kind of
system would require that towns contribute on a per capita basis to
support the area-wide ambulance services and dispatch operations and
that hospitals not providing emergency make some contribution to those
who do. It would require, most likely, that some local tax revenues
be given to hospitals to provide for ambulance garaging, for communica-
tions equipment, and for in-hospital EMT salaries.
Massachusetts towns and hospitals do not have a well-developed
tradition of such cooperation in some ways, but regional school systems
do provide a useful precedent% The author would argue, based on the
findings of this study, that little substantive improvement in the
delivery system is possible without such fiscal cooperation. If county
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government were more viable and independent of the state, it could be
the mechanism for collecting and distributing funds. A special-purpose
district is another alternative, but arranging contributions from one
town or hospital to another is probably a more desirable option.
In this regard, the reliance on revenues from fees for service
to cover the costs of operating the ambulance system is unrealistic.
The system exists and must maintain a state of readiness because every-
one in the community is at risk. Those who actually experience a
medical emergency should only have to pay as a fee the cost that their
request for service adds over and above the cost of the service if no
call had come in during that time. In addition, if the likelihood of-
overuse were great, some additional charge might be made to bring the
total fee up to an amount sufficient to discourage irresponsible use of
the emergency service. (Given present levels of utilization, the pro-
posed system is not at all likely to face the threat of overuse.) The
bulk of the cost of service should be covered by a charge assessed of
every citizen, with some state and federal assistance to cover, as it
were, the cost of having such service available for non-residents
within the region. The local government might either contract with
another town or with a non-government ambulance organization to pro-
vide ambulance service or support one itself, if demand warranted it.
In theory, at least, a hospital emergency service could be financed
in a similar way.
6. The Transition.
The preceding model is intended to provide a direction in which
the Central Massachusetts delivery system ought to move. The process of
transition and the detailed character of the objectives must be determined
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by collaborative planning within the region and with the state emergency
medical service planners. The following sketches a rough order in
which steps could occur within the region that would lead toward the
model presented. A more effective state policy framework must be
developed simultaneously with the first of these steps taken at the
regional level. The passage of the Governor's bill regarding ambulance
services that was mentioned in Chapter II is vital, if state policy
development is to proceed.
The first effort must be to begin developing the cooperative
arrangements for planning and also for sharing resources. The key
hospitals should then be identified and upgraded, and ever-closer
liaison with ambulance services established. Ambulance services should
thin their rosters of all inactive personnel and assess their commitment
to emergency service(placing themselves in one of the ambulance cate-
gories proposed early in the chapter, for example). Towns covered by
ambulance services with old vehicles or with marginal personnel rosters
or otherwise constrained should consider the benefits of contracting
with adjacent communities for ambulance service. Demonstrations of the
utility of hospital-based services, financed at least in part by public
support, should be carried out. Two-way radio communications should be
established at hospitals, beginning with those doing the largest emergency
business. During this time training programs should be upgraded and in-
hospital experience of ambulance personnel increased. Recruiting efforts
to draw ex-medics and other interested people into Emergency Medical
Technician positions in special police and fire ambulance squads as well
as in independent ambulance organizations should begin.
Almost more than anything, the issue of emergency care needs
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to be brought before the public and the costs and benefits or present
and alternative arrangements made explicit so that emergency medical
services planning can take place in a context of awareness.
Summary
The study has shown that the effectiveness of the emergency
medical response and outreach system depends on the effectiveness of
the means of guiding it. Those means are the state planning and
regulatory functions, the regional input to those activities and, in
addition, the regional dialogue and determination of directions and
priorities, in a planning process. In addition, the decision-making
and control processes of providing organizations and institutions
also create and shape policies, even if they remain "unwritten." The
providers also perform the major part of accounting for the quality
of care and for deployment of resources, both as to efficiency and
accessibility. The study concluded that emergency medical services
in Central Massachusetts were fragmented and underutilized, and that
the access needs were not fully met. The reasons for this were, in
part, related to the lack of effective information and accounting
processes.
The study argued that the organization of emergency care ought
to be a topic of high priority on the public agenda and that the response
system must be evaluated and planned with a regional perspective, partic-
ularly as to the geographic distribution of services and the efficiency
with which the resources involved are utilized. It recommended that
organization of ambulance services by town give way to a pattern of area-
wide services and that emergency medical care outreach succeed transpor-
tation as the predominant focus of ambulance service. In conjunction with
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this, it recommended that hospitals become the centers of the emer-
gency care delivery system and that, wherever feasible, ambulance
personnel be based there and have on-going in-hospital assignments.
The study recognized -that this is a somewhat distant objec-
tive that cannot be achieved by a wave of the hand. Key to achieving
progress toward the objective are much improved financing mechanisms
and a process of transition that involves participation of all con-
cerned. The important themes which could guide efforts at improve-
ment are adding legitimacy to the term-"system," as applied to the
organization of delivery, creating a guidance system that is informed
by the participation of providers and consumers as well as by pro-
cesses of data-reporting and regulation, and viewing the purpose as
"medical care outreach." No perfect end state can be expected, but
the means used to establish directions and evaluate performance ought
to be carefully selected.
.i
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lMedical World News, op. cit., P.S.
2As in the Boston Globe series, Jan. 18-20, 1972.
3Such as: Nonurgent--problem could have been treated at a later
date.
RN or paramedical care sufficient.
Physician attention needed within twenty-four hours.
Urgent--Physician attention needed within six hours.
Urgent Plus--Immediate attention needed.
Emergency--Life-threatening condition.
Dead on Arrival.
The fourth, fifth and sixth could be combined with an indica-
tion such as "within our capacities," "we needed additional specialty
assistance which was not immediately available," "beyond our capacities--
the patient should go elsewhere.
4 The sorting of patients according to the nature and severity of
their condition.
5 1t will be an arduous task, involving some mutual sacrifice,
but the benefits as to the overall quality of care and the conserving of
increasingly scarce medical dollars will be worth it.
6As noted, three communities chose a third alternative, using
private companies who also handle routine work.
7Boston Globe, Jan. 20, 1972.
8From a joint statement by Willima Conroy, president and Joseph
Fisher, counsel, Massachusetts Ambulance Association, Boston Globe,
Jan. 19, 1972.
9As in the ABC series, "Emergency!"
1 0These personnel can be police or fire people, but, if so, the
emergency medical outreach assignment ought to become their primary func-
tion and their service area ought to be extended beyond a single com-
munity where necessary.
llData from the Massachusetts Heart Association and the Depart-
ment of Public Health.
12e.g., J.A. Waller, "Traffic Deaths," California Medicine,
Oct. 1964, p. 272.
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SURVEY OF CENTRAL MASSACHUSETTS AMBULANCE SERVICES DECEMBER. 1971
Comprehensive Health Planning Council of Central Massachusetts, Inc.
The following information is sought from all ambulance
services in the region in order to inventory the resources
available to assist a seriously ill or injured person.
"Emergency", when used below, refers to a serious medical
condition: one that potentially threatens life or body function,
that is accompanied by severe stress, and that requires immediate
medical attention.
1. Please designate the area you normally serve, using the map
which is attached to the questionnaire. On the map, number
the locality you service most frequently as "1", the next
most-frequently serviced locality as "2", and so on.
Localities serviced with equal frequency may have the same
number.
2. List the number of runs of each of the following types made
during November.
TOTAL RUNS
No-service runs
Routine transfer
Emergency
Other (Specify)
3. Of the emergency runs, list the number of each of the following:
Traffic accidents
Accidents in home
Accidents at work and elsewhere
Acts of violence
Heart attacks
Complicated childbirth
Other severe illness
Other (or have no record)
4. Do your personnel routinely give emergency first aid care, when
it is warranted, before and during transport?
yes
no
5. Do you feel that your personnel get sufficient training and
practice to deal with the medical emergencies that might
arise?
yes
no
6. What percentage of personnel who staff ambulances have had 138
training beyond an advanced first aid course?
7. Which cf the following is the most frequent source of calls
for emerency assistance?
(check one)
private citizen directly
hospital
phys ic ian
law enforcement agcy
emergency telephone operator
other (specify) 
___
8. Indicate the number of vehicle-crew units (one vehicle and two
crew members) in each category at each of the times:
WEEKDAYS WEEKENDS & HOLIDAYS
6 a.m.-6 p.m. 6 p.m.-6 a.m. 6 a.m.-6 p.m.6 p.m.-6 a.m.
on duty at
base station-
on call
Unavailable
for service
TOTAL
9. On the attached list of general hospitals, please rank the
hospitals that you regularly serve by placing a "1" next to the
hospital(s) that you transport to most often, a "2" by the
hospital(s) served next most frequently, and so on.
10. List the percentages of your total revenue from each of the
following sources:
% fee for service from patient or family
% private third-party (insurance, Blues)
% public third-party (medicare, welfare)
% municipal or state funds
% other grants
% other (specify)
11. We would also appreciate having a copy of whatever forms you use
to log individual runs and record information about patients
handled. Please enclose such with this questionnaire in the
return envelope provided.
12. Describe on opposite side what you find to be the major problems
of ambulance service and, in general, rendering emergency medical
care. We would also be interested in what solutions you would
propose.
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GENERAL HOSPITALS
Please rank the hospitals that you regularly serve by placing a
"1" next to the hospital(s) that you transport to most often, a
"2" by the hospital(s) served next most frequently, and so on.
Name
Athol Memorial Hospital
Henry Heywood Mem4orial Hospital
Winchendon Hospital
Location
AthCiol
Gardner
Wincherdon
Nashoba Community Hospital Ayer
Clinton Hospital Clinton
Burbank Hospital Fitchburg
Leominster Hospital Leomins ter
Holden District Hospital Holden
Doctors Hospital of Worcester Worcester
Fairlawn Hospital Worcester
Memorial Hospital Worcester
St. Vincents Hospital Worcester
Worcester City Hospital Worcester
Worcester Hahnemann Hospital Worcester
Wing Memorial Hospital Palmer
Harrington Memorial Hospital Southbridge
Mary Lane Hospital Ware
Hubbard Regional Hospital Webster
Milford Hospital Milford
Whitinsville Hospital Whitinsvill
Northbridge
Boston Hospitals
Emerson Hospital
Fort Devens US Army Hospital
Framingham Union Hospital
Greenfield Area Hospitals
Marlborough Hospital
Springfield Area Hospitals
Rhode Island Hospitals
Other
Boston
Concord
Fort Devens/
Ayer
Framingham
Greenfield
Marlborough
Springfield,
Holyoke,
Ludlow
Rhode Island
ii
Rank
E/
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MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH
DIVISION OF HOSPITAL FACILITIES
Rules and Regulations Relative to Ambulances
FOREWORD
The Department of Public Health acting under the authority of General
Laws, Chapter 111, Section 8B, hereby prescribes and establishes the
following Rules and Regulations Relative to Ambulances.
These rules and regulations shall apply to all ambulances within the
Commonwealth used for the transportation of sick or injured persons, except
any such motor vehicles owned by, or operated under the direct control of the
Federal Government.
Following a public hearing on April 3, 1968, these rules and regulations
herein set forth were adopted by the Department on April 9, 1968, effective
April 10, 1968.
These Rules and Regulations Relative to Ambulances were filed with the
Secretary of State April 10, 1968.
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DIVISION OF HOSPITAL FACILITI!S
Rules and Regulations Relative to Ambulances
I. Definitions
A. "Ambulance" is defined as any aircraft, boat or motor vehicle, however named,
whether privately or publicly owned, which is specially designed, constructed and
equipped for the purpose of transporting patients. It shall not include a hearse.
B. "Patient" shall mean any individual who is sick or injured. An injured person
shall include a disabled person.
C. "Person" shall include any individual, firm, partnership, association, corporation,
trust, foundation, company or any group of individuals, however namd, concerned
with the operation of an ambulance service. "Person" shall also include any
governmental agency other than the Federal Government.
D. "Ambulance Service" shall mean regularly engaging, within the Commonwealth, in the
transportation by ambulance of the sick or injured.
E. A qualified attendant shall mean an individual at least 21 years of age, certified
as having comCpleted the standard and advanced American Red Crcns First Aid Course
or have equivalent training approved by theDivision of Hospital Facilities.
F. "Commonwealth" shall mean the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
G. "Department" shall mean the Massachusetts Department of Public Health.
H. "Division of Hospital Facilities" shall mean the Massachusetts Department of
Public Health, Division of Hospital Failities.
I. "Registered Motor Vehicle" shall mean a motor vehicle currently registered by the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Registry of Motor Vehicles.
j. "An Ambulance Certificate of Inspection" shall mean a "Certificate of Inspection"
issued by the Department of Public Health to an applicant for a period of one
year in accordance with the Rules and Regulations, prescribed and established
under the authority of General laws, Chapter 111, 8B.
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K. "Original Certificate" shall mean a certificate issued for an ambulance not
previously certified, or a certificate issued for an ambulance in which there
has been a change in ownership or location.
L. "Disinfection" shall mean any process, chemical or physical, by means of which
pathogenic agents or disease-producing microbes are destroyed.
M. "Sanitization" shall mean a process whereby organisms present on an object are
reduced in number to a level considered safe for human use.
N. "Sterilization" shall mean any process by means of which all forms of microbial
life are killed.
II. Ambulance Certificate of Inspection
A. No person, either as owner, agent or otherwise, shall operate, conduct, maintain
or profess by advertising or otherwise to operate, conduct and maintain a business
for transporting patients upon any way or place of the Comonwealth, unless he
holds a current Ambulance Certificate of Inspection for each ambulance issued
pursuant to these rules and regulations. Said Certificate of Inspection shall be
fremad crd coanspicuously posted in each ambulance and no official entry =-mde upon
an Ambulance Certificate of Inspection shall be defaced, removed or obliterated.
B. An Ambulance Certificate of Inspection shall not be required for a motor vehicle
which:
1. Is rendering assistance to certified ambulances in the case of a major
catastrophe or emergency.
2. Is operated from a location or headquarters outside the Commonwealth, and is
transporting patients to locations within the Commonwealth. However, no such
outside ambulance shall transport patients from one area to another within the
Commonwealth, unless there is compliance with these rules and regulations.
C. An Ambulance Certificate of Inspection shall be issued for a specific ambulance
and shall not be transferred to another ambulance.
2.
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D. Representatives of theDivision of Hospital Facilities are authorized to enter and
examine any ambulance, to determine if such vehicle is properly staffed, main-
tained and equipped in accordance with these rules and regulations. Any attempt
to prevent any such representative to enter and examine any such ambulance or
garage, or to examine records as required shall be punishable in accordance with
"XIV Penalty" of these Rules and Regulations.
III. Aplication for Ambulance Certificate of Inspection
A. Applications for an original or renewal Ambulance Certificate of Inspection shall
be made in writing upon forms provided by the Department and shall contain:
1. Name and address of the applicant and of the owner of the ambulance.
2. Trade or other name, if any, under which the applicant does business and/or
proposes to do business.
3. Training and experience of the applicant and attendants in the transportation
and care of patients.
4. Description of each ambulance, including the make, model, year of manufacture;
vehicle identification number; current Massachusetts registration number; and
the color, insignia, name, monogram or other distinguishing characteristics,
if any, to be used to designate applicant's ambulance.
5. Location of the place or places from which it is intended to operate.
6. Such information as is necessary for the Department of Public Health to carry
out its responsibilities under these rules and regulations.
IV. Change in Ownership
A. Upon change o ownership, an Ambulance Certificate of Inspection shall terminate
and the new owner shall be required to file an application for an Ambulance
Certificate of Inspection, in conformance with all the requirements for an
original or renewal Ambulance Certificate of Inspection, herein set forth.
3.
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B. When a registered or certified notice is received by mail by the Division of
Hospital Facilities that a change of ownership of an ambulance has occurred or a
new ambulance has been acquired, such notice shall have the effect' of an ambulance
certificate of inspection for a period not to exceed thirty days.
V. Certification Procedure
A. The Director of the Division of Hospital acilities upon receipt of an application
for an Ambulance Certificate of Inspection shall cause to be inspected, the
ambulance, equipment and premises designated in each application hereunder to
determine ccmpliance with the rules and regulations.
B. The Department shall issue an Ambulance Certificate of Inspection for a specified
ambulance to be valid for a period of one year.
VI. Revocation of Ambulance Certificate of Inspection
A. The Department may revoke an Ambulance Certificate of Inspection issued hereunder
for cause. Failure of a holder of an Ambulance Certificate of Inspection to compl:;
with the rules and regulations of the Department promulgated hereunder, shall be
sufficient ca.use for revocation, after a public hearing hold in accordance with
General laws, Chapter 30A.
VII. Return of Ambulance Certificate of Inspection
A. Bch Ambulance Certificate of Inspection shall be returned to the Division of
Hospital acilities immediately by registered or certified mail upon:
1. Expiration of certificate.
2. Revocation of certificate.
3. Change in ownership of ambulance.
4. Change of name of ambulance service.
5. Discontinuance of use of vehicle as an ambulance.
i.
VIII. Ambulance Equipment 146
A. Each ambulance and its equipment shall be maintained in a sanitary manner and in
good operating condition.
B. Each ambulance shall be quippped with the following:
1. Two-way radio communication system.
2. Recording Tachometer.
3. Siren.
4. Flashing red roof light.
5. Fire extinguisher (Tnderwriter's Iaboratory) approved.
6. Explosion proof flashlight.
C. Each ambulance shall be equipped with the following equipment or its equivalent
when approved by the Division of Hospital Facilities:
1. Hinged half-ring lower extremity splint with web straps for ankle hitch.
2. Two or more padded boards 4.1/2 feet long and 3 inches wide, and two or more
similar padded boards 3 feet long by 3 inches wide, of material comparable
to four-ply wood, for coaptation splinting of fracture of leg or thigh.
3. Two or more padded 15 inch by 3 inch wood or cardboard splints for fractures
of the forearm.
4. Short and long spine boards with accessories.
5. Oxygen tanks with regulators and single use disposable masks of assorted sizes.
6. Hand-operated bag-mask resuscitation unit with adult, child and infant size
masks, capable of being attached to oxygen supply.
7. Simple suction apparatus with catheter.
8. Mouth to mouth, two-way resuscitation airways for adults and children.
9. Oropharyngeal airways.
10. Mouth gags.
11. Universal dressing.
12. Sterile gauze pads.
13. 1, 2 and 3 inch adhesive tape.
5w
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14. Six inch by 5 yard soft roller type bandages.
15. Triangular bandages.
16. Safety pins, large size.
17. Bandage shears.
18. Collapsible stretcher with straps.
19. Two sandbags.
D. Linen and Patient Equipment
1. At least two pillows with removable washable protective covers.
2. A minimum of six individually packaged pillow cases, preferably disposable.
3. A minimum of six individually packaged sheets, preferably disposable.
4. Sufficient towels to protect the patient's head and face, as indicated.
5. A sufficient number of washable blankets in accordance with seasonal
requirements.
6. A sufficient supply of laundry bags, preferably disposable, including a
special color or suitable identification for precaution linen.
T. A sufficient supply of towels, tissues and ;aper bags.
8. Enesis basins, preferably disposable.
9. Sanitized wrapped bed-pan.
10. Sanitized wrapped urinal.
3. Storage Facilities
1. There shall be adequate storage facilities for:
a. Clean supplies and equipment.
b. Clean linen.
c. Soiled linen.
d. Waste.
6.
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A. Each ambulance shall contain equipment conforming with the rules and regulations
provided for herein and shall be:
1. Staffed at all times with a minimum of two qual.ified attendants, one of whcan
may be the driver.
2. Maintained in such a manner as to insure the health and safety of the patient.
3. Used exclusively for the purpose of transporting sick, injuried or disabled
persons.
B. hen not in service, an ambulance shall be protected in such a manner that it
does not become unsanitary.
X. Records
A. Records of service rendered shall be maintained and stored in a satisfactory
manner for a minimum. of two years.
B. Record content shall include the following:
1. Date and time of arrival to transport patient, time of arrival at destination.
2. Name, address, age and sex of patient.
3. Transported: From - - To - -
4. Nama of attendants.
5. First aid administered with date, time and signature of person administering
same.
C. Personnel Records
1. A personnel file shall be maintained for attendants and shall include their
qualifications and training.
D. Records required herein shall be available for inspection by representatives of
the Division of Hospital Facilities.
7.
XI. Personnel
A. Ambulance Attendants
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1. The ambulance attendants shall be well groomed, appropriately attired in
uniform, and shall practice good personal hygiehe, including handwashing.
XII. Sterilization, Sanitization and Disinfection
A. Equipment and supplies requiring sterilization shall be processed by methods
approved by the Division of Hospital Facilities.
B. Written policies for the routine disinfection of the interior of the ambulance,
and for the disinfection and sanitization of all equipment, unless disposable,
shall be established and enforced.
C. All equipment, unless disposable, shall be properly cleansed and sanitized
after each use.
D. When an ambulance has been used to transport a patient known to have a
communicable disease, the interior of the ambulance shall be disinfected
before the next patient is trancported.
XIII. Linen
A. Linen, unless disposable, shall be laundered after each use.
B. Disposable linens shall be discarded after each use.
C. Soiled linen, including disposable linen, shall be handled in such a manner as
to avoid contamination of equipment and personnel.
XIv. peealty
Whoever advertises, announces, establishes or maintains an ambulance and/or
ambulance service, as defined herein, without the required Ambulance Certificate of
Inspection, as set forth in these Rules and Regulations, or whoever being a holder
of an Ambulance Certificate of Inspection as required herein, violates any provision
of these Rules and Regulations as established by the Department in accordance with
General Laws, Chapter 111, Section 8B, shall be punished by a fine of not more than
$500.00 for any particular offense. A separate and distinct offense shall be deemed
to have been committed on every day during which the violation continues after
written notice thereof by the Department to the authority to whom the Ambulance
Certificate of Inspection was issued.
XV. Separability 150
If any section, subsection, sentence, clause, phrase or portion of these Rules
and Regulations is for any reason held invalid or unconstitutional by any court
of competent jurisdiction, such portion shall be deemed a separate, distinct and
independent provision and such holding shall not affedt the validity of the
remaining portions hereof.
XVI. An Emergency Situation
These 'ules and regulations shall not preclude the reasonable omission of any -
of the foregoing requirements when a law enforcement officer or a representative
of a fire department determines an emergency exists.
as9 -
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APPENDIX C: Basic Demographic Data for each Locality, by System Area*
LOCALITY
Auburn
Boyls ton
Brookfield
East Brookfield
Grafton
Leicester
Millbury
New Braintree
North Brookfield
Nor thboro
Nor thbridge
Paxton
Shrewsbury
Spencer
Sutton
Worcester
I. Worcester System
POPULATION
15,347
2,774
2,063
1,800
11,659
9,140
11,987
631
3,967
9,218
11,795
3,731
19,196
8,779
4,590
176,572
293,249
LAND AREA
15.70
15.84
15.68
9.89
22.83
22.70
15.84
20.76
21.11
18.47
17.33
14.87
20.78
33.15
32.48
37.16
334.59
DENSITY
976
175
132
182
511
403
757
30
188
499
681
251
924
265
141
4,752
875
152
Barre 3,825 44.30 86
Holden 12,564 35.50 354
Oakham 730 20.99 35
Princeton 1,681 35.39 47
Rutland 3,198 35.42 90
West Boylston 6,369 12.69 502
II. Holden System 28,367 184.29 154
Berlin 2,099 13.01 161
Bolton 1,905 19.93 96
Clinton 13,383 5.36 2,497
Lancaster 6,095 27.65 220
Sterling 4,247 30.52 139
III. Clinton System 27,729 96.47 288
Bellingham 13,967 18.55 753
Blackstone 6,566 10.97 599
Franklin 17,830 26.80 665
Hopedale 4,292 5.12 838
Medway 7,938 11.60 684
Mendon 2,524 17.73 142
Milford 19,352 14.79 1,308
Millville 1,764 4.92 359
Upton 3,484 21.65 161
Uxbridge 8,253 29.29 282
IV. Milford System 85,970 161.42 532
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Appendix C continued
Douglas 2,947 36.93 80
Dudley 8,087 21.07 384
Oxford 10,345 26.71 387
Webster 14,917 12.53 19190
V. Webs ter Sys tem 36,296 97.24 374
Charlton 4,654 42.86 109
Southbridge 17,057 20.38 837
Sturbridge 4,878 37.39 130
VI. Southbridge System 26,589 100.63 264
Brimfield 1,907 35.37 54
Hardwick 2,379 38.40 62
Holland 931 12.35 75
Monson 7,355 44.84 164
Palmer 11,680 31.93 372
Wales 852 16.21 53
Ware 8,187 34.85 235
Warren 3,633 27.50 132
West Brookfield 2,653 20.67 128
VII Palmer System 39,577 261.62 151
Athol 11,185 32.34 346
New Salem 474 45.04 11
Orange 6,104 35.03 174
Petersham 1,014 54.27 19
Phillipston 872 23.70 37
Appendix C continued
Royalston 809 41.99 19
Warwick 492 37.19 13
VIII. Athol System 20,950 269.56 78
Gardner 19,748 22.02 897
Hubbardston 1,437 40.34 36
Templeton 5,863 31.49 186
Winchendon 6,635 42.53 156
IX. Gardner System 33,683 136.38 247
Ashburnham 3,484 39.15 89
Ashby 2,274 23.66 96
Fitchburg 43,343 27.47 1,578
Leomins ter 32,939 28.81 1,143
Lunenburg 7,419 26.63 279
Westminster 4,273 35.64 120
X. Fitchburg System 93,732 181.36 518
Ayer 7,393 8.82 838
Groton 5,109 32.54 157
Pepperell 5,887 22.79 258
Shirley 4,909 15.81 310
Townsend 4,281 32.66 131
XI. Ayer System 27,579 112.62 245
369713,721 1,936.18
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Appendix D: Region II Ambulance Service, by Type of Coverage
LOCALITY NAME OF SERVICE
(1) No Organized Ambulance Service Within the Town
Brimfield Not Applicable
Holland Not Applicable
Hopedale Not Applicable
Hubbardston Not Applicable
Millville Not Applicable
New Braintree Not Applicable
New Salem Not Applicable
Phillipston Not Applicable
Royalston Not Applicable
Wales Not Applicable
Warwick Not Applicable
SPONSOR ORGANIZATION OR TYPE
Not Applicable
Not Applicable
Not Applicable
Not Applicable
Not Applicable
Not Applicable
Not Applicable
Not Applicable
Not Applicable
Not Applicable
Not Applicable
NO. OF VEHICLES
Not Applicable
Not Applicable
Not Applicable
Not Applicable
Not Applicable
Not Applicable
Not Applicable
Not Applicable
Not Applicable
Not Applicable
Not Applicable
I-A
L.,
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LOCALITY
(2) Unregulated
Ashburnham
Auburn
Boylston
Brookfield
Grafton
Holden
Leicester
Mendon
Millbury
Monson
Oakham
Paxton
Pepperell
Petersham.
Rutland
NAME OF SERVICE
Service Using Dual-Purpose Vehicles
Not Applicable
i" it
it .11
if
"o
i
i
"
"
"
SPONSOR ORGANIZATION OR TYPE NO. OF VEHICLES
Incomplete
"oPolice
I I
it
itPolice
Police
Police
i I I
"I
"
"
"t
Police
Fire
I, II
ii 11
II II
I, II
II II
I,
II
I,
It
I,
I,
It
It
It
I'
Police
Police
Data
",
It
It
if
It
"I
",
"I
"I
"I
"I
",
U1
a%
SPONSOR ORGANIZATION OR TYPE
Appendix D continued
LOCALITY
Shirley
Sutton
Templeton
Upton
Warren
Wes tmins ter
(3) Regulated Service
Ashby
Ayer
Barre
Bellingham
Berlin
Blackstone
Bolton
Charlton
Douglas
NAME OF SERVICE
Not Applicable
it 11
to
is
SPONSOR ORGANIZATION OR TYPE
II
I,
I,
'I
- Volunteer or On-Call
Ashby CD Ambulance
Ayer Fire Dept. Ambulance Assoc.
Barre Police Dept.
Town of Bellingham Fire Dept.
Berlin Emergency Rescue Squad
Blackstone Ambulance Assoc., Inc.
Town of Bolton Police Dept.
Charlton Ambulance Service, Inc.
Douglas Fire Dept.
Volunteer
Fire Department
Police Department
Fire Department
Volunteer
Volunteer
Police Department
Volunteer
Fire Department
NO. OF VEHICLES
Incomplete Data
'I
I,
II
At
if
if
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
J.
1
1-
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LOCALITY
Dudley
East Brookfield
Franklin
Groton
Hardwick *
Lunenburg
Medway
Northboro
Northbridge
North Brookfield
Orange
Oxford
Princeton
Spencer
Sterling
Sturbridge
i-a
NAME OF SERVICE
Dudley Fire Emergency
East Brookfield Fire Dept.
Town of Franklin Ambulance Servic
Groton Volunteer Fire Dept.
Emergency Rescue Squad
Lunenburg Fire Dept.
Police Dept.
Northboro Ambulance Assoc.
Northbridge Fire Ambulance Servic
North Brookfield Emergency Squad
Town of Orange Fire Dept.
Town of Oxford Police Dept.
Princeton Fire Dept.
SpencerRescue & Emergency Squad
Sterling Firefighters
Town of Sturbridge
SPONSOR ORGANIZATION OR TYPE
fire dept.
fire dept.
e fire dept.
volunteer
volunteer
fire dept.
police dept.
volunteer
e fire dept.
volunteer
fire dept.
police dept.
fire dept.
volunteer
volunteer
fire dept.
NO. OF VEHICLES
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
Appendix D continued
LOCALITY
Townsend
Uxbridge
Ware
Webster
West Boylston *
West Brookfield
(4) Regulated Service
Athol
Clinton
Fitchburg
Leominster
Shrewsbury *
Southbridge
Winchendon *
Worcester
SPONSOR ORGANIZATION OR
volunteer
volunteer
volunteer
volunteer
fire dept.
volunteer
TYPE NO. OF VEHICLES
1
1
1
2
NAME OF SERVICE
Townsend Police Association
Town of Uxbridge
Town of Ware
Webster Rescue & Ambulance
West Boylston Fire Ambulance
West Brookfield Rescue Squad
- Full-Time
Athol Police Dept.
Town of Clinton Police Dept.
City of Fitchburg Fire Dept.
City of Leominster Fire Dept.
Shrewsbury Police Dept.
Town of Southbridge Fire Dept.
Winchendon Police Dept.
City of Worcester Police Dept.
F"
U'
%0
police dept. 1
police dept. 1
fire dept. 1
fire dept. 2
police dept. 2
fire dept. 2
police dept. 1
police dept., 2
Appendix D continued
LOCALITY NAME OF SERVICE SPONSOR OR
(5) Regulated Service - Private
Gardner Wood's Ambulance Service
Lancaster R & R Ambulance Service
Milford Ruggerio Brothers Ambulance Service
Milford Ambulance Service
(6) Regulated Service - Hospital-Based
Palmer Wing Hospital Ambulance
Other Regulated Services Without Primary Emergency Responsibility
Fitchburg Montachusett Ambulance Service
Leomins ter Leomins ter Civil Defense
West Boylston Himmer Ambulance Service
Worcester Kane Ambulance Service
Worcester Scott McAvoy Ambulance Service
GANIZATION OR TYPE
private
private
private
Drivate
hospital
private
volunteer
private
private
private
NO. OF VEHICLES
2
2
1
2
2
3
*Licensure status with Department of Public Health is unresolved. 0
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Appendix E: Technical Appendix on Ambulance Allocation and Utilization. 1
Four measures are used to indicate the work load imposed by
various levels of demand on outreach resources: demand intensity,
utilization, probability of dispatch delay, and expected dispatch
delay.
1. Demand intensity is given by the equation:
DI = AR x ST
where DI equals demand intensity, AR equals arrival
rate of calls, and ST equals service time per call.
2. Utilization, U, is given by
U = DI
N
N being the number of provider units.
3. The probability of dispatch delay, P (d) is a complicated
equation:
N
P (d) = DI1 (N ) [_ D'(DI ) DI -1
N! (N-DI) i=o i! +(N-DI) N!
and refers to the likelihood that any one request for service,
assuming distribution of such requests is random over time,
will encounter a delay because all provider units are
occupied. More simply stated, P (d) is the average propor-
tion of all calls that will experience some delay.
4. The expected dispatch delay E(d) is given by
E (d) = ST (in minutes)
N-DI
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and refers to the average delay encountered by these
calls which are delayed.
These four parameters can be used to indicate the maximum rate of
utilization possible for a given service, which maximum varies according
to the number of vehicles, the demand levels, the time necessary to
service calls, and so forth.
Utilization may be increased by either reducing N (the number of
provider units) or increasing the demand intensity. Thus, the longer
it takes to provide service in each case, the higher the demand. Also,
if the frequency of use of the service increases (whether due to a
larger base population, higher rates of incidence, or increasing con-
sumer preference), the demand intensity increases.
As either of those factors change so as to increase utiliza-
tion, the probability of dispatch delay and the expected dispatch delay
begin to increase. At a certain point, the likelihood of delay and/
or the length of the average delay exceed tolerable levels, which
establishes a maximum utilization. No decision rules exist for set-
ting levels of tolerance. In most cases, they are set by the limits on
economic resources available for ambulance service. For our purposes
here, the more important measure is the P (d). The P (d) is more
sensitive to adjustments in the service provided, and if it is small,
the size of some expected delay is unimportant because almost no one
will encounter it. Both probability of delay and the expected delay
increase rapidly with small increases in utilization when the number
of provider units is small (i.e., under 3).
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The number of vehicles and crew teams available at present in
Central Massachusetts is so large that both figures are minimal for most
of the region--despite the small organizational scale. Hence, a maximum
tolerance level for the probability of delay would have to be set low,
say, under five percent. Because distances in the region make service
time and therefore expected delays relatively large, the probability
of dispatch delay must be small so that delays seldom occur.
Increasing Utilization
Now, if the objective is to maximize utilization of ambulances,
either the total demand must increase or the number of vehicles de-
crease. However, in either case, we do not want to exceed present
response time levels. Response time is made up of three parts,
mobilization time, dispatch delay, and travel time, as given below
dispatch mobilization travel
delay time time
call arrives ambulance departs arrival at scene
Mobilization time is the period between the arrival of the call and the
moment at which a crew and the ambulance are ready. If the likelihood
of dispatch delay is very small, response time essentially consists of
the time to get the crew and vehicle ready and the travel time to the
scene. Assuming mobilization time is relatively constant, the maximum
response time and be converted into a measure of distance to the peri-
phery of the service area.
Further, if present maximum response times must not be exceeded,
then the size of the service area--and, therefore the population served
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and the resulting demand for service--can only be increased. if mobili-
zation time can be reduced, assuming travel times per mile remain un-
changed. Such might occur, for example, with a shift from on-call to
on-duty staffing of ambulances.
The number of vehicles can be reduced only if fewer vehicles can
be distributed in a way that does not result in longer maximum response
times than at present or in exceeding tolerable levels of delay. That
would be possible, for example, if at one location the number of vehi-
cles was excessive.
Illustrative Assumptions
In order. to illustrate the effects of increasing utilization
in the context of the case, certain simplifying assumptions have to be
made.
1. Calls arrive at a rate of 35 per 1000 population per year.
2. Mean service time per call is one hour.
3. Average mobilization time is three minutes for on-duty
services and eight minutes for on-call services.
2
4. Service areas are essentially circular because of
basically a radial street pattern from the town
center.
5. Travel speeds vary, with increasing density, from two to
three minutes per mile as follows:
density (persons per
square mile) 50 100 300 500 700 1000
travel time per mile 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.65 3.0
6. The maximum travel time is twelve minutes. Derivation: the
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radius of the average service area--which is about
26 square miles in size--of present regulated emergency
vehicles is approximately 2.9 miles. At an average
density of 520, the travel time is seven minutes.
Since most services are presently on-call and since
higher utilization would be achieved by full-time on-
duty personnel, we will consider the effects of having
full-time crews. Putting crews on-duty full-time adds
five minutes to the maximum travel time allowable
since, from #3 above, the same amount is saved in mobili-
zation. Thus, twelve minutes travel time indicates the
maximum radius of a service area. That can be plotted
for increasing densities and is shown in Figure E-.. The
population of various densities within maximum service
areas defined thereby are listed in Table E-1.
7. Finally, the population necessary to support a full-time ser-
vice is assumed to be 25,000 with a demand intensity of 0.1.
The distance to the perimeter of a service area of the size
necessary to contain that population can be computed and
plotted for increasing population densities. See Figure
E-l. The point of intersection of the two curves (at about
285 persons per square mile and about 5.5 miles maximum
distance) defines the size of the minumum service area which
will support an on-duty ambulance service at present response
times.
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A number of aspects presented here are derived from work done
by Keith A. Stevenson of M.I.T. in a-technical report titled Operational
Aspects of Emergency Ambulance Services (M.I.T., May 1971). However,
those aspects are stated less rigorously here than he presents them.
A set of service areas then has some overlaps or gaps between
areas, but these are not important here.
3 Stevenson assumes a rectangular service area with a grid street
system, which in some ways is more correct if one is concerned, as he
is, with the expected travel times. Here we are only interested in
travel times to define the size of service areas, for which purpose the
radial assumption is more useful.
Table E-1: Maximum Service Areas and Populations at Various
Densities, given a set maximum travel time of 12.0 minutes
(2)
TIME PER MILE
. (3)
MAX. RADIUS
(4) (5)
MAX. AREA POPUJLATION
(6)
CALLS/YEAR
2.0 min.
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.65
3.0
6.0 miles
i
i
i
i
i
5.7
5.5
5.2
4.5
4.0
i
i
i
i"
i"
113 sq. mi. 5,650
102 " " 10,200
95 i " 28,500
85 " " 42,500
63 " " 47,800
50 " " 50,000
(3)= 12.0/(2)
2(4= (3)2
(5Y (4)x 1
(6)=(5)x 35/1000
minutes
miles = minutes/mile
square miles = x (miles)2
population = persons/miles2 x miles2
calls/year = population x calls per year per population
(1)
DENSITY
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50
100
300
500
750
1000
200
360
1000
1490
1670
1750
MAX. AREA POPULATIOb
*~0.
40-
4t .w . .$ - -.- - LE- -
7T.- -
- a . -
*.I . i ~ * ~ .~II -
I
.
IU
S- 00
i I I I 4
Appendix F: From Worcester Telegram, November 10, 1971.
Dudley Officer
Claims Delay
By Ambulance
By HELDON D. BARTH
Telegram Webster Bureau
DUDLEY - Operation of the
D u d I e y ambulance service
,came under criticism yesterday
after an industrial accident that
severed the left arm of a 41-
year-old Webster man at Stt.
vens Linen Co.,
Patrolman Philip J. Ryznal
charged that it took 30 minutes
for the ambulance to respond
when Daniel F. MacQuarrie, 41,
of Myrtle Ave.. Webster, had
his arm severed three inches
from the shoulder.
MacQuarrie was taken by
Ryznal in a police cruiser to
H u b b a r d Regional Hospital,
Webster, where he is listed. in
satisfactory condition in the in-
tensive care unit.
Ryznal said an ambulance
was summoned about 4:30 a.m..
m i n u t e s after MacQuarrie's
1arni became caught in* a card-
lng machine. When Ryznal
saw that MacQuarrie needed
immediate attention, he said he
.t took him to the hospital in the.
cruiser.
Ryznal was asked by a doctor
at the hospital to try to bring
back MacQuarrie's arm. When
Ryzna returned to the- mill
about -5 amthe ambulance was
Just arriving, he said.
"1m not blaming the kids in
the ambulance," Ryznal said.
i "But they ought to have some-
one in that fire station at night,
even if they're sleeping, to
handle calls like this.
"We were fortunate this time,
thanks to two women at the mill
who helped save this.man's life,
but I'd hate to see someone die
in an accident because we can't
get an ambulance in time.
"The people pay for this am-
bulance service, and they're en-
titled to a good one."
Fire Chief Roger D. St. Ger-
main would not comment; ex-
cept to say that there had never
been discussion about a full-
time ambulance service.
Asked if he felt the town
needed full-time personnel on
ambulance duty, he replied:
"We don't think so."
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